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Preface

This thesis seeks to determine how television has changed as a communication
medium for presidents over the past half century. An evaluation of the evolving ways
presidents use television to communicate with and to build support from the American
people has been conducted. Presidential communication strategies have been identified
by drawing primarily from primary sources wrinen by presidents and White House staff.
Television technology and the television audience have changed over the years.
Presidents have taken a more pro-active, aggressive role in their efforts to harness
television for their own purposes. Why have these changes occurred? What impact have
these changes had on presidential leadership capabilities? What benefits and drawbacks
do they have for presidents trying to communicate with the American people? And
finally, what will the presidential strategy for effective political communication be in the
future?
I am grateful to my thesis advisor, Professor G. Calvin Mackenzie for his
continuous guidance and valuable insight. I would also like to thank Mr. Ronald Nessen,

Mr. Dan Harris, Mr. Stephen Hess, and Mr. Thomas Giarrosso for their willingness to
spend time in conversation with me about this subject of presidential use of television. I
am also grateful

to

Professor Samuel KerneII for providing me with data from Nielsen

Media Research on presidential viewing audiences and to the library staff at Colby
College. the GAR Library, and the John F. Kennedy Library and Museum. Finally, I
would like to thank Mr. James Teeters for his "technical support" and most importantly

my family and friends for their unconditional support.
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Chapter 1
Television: the Evolving Medium

On April 30, 1939, RCA President David Sarnoff made a historic telecast from
the New York World's Fair and stated,
"Now we add radio sight to sound .. .It is with a feeling of humbleness that I come
to this moment of announcing the binh in this country of a new an so important in its
implications that it is bound to affect all society. It is an art which shines like a torch of
hope in a troubled world. It is a creative force which we must learn to utilize for the
benefit of all mankind."l
The very next day, television sets went on sale to the public. From that day on, television
would have a profound impact upon American culture.

Altempting the "impossible"

The invention of television was a cooperative effon by a number of geniuses; yet,
Philo Farnsworth stands out among these inventors as the true father of television. At the
age of thineen, Farnsworth began spending hours in his attic working on his dream of
developing the first electronic television picture. Yet many people were doubtful that
Farnsworth's dream would actually become a reality. Pem Farnsworth, Philo's wife,
stated, "Very few people thought that Phil could do it. He spoke to the heads of the
electrical departments at Berkeley and Stanford. Both gave him the advice ... 'You are
attempting the impossible.' .. 2
Yet by 1927, when Farnsworth was only twenty-one years old, his seemingly
"impossible" dream became a sensational reality. Farnswonh waited to perfect his
picture and finally showed his invention to his backers in 1928. During Farnswonh's
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years of work, the backers would always taunt him and ask when they were going to "see
some money in the gadget." On the day Farnsworth presented his electronic picture to
the backers, they once again asked him, "Farnsworth. when are we going to see some
money in this gadget?" Without a word, Farnsworth put in a slide, and a picture of a
dollar sign appeared on the television screen before the backers' eyes.'3 This dollar sign
was just a hint at the multi-billion dollar enterprise that would unfold in the following
years.

Emergence ofrhe television indusrry

RCA President David Samoffs excitement for television represented the high
hopes of everyone involved in the television industry. Yet the initial public response to
the sale of television did not reach expectations when televisions went on sale in April of
1939. The high price for a set and the loorning prospect of World War IT had a

detrimental impact on the new medium. RCA's TRK-12 went on sale for $600 (about
$7,000 today) when the average income for Americans was only $1.906 per year.
Although the cost was later reduced to $395 (about $4,500 today), the sales were still not
impressive; only 7,000 television sets were sold between 1939 to 1941. And when the
United Slates entered the war, television was put on hold:'

In the years from 1942 to 1945. all television production was banned. s Instead of
producing television sets, electronic companies began producing military supplies. Over
550 electronic companies. including General Electric, Bell Labs, and RCA, all played a

Jeff Kisseloff, The Box: An Oral HislOry of Television (New York: Viking. 1995), p. 5l.
Kisseloff. p.2?
3 Kisseloff. p. 27.
~ www.tvhistory.tv.
I
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3
role in the war effort. Although limited broadcasting was allowed to continue, a lack of
employees forced many of the stations to close, leaving only DuMont on the air. 6 Once
the war ended, the television industry was slow to revive. Even by 1947, there were only
7, 514 televisions operating in the major city of Chicago. The average daily viewing
audience in the fall of 1947 was less than 96,000 viewers. 7 Yet after 1947, the industry
began to gain momentum. Metal antennas began to appear on the rooftops of homes, and
according to television historian Jeff Kisseloff, the RCA service truck driver "generally
received the same heany welcome that the local hero got upon his safe return from
overseas." "Television had finaJly arrived," Kisseloff declares, "and the life in the home,
around the country and around the world was about to be changed forever. ,,8
By the 1950s, the industry was booming; television was becoming more accepted
and more affordable. In 1948, there were only 350,000 sets in operation around the
country, and 27 different stations in 18 cities were in operation. An average of 3.47
people watched television each night per television set, and of the 42 hours per week
available for viewing, owners watched an average of 17 hours. 9 Yet, according to Figure
1.1, by 1950 there were 3,880,000 setS in American homes, and by 1963 the number of
sets exploded to 50,300,000. As Figure 1.2 reveals, the number of televisions quickly
plateaued at near-saturation, and today approximately 98% of American homes have at
least one television.

Figure 1.1 goes here
Figure 1.2 goes here

www.tvhistory.tv.
Kisseloff, p.93.
7 Kisseloff, p.33.
B Kisseloff, p. 120.
S
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Figure 1.1: Number of Televisions in America 1950-1963
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Figure 1.2: Percent of Households with Television Sets 1950-2000
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Figure 1.1 Number of Televisions in America 1950-1963
Year
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963

Number of TV Households
3,880,000
10,320,000
15,300,000
20,400,000
26.000,000
30,700.000
34,900,000
38,900,000
41,920,000
43,950,000
45,750,000
47,200,000
48.855,000
50.300,000

Source: Cobbett. Steinberg. TV Facts. New York: Facts on File, Inc.• 1985. P.86.

Figure 1.2. Percent of Households with Television Sets, 1950-2000
Year
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000

% of total households

10
67
87
94
96
97

98
98
98
98
98

Source: "Television Set Ownership." www.tvhislOry.tv

Network domination

By 1950, television was beginning to get a fi rm foothold in American culture and
the networks began to dominate this new multi-billion dollar industry. Even by the end

9 www.tvhistOTy.t V .
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of 1949.92 of the 98 operating stations were network affiliated. Eleven years later, more
than 96% of the 515 operating stations were network affi liated. lo The three major
networks. National Broadcasting Company (NBC), Columbia Broadcasting System
(CBS), and American Broadcasting Company (ABC) took control of television by
pursuing highly efficient practices and by using the ratings as a guide to their
programming, II With the help and credibility of itS parent company RCA, NBC became
the new network leader. Frank White served as the network's president in the 19505, but
the driving force behind the success of NBC was chairman of the board David Sarnoff.
Because of Sarnoffs leadership and expertise, NBC became known as the "entertainment
champion of the first half of the 1950s."12
Striving to surpass NBC was rival network CBS and its president Frank Stanton
and its chairman of the board William Paley. The second-place status of CBS did not last
long due to the network's ability to attract popular stars and to create hit programs.
Chainnan Paley stated, "In 1955 CBS became by far the leading network in
popularity ... Being the most popular network was a nice position to be in, and though we
could hardly expect to stay there unc:listurbed forever, we would always try."/3 And,
Paley attempted and tried to sustain this slatus by recruiting stars regardless of the cost.
He became known for his "raids" on NBC's talent and stopped at nothing to please his
growing audience. 14
ABC was the struggling third network. Although a merger with United
Paramount Theaters in 1951 saved ABC, it nonetheless had difficulty competing with the

J. Fred MacDonald, One Natiofl Under Television (New York: Pantheon Books, 1990), p.65.
MacDonald, p. 61.
12 MacDooald, p.65.
J) William S. Paley. As It Happened: A Memoir (Garden City: Doubleday & Company. Inc., 1979). p.242.
10
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6
network giants of NBC and CBS. Even by 1954, only 40 of the 354 operating U.S.
stations were affiliated with ABC, compared to the 164 stations affiliated with NBC and
the 113 stations affiliated with CBS. Furthermore, ABC accounted for only 11 % of the
industry total, whereas NBC and CBS accounted for 39% and 46% respectively. Yet
ABC was able to survive through these early years and grow to become a strong
competi tor. J 5
Unfortunately, DuMont was a smaJler network that could not survive among
NBC, CBS, and ABC. The network lacked program development strategies and the
ability to attract popular entertainers. Even if DuMont had the luck to attract a star, NBC
or CBS would simply outbid DuMont to bring the star to their networks. 16
The three network giants easily crushed local stations that were not affiliated with
any of them, and their power strengthened into the 19605. The affiliation with a network
was more "glamorous and attractive" and most stations opted for popular network
programs as opposed to local programming. I? Chairman E. William Henry of the Federal
Communications Commission stated in the rnid-1960s that the NBC, CBS, and ABC
dominated "virtually afl programming which the American public sees during their prime
evening hours," He went on to state that in a report conducted by the FCC Office of
Network Study, it was concluded that the three networks dominated 75% of prime time
programming in 1957. By 1965, this percentage grew to 93%, leaving just 7% of prime
time scheduling coming from independent stations. 18 Furthermore, Henry revealed that
the 1964 gross revenues of the three networks were $ 929 million. He stated, ''This

MacDonald. p.
MacDonald. p.
16 MacDonald. p.
17 MacDonald. p.
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7
amounted to 52 percent of the television broadcast total - more than all of the nation's
560 other television stations put together!"19
The networks' profits grew rapidly in the 1970s. There were 434 half-hour
weekly network programs in 1960, and by 1976 this number grew to 540 half hour
programs. In 1976,59 percent of U.S. households were tuned into one of the three
networks. 20 And, during the 1978-80 season, 91 % of Americans watching television
during prime time were tuned into NBC, CBS, or ABC. 21 With such complete dominance
by all three networks, even the network making the smallest profits was still making

millions of dollars.
Despite the prosperous environment for all, an intense rivalry continued to exist
among the three networks, and this domination and rivalry aroused much debate. In
1970, FCC Commissioner Nicholas Johnson spoke of the "failure of television," Norman
Lear described network television rivalry as "the most destructive force in television
today," President of Universal Television Frank Pierce stated that "if the heavy emphasis
on ratings" and the desire "to acquire greater and greater profits" were diminished, the
networks might "feel a little more free to put on something they thought was good, ,,2:2
Despite this criticism, NBC, CBS, and ABC continued to flourish. The networks'
remarkable ability to understand, to take advantage of, and to even mold audience
preference was the key to their amazing success. 23

E. William Henry. "The 50-50 Rule," Television Qunnerly. Fall 1965. p. 8.
Henry. p. 10.
20 Nielsen Media Research.
21 MacDonald. p. 200.
n Neilllickey, "the Changing Shape afTY:' TV Guide. April 22, J978, p. 9-10; see follow up articles.
i..llli1. April 29. 1972. and May 6. 1972.
!~ MacDonal'd. p. 203.
16

19

8
Yet the prosperity of the networks could not last forever. Viewers began to
become dissatisfied with the networks by the late 19705. IV Guide reported in 1979 that
44% of Americans were unhappy with network programming. This dissatisfaction can be
attributed to the lack of variety among programming. IV Guide writer Myles Callum
stated that a "single audience" did not exist, but that "there is only a diverse, demanding,
fascinating galaxy of demographic groups and subgroups, in short, many audiences, each
with its own profile, passions, and peeves." The American people had been subjected to
"homogenized programming" for the past thirty years and were now growing restless and
looking for a change.:U
Growing demands for more diverse prog:ra.rnmjng. coupled with the emergence of
some promising new technologies, posed profound challenges to the networks in the
1980s. J. Fred MacDonald, a professor of history at Northeastern lllinois University,
states, "At exactly the moment American video was realizing its greatest financial
achievements and weathering its most intense and broad-based criticism, it was rapidly

I
I

loosing control over its future." The technological advancements began to erode the
network audience in the 1970s, and by the 1990s "network television was well beyond its
prime and unable to maintain its dominating role in the new television order." ~

Technology poses as a threat to the networks

I
I
I
I
I

Color television technology was the one technological advancement that did not
have a negative effect upon the network's domination. After much debate, the FCC
allowed for the adoption of color technology on December 17, 1953, and stations began

2.l

II

Myles CaJlum, "E:xclusive Poll: What Viewers Think About TV," TV Guide, May 12, 1979, p. 6-12.
MacDonald. p. 218.
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9
to make the transition from black and white to color. By 1957. 106 of the 108 stations in
the top 40 cities had adopted color capabilities. Yet color programming was slow to gain
popularity. By 1965. CBS had only 800 hours of color programming for the entire year.
and ABC had only 600 hours. Manufacturers were also reluctant to embrace the new
color technology because the market for black and white television was still so profitable;
therefore, color television prices remained high.26 As indicated in Figure 1.3, only 3.1 %
of households had a color television in 1964. But color sales began to increase in the late

19605. By 1972.52.6% of homes had color televisions. Today, over 95% of all
American households have a color television. Z7

Figure 1.3 goes here
Figure 1.3: Percent of TV Households with a Color Set 1964-1978
Year

% of TV Households with Color TV

1964
1966
1968
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978

3.1
9.6
24.2
39.3
45.2
52.6
60.1
67.3
70.8
74.0
77.0
78.0

Source: Cobbett, Steinberg. IV Facts. New York: Facts on File, Inc .• 1985. P.87
After analyzing the effects of television technology. the development of color
receivers seemed to be the only new technology that did not have a detriment.a1 effect

26

27

Encyclopedia of Te1evision. p. 396.
Encyclopedia of Television , p. 396.
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Figure 1.3: Percent of TV Households with a Color Set 1964-1978
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10
upon the network domination. The invention of the video cassette recorder (VCR) was
the Erst invention to pose as a threat to network domination. The enormous popularity of
television created a demand among the public for a way to record favorite programs.
Although Sony developed a machine to do this in 1975, the Betamax, a year later JVC
introduced the VHS machine that was able to caprore the home markel. 2S In 1982, only
4% of homes contained a videocassene recorder; yet as Figure 1. 4 indicates, this
percentage increased to 66% by 1990. Today, 85 % of television households own a VCR.
In 1988, Nielsen Media Research, a company founded in 1923 by Arthur C.
Nielsen Sf. in order to acquire information about television usage and audience
preference, revealed that the average household made 14.1 VCR recordings and watched
16.9 recorclings each month. In a typical week, households taped for 179 minutes and
watched for 296 minutes. Furthermore, the average household rented 2.3 videos per
month and 41 % of households had purchased a video within the last twelve months. 29
Viewers could finally watch a program whenever they wished.
Despite these new opporrunities for the television audience, many people in the
television industry were not as enthusiastic. Instead of tuning into a prime time network
program, viewers were now choosing to watch their favorite pre-recorded progTams.
Furthermore, cutting out commercials while recording a program, a behavior known as
"zapping", created many problems for advertisers. In 1984, a Nielsen study discovered
that 5% of the total commercial audience was lost due to zapping. General Foods
claimed a loss of $1 million in advertising due to the audience zapping commercials
while recording. In 1985, VCRs existed in 14% of homes and 44% people admined to

!!
29

Encyclopedin oJ Television, p. 1761.
MacDonald, p. 223.

•
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zapping out commercials. 30 It is clear lhat the advent of the VCR brought about dire
consequences for NBC, ABC, and CBS,

Figure 1.4 goes here
Figure 1.4: Percent of Television Households Owning a VCR
Year
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000

1950~2000

% Owning VCR

14

66
79
85

Source: "Television Set Ownership." www.tvhistory.tv
The remote control was another technological advance that altered the use of
television in America. Now Americans could use the remote to jump from channel to
channel, an activity known as "zipping," "grazing," or "surfing," in order to watch more
than one program at a time and in order to avoid commercials. 31 It was not until the 19805
that the "clicker" became a household "necessity," and its popularity has grown ever
since. Figure 1.5 indicates that in 1985 only 29% of television households had a remote;
in ten years, that number grew to 91 %. A survey conducted in 1996 revealed that remotes
increased the amount of channel changing by 70%. Furthermore, 5-20% of commercials
are not watched due to the changing of channels. 32 With the remote in hand, the American

3D

Richard Butsch, Tile Making of Amen'can Audieru:es (Cambridge: Cambridge Unjversiry Press. 2(00).

p.273.
31

MacDonald. p. 223.

32

Butsch, p. 275.
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viewer was no longer a captive audience of the networks or of advenisers; viewers had
acquired the power to surf from station to station.

Figure 1.5 goes here
Figure 1.5. Percentage of TV Households with a Remote Control Device 1950-2000
Year
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995

2000

% of TV households with Remote

29
77
91

95

Source: "Television Set Ownership." www.tvrustory.tv
VCRs and remote controls many have had a negative impact, but cable television
was the new technology that networks feared most and rightly so. The networks spent
the first half of the 19605 fighting the legalization of the cable industry in an effort to
maintain the network audience that they feared would be lost to new cable prog:ram.rrung.
In 1966, however, the Supreme Court upheld the emergence of cable in Southwestern

Cable Company v. FCC. The fear of cable diluting the networks' audience was soon
realized. In 1964, only 8% of homes could receive 9 or more channels, yet this
percentage rose to 71 % by 1987, As indicated in Figure 1.6, only 17% of households
were cable subscribers in 1978, and 59% were subscribers by 1991.

Figure 1.6 goes here
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Figure 1.4: Percent of TV Households Owning a VCR 1950-2000
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Figure 1.5: Percent of TV Households with a Remote Control Device 1950-2000
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Figure 1.6: Percent of TV Households with Cable 1969·1998
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Figure 1.6. Percentage of TV Households with Cable 1969-1998
Year

% TV Households with Cable

1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979

6
8
9
9
11
13

13
15
17
17

19

1980

20

1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989

25
30

43
46
48
49
53

1990
1991

56
59

1992

60

34
39

1993

61

1994
1995

62
64

1996
1997
1998

65

67
68

Source: Nielsen Media Research.
This increase in the access to cable television caused a downward spiral in
network viewing. The increased program cancellation rates among the three networks
during this time illustrates the networks' desperate efforts to find programs that would
keep their audiences. During the years from 1982 to 1989, an average of 47 shows were

14
cancelled each year. 33 Figure 1.7 illustrates that in 1979,57% of U.S. households were
tuned into one of the three networks. But by 1989, this percentage had decreased to only

38%.3A
By 1988, the networks admirred to their losing barrIe against the cable industry.
Thomas S. Murphy, the chairman of Capital Cities/ABC, stated, "All three networks are
deeply affected by a significant and pennanent erosion of audience ...Network television,
in short. is now a mature business, one which can no longer simply assume continued
growth or expansion. ,,35
The introduction of digital cable diluted the network audience even funher. This
19905 technology allowed loday's many household viewers to receive over 500 different
channels. And the introduction of satellite dishes allowed Americans living in more rural
areas to still be able to access cable programming. The new technologies of VCR,
remote control, and cable gave American viewers an increasing array of television
choices. The emergence of these new technologies caused the American auctience to
become much more complex, differentiated, and difficult to reach.

Figure 1.7 goes here
Figure 1.7: Percentage of Three-Network Primetime Sbare 1969-1998
Year
1969
1970

3 Network Primetime Share (%)
56
56

1971

57

1972

56

1973

58

1974
1975

57
56

MacDonald, p. 230.
Nielsen Media Research.
JS MacDonald. p. 243.
)3
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1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985

1986
1987

1988
1989
1990

1991
1992

1993
1994
1995
1996
1997

1998

59
58
58
57
55
53
51
51

49
45

48
43
42
38
38

38
37
37
35
32
29
29
29

Source: Nielsen Media Research.

Evolution ofthe television audience
Not only has the television industry evolved since the its inception in 1939, but
the television audience has evolved as well. In the summer of 1945, before television use
had exploded among the public, Televisor magazine conducted a survey and asked New

I

Yorkers about their thoughts on the new industry. One man stated, "It will be a rather
wonderful thing. A little theater in every home. It will be a new industry." This man's
prediction proved to be absolutely true. 36
Those "pioneer families" who did purchase a television in 1939 started behavioral
patterns that would repeat themselves for generations to come. Families rearranged their
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Figure 1.7: Percent of TV Households Tuned into One of the Three Major
Networks during Prime Time (Netshare) 1969·1998
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eating and sleeping habits in order to be able to watch the few hours of programming that
were available to them. The evening hours that were once designated for family time,
were suddenly designated for television time. n Richard Butsch, professor of sociology at
Rider College in New Jersey, states that the television "moved immediately into the
living room, becoming the new hearth around which the family galhered."38
Yet the early household audience did not simply consist of family members;
pioneer families made many "new friends" with the purchase of their television. A 1947

I

survey conducted in Los Angeles found that the average size of a family who purchased a

•I

television was 3.6, but the average viewing audience in these same homes was 5 people. 39

I

I

This group viewing continued well into the 1950s. In 1951. comedian Paul Ritts revealed
his experience as a television owner. He stated, "Having a television set, one
automatically becomes the proprietor of a free theatre, free snack bar and public lounge.
Nobody in the neighborhood is just a casual acquaintance. They are all friends - the 'just
thought-I'd-drop-in' variety. People who merely nodded to me on the street before now
made a point to wave cheerily and shout, 'Hello neighbor!'

11.10

Only as televisions

became more reasonably priced and more households were able to afford one of their

I

own, did this behavior of "communal viewing" diminish. 41

I
I
I.
I
I
I

37.

36

Marian Thomas, "What the 'Man-On-the-SITeet' Thinks of Television!" Televiser, Summer 1945. p. 17,

Kisseloff. p.120.
Butsch, p. 235.
:;9 Butsch, p. 235.
.j() Paul Ritts. The 7V Jeebies (philadelphia: John C. Winsron. 1951). p. 96.
JI Butsch. p. 242.
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Television and the News
In its early decades, and even now, television was and is a medium dominated by

light fare: comedy, game shows, variety entertainment, and spons. In April of 1952,
42

42.7% of all network television programs were comedies. The American audience has
always looked to television as a way to be entertained. Figure 1.8 indicates the
popularity of the different types of programming offered to viewers in 1970 when the
networks were in their heyday. The percentages indicated the amount of time an
audience member watched a certain type of program when he or she watched television.
Movies ranked highest and were watched 76% of the time, whereas the news was ranked
last and was watched 55.3% of the time. Yet the audience's relative non-reliance upon
television as a source of information would change over the years.

Figure 1.8 goes here
Figure 1.8. Favorite Types of Programming in 1970
~
Movies
Children's
Suspense
Religious
Family
Game Show
Talk Show
Melodrama
Sports
News

% Time Watched when Television is On
76
71.4
68.1
66.7
66.4
65.9
63.7
59.3
58.7
55.2

Source: Cobbett, Steinberg. IV Facts. New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1985. P.85.
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MacDonald. p. 72.
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Figure 1.8: Favorite Types of Programming among American Viewers in 1970
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According to an audience survey in 1960, viewers did not rely upon television as
their primary news source. The administrator of the survey Gary A. Steiner stated that
the typical audience member "would like TV to be more informative and educational but
certainly not at the expense of entertainment." He further noted, "Aside from the day's
news and weather- which he watches regularly- he rarely uses the set as a deliberate
source of information, and he is extremely unlikely to tum on serious and informative
public affairs presentations, even if he is watching while they are on the air."J3
By the late 19605, however, Americans had come to rely upon television as their
primary

sour~e

of information. Although the ratings for news programs did not compare

to the ratings for prime time programming, the networks responded to viewers' new
reliance upon television as an information source. NBC and CBS hired increased
numbers of news personnel to cover local and national events, and also began to create
more documentaries. By 1967. all three networks had doubled the length of their nightly
newscasts from 15 to 30 minutes. 44 A poll conducted in 1971 revealed that 60% of
Americans preferred television to newspapers as the source of "most of their news. ,,45
Today, access to news information on television has expanded even more. Multiple
newscasts are aired throughout the night, and entire networks, such as CNN and MSNBC.
are dedicated to the delivery of news to the American people.

Gary A. Steiner. The People Look at Television: A Sludy of Audienu Arritudes (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1963), p. 228-229.
~ MacDonald. p. J 54.
•5 MacDonald. p. 154.
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Conclusion

In today's contemporary television audience, 98.2% of U.S. households own at
least one television. Of these homes, 99% own a second television, 35% have a third
television, and 41 % own four or more television sets. 85% of American homes with a
television own a VCR, 68% receive basic cable, and 32% subscribe to premium cable.
And, loday's typical American watches an average of 28 hours and 13 minutes of
television each week. J6 Americans rely upon television as their main source of news, but
also as a source of entertainment. With today's television options, viewers are offered
hundreds of different channels making today's audience is much more complex,
differentiated, and difficult to reach than it was in the early days when television was
simply dominated by three networks.
Television has been evolving since its inception in 1939. Its usefulness as a mass
communication tool is extremely powerful; yet each new technological advancement has
altered the way in which television is used and is viewed. For American presidents
seeking to use television to their own political advantage, the powerful medium has been
a constantly moving target.

46
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Chapter 2
Presidents and Television: The Early Days

Introduction
In his "Memo to President [George H. W.] Bush: How to Use TV-and Keep from
Being Abused by It," former President Richard Nixon warned, "Of all the institutions
arrayed with and against a President, none controls his fate more than television. Unless
a President learns how to harness its power, his Administration is in trouble from the very
beginning."l Nixon, like all the other presidents in the second half of the twentieth
century had learned, sometimes painfully, the true power of television.
The President's ability to communicate with the American people has evolved
over the years. Nearly a century and a half ago, Abraham Lincoln refused to speak about
the approaching civil war, and the members of the audience applauded his decision. 2 But,
at the beginning of the 20lb century, President Theodore Roosevelt took a different view,
recogniz.ing the value of the presidency as a communicating tool. He called the office of
the presidency a "bully pulpit," because the position allowed him to communicate his
beliefs to the American people-and to be heard. This, of course, was before radio or
television were even invented, and the emergence of these communication venues made
the presidential pulpit even more "bully."

3

In his book Presidential Power, Richard Neustadt emphasized that the president's

I

prestige among the public has an integral impact on the president's ability to implement
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policy and to govern successfully. Although his book was written over 40 years ago, its
message still resonates in today's contemporary political environment. If used
efficiently, television can become the president's tool to build the popular support needed
for an effective administration. 4 Today, presidents communicate constantly with the
people; Americans are inundated with the image of the president on television. Analysts
Newton N. Minow, John Bartlow Martin, and Lee Mitchell state in their book

Presidential Television, "No mighty king, no ambitious emperor, no pope, or prophet
ever dreamt of such an awesome pulpit, so potent a magic wand. "S But to what end? And
with what effect?
This chapter traces the evolution of the president's "bully pulpit" in the television
era. What advantages and disadvantages does television provide compared to other
means of presidential communication? What have presidents learned about using
television effectively? The evolution of presidential use of television has been influenced
by three important factors. Until President Franklin D. Roosevelt, presidential
communication was dominated by newspapers. The administrations of Presidents
Truman and Eisenhower mark the beginning of television as a communication tool.
From Presidents Truman and Eisenhower to President Carter, presidential communication
was profoundly impacted by network television domination. And, the Reagan
administration marks the beginning of cable television domination. While other
tenninology might be equally appropriate, newspaper domination, network domination,
and cable domination are useful categories for this analysis. This chapter will explore the
presidentiaJ use of television in the first two of those periods, a time when television was
Richard Neustadt Presidential Power and the Politics of Leadership (New York: John Wiley & Sons,
Inc, 1960).
5 Ibid. p. vii.
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dominated by the three networks and before the advent of cable and VCR. Chapter 3 will
then trace the presidential use of television in the time of cable television domination.

Newspaper Domination
FDR sets a precedent
Presidential communication with the American people was dominated by the
newspaper until President Eisenhower's Administration. Yet important developments
during this time set the stage for effective presidential use of television during the period
of network domination. President Franklin D. Roosevelt was the first president to move
beyond simple experiments with technology in order to reach out to the public.
Roosevelt knew that he needed to establish communication with the public in order to
calm their fears during the Great Depression. On March 12, 1933, only a few days after
his inauguration, Roosevelt addressed the American people over the radio for ,the first
time. He informed the nation of hjs plan to reopen the banks and sought to instill a sense
of security among the American people. FDR's speech was broadcast over CBS and
NBC stations and reached an audience of unequaled size. 6 Sixty-four percent of all radio
receivers were tuned to this first "fireside chat," one of the largest audiences in the history
of radio.'
The success of the first fireside chat inspired FDR to give nineteen more, each

I

running about a half an hour. s By 1941, the average listening audience for me chats had
grown to 60 million people. Popular entertainer Will Rogers wrote, "America hasn't

6
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been so happy in three years as they are today, no banks, no work, no nothing ...They
know they got a man in there who is wise to Congress, wise to our so-called big men.
The whole country is with him, just so he does something. ,,9 Franklin Roosevelt's
example influenced presidents who followed; he proved that by using broadcast
technology as a communication medium, the spirits of the American people could be
bfted and their confidence in the president could be solidified.
FDR's second innovation continues to play an integral role in presidential
communication. Although other presidents held press conferences, Roosevelt was the
first to take a "modem" approach with his first press conference in 1933. 10 He was the
first to schedule frequent, regular press conferences. Under FDR's administration, the
press conference transformed into an integral part of presidential communication. He
referred to these sessions not as press conferences, but as "delightful family conferences,"
and eSlablished a set of rules that future presidents would implement and amend.
Roosevelt stated that the reporters could only use direct presidential quotes if they had
written consent from the White House. Furthermore, all background information
included in articles could not be associated with the White House, and "off the record"
remarks could not be repeated to other reporters who were not in attendance. 1I Roosevelt
would even insist that reporters attribute all summaries of presidential remarks to "a
White House spokesman."12 Roosevelt took all necessary precautions to prevent himself
from being falsely quoted; he was we1l aware of the danger of slanted reporting.

9 Quoted in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age ofRoosevelt (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1957), Vol.
2.
iO Pierre Sa'iinger. With Kennedy (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1966), p. 139.
11 Samuel Kernell. Going Public (Wash.iiigLOD, D.C.: CQ Press, 1997), p. 79.
11 Salinger, ,po 55.
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The press's reaction to the binh of the press conference was one of overwhelming
excitement. Samuel Kernell, professor of political science at the University of California
at San Diego, states, "That first day, FOR gave them what they had sought for more than
a d~cade: assurance of hard news, openly conveyed. The President had made a pact with
the Washington press

COrpS."13

Yet when television later took over the press conference,

presidents transformed FOR's "delightful family conversations" into a primary way in
which to reach a large number or Americans.

Truman and EisenJwwer set the stage
The Administrations of Truman and Eisenhower mark the transition from a period
of newspaper domination to network domination. Both Truman and Eisenhower learned
from FOR's successful fireside chats and his "delighrful family gatherings." President
Truman's plea for the suppon of the American people for his Food Conservation Program
on October 5, 1947 was the first televised broadcast from the While House. It was the
first time a president had ever appeared on television, and it marked the very beginning of
the powerful relationship between the president and the television. I", Presidents Truman
and Eisenhower began to experiment with television, and their innovations laid the
groundwork for future televised presidential communication. Each administration
developed a urnque strategy in order to manage this new relationship between the
president and the television.

Kemell, p. 79
Joe S. Foole. Televisio.II Access alld Political Power (New York: Praeger Series in Political
CommuDicatioD, 1990), p. 25.
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TeLevision: an integral part in presidential communication strategy
The birth of the television made it possible for presidents to use this new
technology

to

communicate with the American people. Each president and his staff

embraced the powerful medium in different ways. Although President Truman was the
first president to appear on television, neither he nor his staff considered television to be
an integral part of the communication strategy. It was not until the Eisenhower
administration that the true power of television as a communication tool was harnessed.
Beginning with Eisenhower's administration, television has become a primary way in
which the American president reaches out to the electorate.
President Eisenhower and his staff realized that the president's popularity played
a major role in the president's ability to exert influence. President Eisenhower stated,
"One man can do a lot...he can especially do a lot at any particular given moment, if at
that moment he happens to be ranking high in public estimation. By this I mean he is
dwelling in the ivory tower and not in the doghouse."ls For this reaSOD, Eisenhower and
his staff wanted to use the medium of television to communicate an image of Eisenhower
in which the people could trust and believe.
Back in 1948, more than 20,000 letters were sent to Eisenhower urging him to run
for president. Eisenhower was interested to see what qualities he possessed that
connected with the people and that provoked such an outpouring of letters. In the
summer of 1949, Eisenhower asked Columbia's distinguished sociologist Robert Merton
of the University's Bureau of Applied Social Research to analyze the content of the
letters. Merton agreed, and the results showed that the letter writers picked up upon and

I~ "Eisenhower to Emmet Hughes," December 10, 1953. DDE Diary Series. appeared in Fred I. GreeDslein.
The Hidden-Hand Presidem:}' (New York: Basic Books. [oc., 1982). p. 98.
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admired Eisenhower's qualities of sincerity and humanity and that the phrase "born
leader" appeared again and again. Furthennore, the lener writers thought of Eisenhower
as an intelligent general but also as a non-militaristic man who would excel in a position
of civil leadership. Merton stated that he reviewed the analysis of the report "with the
General almost line by line in two or three sessions" and that Eisenhower considered the
results to be of great interest. 16 Eisenhower took care to understand the public's
perception of his character.
When Eisenhower took office in 1953, he wanted to develop a communication
strategy that would convey these qualities that were noticed by so many Americans in
order to build the popularity that he considered to be so vital to his success as a leader.
Eisenhower and his staff recognized that fact that television could help them
communicate these important qualities. Eisenhower took great care in expressing the
characteristics of sincerity, humanity. and the others mentioned in the report during hjs
public addresses. especially during his press conferences. 17 For this reason. and for other
reasons that will be discussed in the following section, President Eisenhower took the
unprecedented step of allowing portions of his press conferences to be televised. As
discussed above, many Americans prompted Eisenhower to run for the presidency based
upon their perception of his upstanding character; television gave Eisenhower the chance
to convey these qualities to all Americans.

Roben K. Menon, An Inventory of Communications Addressed ro General Eisenhower in Spring of
/94& SURunary and Digest (New York: Columbia University Bureau of Applied Social Research,
September 1949. appeared in Fred I. Greenstein. The Hidden-Hand Presidency (New York: Basic Books.
Inc.. 1982). p. 96.
17 Fred I. Greenstein. The Hidden-Hand Presidency, Eisenhower as a Leader (New York: Basic Books,
Inc.. 1982, p. 97
16
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John F. Kennedy and his administration recognized and utilized the power of
television before Kennedy even took office. President Kennedy's press secretary Pierre
Salinger remarks, "Without television, JFK could not have won the election" and the
President himself later admitted, "We wouldn't have had a prayer without that gadget."ds
Television's boost to Kennedy's campaign against Richard Nixon inspired Kennedy and
his administration to take unprecedented steps in incorporating television as a main Lool
in their communication strategy. Kennedy took office hoping to maintain an open
channel of communication with Americans, and television was the primary "gadget" to
facilitate this goal.
In an address to the National Association of Broadcasters in May of 1961,
President Kennedy expressed his desire for open communication and his realization of
the power of television as a means to achieve this. He stated, "I feel. as a beHever in
freedom, as well as President of the United States, that we want a world in which the
good and bad, successes or failures, the aspirations of our people, ~eir desires, the
disagreements; their dissent, their agreements, whether they serve the interest of that state
or not. should be made public, should be made part of the general understanding of all
people." He went on to comment, "For the flow of ideas. the capacity to make informed
choices, the abi lity to criticirze, all assumptions upon which po Ii tical democracy rests,
depend largely upon communication. And you are the guardians of the most powerful
means of communication ever designed."
Furthermore, in a speech at a Pulse luncheon, press secretary Pierre Salinger
spoke of the integral role that broadcasters play ifn disseminating information to

1~ Pierre Salinger.
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Americans. He stated that the broadcaster is "the most powerful and effective means of
communication ever designed, and more people depend on him for news, for infonnation,
for interpretation than on any other means of communication."19 Television's power was
certainly recognized and harnessed by the Kennedy administration. The president and his
staff embarked upon a presidency based upon the goals of communication and education,
and television lay at the foundation of these goals. 20
In the wake of the tragedy of President Kennedy's assassination, President
Johnson initiaJly used television as a way to reach out to Americans and reinstate their
sense of security and confidence. Kennedy's press secretary Pierre Salinger, who
continued on as press secretary for President Johnson for a short period of time,
suggested the use of television "to establish the President's image solidly around the
nation." Salinger recommended that President Johnson hold a televised meeting with
leading network reporters, and after a considerable amount of persuasion, the President
agreed. The hour-long program was aired on March 15,1964. Salinger was content with
the reception of the program and stated, "President Johnson's thoughtful responses to the
questions did a great deal to underline the fact that he had the reins of government firmly
in hand."21
Once Johnson's presidency was underway, his administration began to broaden
the focus of their television strategy. Jack Valenti, an assistant to President Johnson,
stated, "When I worked in the White House, one of my pet projects was how to construct
some way for the President to leap over the barriers of difficult and hard

to

explain

19 "Speech Notes for tbe Pulse luncheon, New York, October 18. 1961," p. 2·3, Papers of Pierre Salinger,
Subject Files, John F. Kennedy Library, Box II, p. 2-3.
20 "Memo to Ted Soren~en from Pierre Salinger, The Relations of the President with the Press, April 17,
1961:' Papers of Pierre Salinger. Subject Files, John. F. Kennedy Library, Box 11.
~l Salinger. With Kennedy, p. 338.
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subjects (Vietnam, the economy, the Dominican Republic, white vs. black ... ), to
interpose himself between the people and the press, so that he could tell his story, in his
way, to the American people and tell it truthfully, simply, dramatically, and briefly."n
Johnson and his administration saw "educator" and "communicator" as twO imponant
aspects of Johnson's role as president. Valenti stated, ''There is no higher priority than
the president's need to inform the American public, so they understand his motives, his
actions, and the facts behind whatever it is the president has chosen to place before the
people. For the modern truth exists, in particularly in this day of instant communication,
that no leader can lead when those whom he abjures to follow him are confused about
'why' and fearful about 'how' and hesitant about 'what'

."23

Valenti suggested numerous ideas to use television as a tool in becoming a great
"educator" and "communicator" with Americans. He recommended a series of tenminute telecasts in which the President addressed subjects of pressing concern to
Americans, such as the economy and Vietnam. Valenti based this recommendation upon
the belief that Johnson "use national television as a rostrum, ediuing out all needless
words and ideas, keeping what he had to say simple and clear."u
Unfortunately, President Johnson did not embrace Valenli' s strategy; he was not
as willing to use television as an educational tool as his predecessor was. Looking back,
Valenti admits that he is uncertain as to why President Johnson did not agree with his
strategy. Valenti hypothesized, "I would say he recoiled from being compared with JFK,
as superb a television performer as ever inhabited the White House, somewhere deep in

LSI there lingered some messy doubts about his television image being measured againsl
Jack Valenti. A Very Human President (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1975), p. 272.
Valenti. p. 273.
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JFK's. But I really don't know,"2S Johnson's internal battle with Kennedy's legacy
certainly played a part in his hesitation, and will be discussed is greater detail in the
following section. Although Johnson.did use television to communicate with Americans
through his televised press conferences and addresses, his strategy was never truly all that
it could be due to his unwillingness to fully embrace the medium.
Like Kennedy, Nixon came to the White House with a strong understanding of the
advantages (as well as the possible disadvantages thanks to the Kennedy-Nixon debate)
of television.' Herbert C. Klein, Director of Nixon's Office of Communications, stated,
"His [Nixon's] first insITuctions to me on the morning after then 1968 election were, 'I
want to do a lot more with television.'

,,26

Nixon wanted his use of television to aid him

in conducting an "open" presidency. During his Inaugural Address, Nixon stated, "Let
all Americans know that during this administration, our lines of communication will be
open." Klein stated that he focused upon Nixon's reference to "open" and to
"communication" and understood the significance that these ideas had to Klein's own
role as Director of Communications. Klein admitted, "In a statement I later came to
regret, I had when I was appointed told the press, 'Truth will be the hallmark of th~
Nixon administration.' On that Inaugural day, I was confident it would be. Because of
my news and political background., more than anyone else sitting on that long, cold
platform bench, I knew that truth had to be the 'hallmark' if we were to succeed. I have
not changed my mind on that point."~

Valenti. p. 275.
Herbert C. Klein. Making It Perfectly Clear (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc.,
1980). p. 76.
27 Klein. p. 5.
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Yet Nixon viewed the members of the press as adversaries in his quest for
openness. Jack Keogh, chief of Nixon's research and writing team, stated, ''The
conviction that President Nixon could expect more twisted stories than straight reporting
in the major media ran strong in his Administration."28 Nixon felt that the press was out
to

•

get him from the very beginning of his administration, and it was this feeling that was

the foundation of his use of television in his communication strategy.
Nixon's conviction proved to be a reality. Klein stated that an "unproductive,
bully attitude toward the news media" began to emerge within the first few months of the
administration. 29 And, it was not long until this "unproductive bully attitude" escalated
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out of control. David Gergen stated, "No modern president has surpassed Nixon in the
fury stirred up in the press corps." Gergen was able to witness this fury first hand; he

would occasionally observe interaction between reporters and Nixon's press secretary
Ron Ziegler. Gergen describes these interactions as scenes "of animalistic intensity. as
each side ripped away at the other. Reporters were sometimes screaming, eager to tear
out Ziegler's throat. They thought the men working in the White House were akin to
Nazi stonn troopers working for a neo-Fuhrer. ...Those scenes are burned into the
memory of all who witnessed them, reminders of what can come when a savage war
breaks out between the government and the press."30
On November 13, 1969, this hostility between Nixon and the press reached its
height With Nixon '5 insistence, Vice President Spiro Agnew attacked the television
networks. He daiiffied that the networks' "endless pursuit of controversy" caused "a
nat1"ow and distorted pictme of America." He encouraged the members of the media to
Jack Keogh. Presidenl Ni.:con and the Press (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1972), p. 39
Krein. p. 69.
30 Da\rid Gergen. Eyewimess to Power (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), p. 89.
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"tum their critical powers on themselves" and to "direct their energy, talent, and
conviction toward improving the quality and objectivity of news presentation."]l Nixon's
speech writer Raymond Price admits, ''Though in some respects Agnew overstated. his
case, I thought that basically what he said needed saying....The question, in our minds,
was not whether news organizations should be 'subservient' to the administration ... but
whether we had a right to warn the public not to be misled by reporting that we
considered heavily biased, sometimes propagandistic and often untrue. We thought we
had that right. "32
Nixon and his staff were ready to fight for their right to provide Americans with
unbiased information, and they worked to develop a strategy to use television to get their
message across to Americans without the slanted voice of lhe press. Herbert Klein states,
"From the President on down, an amazingly excessive amount of time was spent
worrying about plans to conjure up better and more favorable coverage.'133 And,
Raymond Price states that the conviction to circumvent the press "led the Nixon
administration to devote so much effort to its communication - an effort which from time
to time summoned tbe energies of a large percentage of the White House Slaff."l4
Utilizing live television was the way in which Nixon and his team sought to reach
out to Americans without letting the press contaminate Nixon's message with their own
biased commentary. Keogh writes, "Nixon believed... that the best way to communicate
with the people was

to

appear on live television and speak directly to them. This was in

effect, going over the heads of the newsmen so that what was said would not be strained

Raymond Price. With Nixoll (New York: The Viking Press. 1977). p. 188.
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through their political bias.,,)5 In a memo received by Klein, it is stated that "Richard
Nixon, very consciously, has taken an entirely different tact [sic] from LBJ's ... .Instead of
ItryiTilg to win the press, to cater to them, to have backgrounders with them, RN has
ignored them and has talked directly to the country TV whenever possible .... He has
particularly not allowed the press, whenever he could avoid it, to filter his ideas to the
public. This is a remarkable achievement.,,)6 It is true that Nixon was not the first
president to recognize the need to "go over the heads of the press" in order to avoid
biased information being disseminated to the public; yet, Nixon was certainly the first to
go about circumventing the press with such anger and conviction.
Another piece of Nixon's television strategy was the effort to "spin" the news in
order to portray Nixon in a positive light at all times. David Gergen states, "The
prevai ling view at the top, as I and others elsewhere on the staff found out late in the
game, was to see the press podium as a propaganda weapon. It was not a place for a free
give-and-take between man and women seeking truth." Although he proclaimed an
"open" administration during his Inaugural Address, telling the truth at all times was
certainly not an element of Nixon's communication strategy. It was imperative to Nixon
that the press be controlled, that he be portrayed in a positive manner. Gergen reveals,
"Nixon said to advisers, tellthern what you want them to hear, not what they want to
know. Control the story. Put a rosy face on everything, no matter what you may think.
'The press is the enemy,' Nixon told his advisers over and over in private meetings.,,37 It
appears that Nixon's entire communication strategy with the American people was based
upon those very word's: "The pr6ss is the enemy.
Keogh; p. 39.
Klein. p. 127.
:17 Gergen. p. 90.
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Like President Johnson, President Ford also initially utilized television to restore
American's confidence in their government in the aftennath of Nixon's Watergate
scandal. 38 And, according to Ron Nessen, one of Ford's press secretaries, Ford also set
out to restore the relationship with the press. J9 Yet, after those initial weeks, the focus of
Itel'evision began to widen. Unlike President Nixon, Ford and his staff did not seek to use
television as a "propaganda weapon;" their intent was not to use television to "spin" the
mews but to convey a truthful message to Americans. Ford did not place a heavy
emphasis upon controlling the message of the press. David Gergen, whose recollections
of Nixon's desire to "spin" the news have already been mentioned, also served Presidents
Ford, Reagan, and Carter. Gergen's appraisal of Nixon's desire to tell the truth lies in
stark contrast to Gergen's appraisal of Ford's intentions to tell the Lruth. He states, "In
my experience over the past thirty years, every White House save one - has on occasion
wiilllfu]]y misled or lied to the press ...The exception to the rule, of course, the Ford White
House." Gergen goes on to admit, "More than one of our modern presidents has been a
congen'tal liar; Jerry Ford was a congenital truth-tel.ler." Gergen reveals that Ford's
truthfulness was not just a unique personal quality, bUl a quality he expected his entire
adminrilstration to embody..IO Ford was the first, and most likely the only presidenl, who
never iliHentionally manipulated television as a way to convey a false message to
Americans.
President Carter and his staff sought to utilize television as a way to make
Americans feel more involved in their government. Barry Jagoda, Carter's television

3S
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adviser during the 1976 presidential campaign and during the first year and a half of
Carter's administration, stated, "One of the things television does best is to let people feel
they are part of a national moment.'t41 Yet, in their quest to involve Americans, Caner
was careful not to over-expose himself. James Fallows, Carter's first speechwriter, stated
that President Carter favored two to three minute public statements as opposed to the
traditional televised addresses. Carter stated that all "most people hear [of (hose
speeches] is about a minute or two on the news anyway. [That's] the same amount of
coverage you get if you go out there and talk for one or two rninutes.'>42 President Carter
was realistic in the approach that he took toward the use of television as a communication
tool. Each president seemed to learn from the successes and the failures of their
predecessors as well as to incorporate new strategica aspects in their embrace of
television. One of the most successful tools that presidents found in communicating with
their constituents was the presidential press conference.

TIle evolution ofthe press conference
The press conference became one of (he most effective communication tools in
the period of network domination, as well as in today's period of cable domination,
because it allows the president to demonstrate his knowledge and strength to the
American public. David Gergen deems the press conference "one of the most important
exercises of public accountability by a presidenL"~ Yet it is imperative to note that the
necessary foundation for this form of presidential communication was created during the

Michael Baruch Grossman and Manna Joynt Kumar. Portraying the PresioenJ: The White House and
tile NewS' Media (B.a,]timure~ The Johns Hopkins University Press. 198 I). p. 29.
~ [bid.
.u Gergen, p. 84.
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period of newspaper domination. President Franklin Roosevelt held the first modern press
conference in 1933, and his press conference rules ultimately evolved into today's live
press conference. Presidents Truman and Eisenhower look the first steps in modernizing
FOR's creation.
Truman made minor changes to the rules and changed the location of the press
conferences from the Oval Office to the old State Department Indian Treaty Room.
Instead of conversing with reporters from his desk, the president now stood at the head of
the room, looking out over the reporters. The major implication of this new setting was
to create a more competitive, adversarial atmosphere among the president and the press.

He also reduced the frequency of press conferences.~ FOR mel twice a week with the
press; Truman only met weekly. Although television began to lake hold of the nation
during his presidency, television or newsreel cameras were not permitted at Truman's
press conferences. 4S Yet, Truman did allow recorded excerpts of his press co"nferences to
be broadcast over the radio. J6 This decision marks an important step in the relationship
be~ween

technology and the press conference.

President Eisenhower adapted FOR's roles even more and allowed

mm crews to

be present at press conferences starting in 1955 so that the networks could broadcast
prerecorded excerpts to Americans. Although President Eisenhower was frustrated with
the slanted! stories, he was hesitant to take the unprecedented step and allow cameras
during the press conferences. Eisenhower was not even comfortable with the idea of
press conferences, let alone allowing cameras to be present. Eisenhower's adviser

... Caroly!J' Smith. Presiaenrial Press Conferences (New York: Praeger Series in Political Communicalion,
1990), p. 33-34.
Salinger. With Kennedy, p. 55.
.16 Smith, p. 33-34.
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Emmet John Hughes recalls, "For weeks before and after his first Inauguration, he
grumbled and argued against even the necessity of press conferences, deploring their
establishment by Roosevelt as a fixed form of presidential communication; it required the
persistent persuasion of Hagerty to have him hold his first such conference, aJmost a
month after he took office." And, all of this convincing was just for Eisenhower to hold a
traditional press conference. When confronted with the idea of televising the
conferences, Eisenhower argued, "I keep telling you fellows 1 don't like to do this sort of
thing. I can think of nothing more boring, for the American public, than to have to sit in
their living rooms for a whole half houf looking at my face on their screens.',.s1
Yet ao incident in March of 1954 gave Eisenhower the extra push he needed to
telev,ise his press conferences. Eisenhower's Press Secretary James Hagerty recalls
waliking into the office one day and finding the President very upset by the unfair articles
he ,read by Ed FoUiard of the Washington Post and James Reston of the New York Times
regarding a statement he made the previous day. Hagerty was in accord with the
President's senLiments, and stated that "both stories, in my book, really hit below the belt
and were deliberately needled up by Folliard and Reston, both of whom know better... ."
Hagerty then stated, ''That's why I'm glad we released tapes of the statement to radio, TV
and newsreels. To hell with slanted reporters. We'll go directly to the people who can
hear exactly what the President said without reading warped and slanted stories. ,,4& This
incident served as an important Jesson to Eisenhower and his staff; they realized that the
reporters' biased summaries of presidential statements and the importance of releasing

Emmer Iohn Hughes. The Ordeal of Power:A Political Memoir oflile Eisenhower Year:s (New York:
Anlheneum, 1963). p. 131.
.IS Robert H. Ferrell. Tire Diary ofJames C. Hagerty (Bloomington, Indiana: rodiana University Press,
1983), p. 25.
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tbe President's words directly to the people. The following year, on January 19, 1955.
cameras were allowed at Eisenhower's press conference for the first time in rustory:4.9
The televised press conferences brought about a favorable reaction, even among
the reporters. In his diary, Hagerty stated that the majority of reporters "admined that
this way a very potent way of gening the President's personality and viewpoints across to
the people of the country .... "50 Now, the people could make their own decisions and not
be influenced by the bias of the press. Yet Eisenhower was criticized by some for

holding somewhat vague press conferences and for mumbling through certain statements.
Strengthening Eisenhower's image through his actual appearance on television was the
main focus of Eisenhower's staff; what he was saying was not their primary concern.51
Eisenhower would later remark that this "intellectual thinness" and the "syntactical
flaws" were a product of the great concern Eisenhower had of making an error.
Eisenhower stated, "An inadvertent misstatement in public would be a calamity." He
justified his "intellectual thinness" and "syntactical flaws" by stating, "It is far better to
stumble or speak guardedly than to move ahead smoothly and risk imperiling the country
by consistently focusing on ideas rather than on phrasing." Eisenhower was proud of the
fact that he "was able to avoid causing the nation a serious setback through anything I
said in many hours, over eight years of intensive questioning."52 Eisenhower did not take
the risk of televised press conferences lightly.

Ferrell. p. 168.
Ferrell. p. 169.
Sl Fred I. Greenstein. The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as a Leader (New York: Basic Books.
Inc" 1982). p. 19.
S2 Dwight D. Eisenhower. 77le White House Years: Mandate/or Challge 1953-1956 (Garden City. New
Jersey: Doubleday, 1963), p. 232-233.
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Aside from taking the unprecedented step of allowing cameras at the press
conferences, Figure 2.1 and Table 2.1 show that President Eisenhower also further
reduced the frequency of press conferences. He only met with the press twice a month,
and his steady reduction in the number of press conferences continued to change it from a
friendly gathering into a more fonnal, structured meeting between the president and the
press. S3 With Truman and Eisenhower, first steps were taken toward televised
communication with the American people. Elmer E. CornwaJl, professor of political
science at Brown University, states that FDR's "private encounters" were evolving into
"semi-private perforrnance[s] whose transactions were increasingly part of the public
record. SJ

Figure 2.1 goes here
Table 2.1: Presidential News Conferences 1929-1981
President
Hoover
F. Roosevelt
Truman
Eisenhower
Kennedy
L. Johnson
Nixon
Ford
Carter

(1929-1933)
(1933-1954)
(1945-1953)
(1953-1961)
(1961-1963)
(1963-1969)
(1969-1974)
( 1974-1977)
(1977-1981)

A ve. Per Month
5.6
6.9
3.4
2.0
1.9
2.2
0.5
1.3
1.2

Total Number
286
998
334
193

64
135
37
39
59

Source: Kernell, Samuel. Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Lecu1ership.
Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1997, p. 84.
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Kernell. p. 83
Smith, p. 34.

Figure 2.1: Presidential News Conferences 1929-1981
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An in-depth fook a1 Kennedy's live press conferences

President John F. Kennedy's election to office signifies the beginning of the
period of network domination, and it is under this administration that the press
conference was shaped into the modernized format that is used today. When Kennedy
and his staff took the unprecedented step in allowing presidential press conferences to be
seen on live television, they transformed the press conference from an instrument mainly
used to communicate with reporters to an instrument used to communicate directly with
the American people.
President Kennedy's press secretary Pierre Salinger was the first to bring up the
possibility of opening the press conference to live television. Salinger knew that
Kennedy had the ability to perform well under pressure and to captivate an audience
based upon his performance during the Kennedy-Nixon debate. Furthermore, Salinger
realized that the majority of the press was against a Democratic president. He stated,
"Although no Democratic candidate for President had ever been given fairer treatment by
a predominantly Republican press, the honeymoon couldn't last."ss
In order to circumvent the press, Kennedy needed to find a "weapon by which we
could go over the American press's head to the American people." When Kennedy took
office, full transcripts of a presidential press conference were printed in only three or fouf
of U.S. newspapers. Kennedy and Salinger wanted a way to get unedited message to the
people. 56 Just two days after Kennedy was elected, Salinger presented his unprecedented
idea to the President. Salinger stated. "What do you think of opening up your press

Salinger. With Kennedy. p. 56.
Pierre Salinger. recorded interview by Theodore H. White. July 19. 1965, page 109, John F. Kennedy
Library Oral History Program.
H

56
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conferences to live television? I don't think there's any doubt that you can handle it."57
And,· after much consideration, the President agreed.
Yet President Kennedy's decision to allow live broadcasting "was to provoke a
stonn of historic proportions." Looking back, Salinger states, 'Today, no one blinks at
the prospect of the most powerful head of slate in the world exposing himself to free and
often hostile questions before an audience of many millions and with no possibility of
censorship. But, in 1960 my proposal was a radical departure from tradition, and the
reaction was swift and violenL"ss

New York Times columnist James Reston believed the decision to go live was "the
goofiest idea since the hula hOOp."S9 Another columnist stated that the whole idea was
hazardous" and that it would instigate "off the cuff' government.,,6£) The strongest
argument against live coverage was the fact that one mistake by the President could bring
about detrimental consequences. The national and international aIDlospheres in 1960
were on edge, and one error could instigate disaster. No other world leader would even
consider the risk of live coverage during these tense times. For example, in France,
Charles DeGaulle's press conferences were held only twice a year upon DeGaulle's
request and were carefully staged with planted questions. In Great Britain, press
conferences do not even exist, and a forced question period serves as a means of
accountability. And, the idea of a press conference in the Soviet Union was not even a
possjbility.61 Even ilillthe United States, President Eisenhower had considered pre

ss.

Salinger. lVi/h Kenlledy, p. 54.
Salinger. Wilh Kennedy. p. 52.
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'Salinger's Speech Notes for Pulse. Inc. Luncheon, New York, October 18.1961:' Papers of Pierre
Salinger, Subject Files, John F. Kennedy Library, Box II.
61 Salinger. Wi/h Kennedy, p. 55.
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recorded excerpts of his press conferences to be a risk; going live was not even a
consi deration.
Kennedy's advisers Dean Rusk, Ted Sorensen, and Bundy believed the stakes to
be too high; one error could instigate an international fiasco. 62 But, Kennedy assured
them that he possessed the

abil~ty

to meet the challenge. And, as Salinger pointed out,

" ... Even if he did blow a question -TV or no TV - it would be impossible to suppress it
for very 10ng."63 President Kennedy had the confidence to take the risk.
The criticism surrounding Kennedy's decision was valid; it was certainly a risky
move. Samuel Kernell states, "Compared with the alternate forms of
communication ... the press conference presents the president with ample opportunity to
look uniformed, inarticulate, and irncompetent."64 But this built-in risk also helps make
the live press conference such an effective way

10

communicate with the American

people. If the president is able to respond articulately to the difficult questions posed by
reporters, a sense of admiration and confidence is fostered among the people.
But, President Kennedy was not afraid to take the step that Truman, Eisenhower,
and so many world leaders had feared to take. On December 27, 1960, after several
weeks of discussion and evaluation, President Kennedy agreed to live coverage of his
presidential press coverage. Kennedy told Salinger, "This is the right thing to do. We
should be able to go around the newspapers if that becomes necessary. But, beyond that,
I don't know how we can justify keeping TV out if it wants in.,,65 SaJinger announced the
decision to reporters durin.g a press conference that he claims he will never forget.

Salinger. Oral HislOry. p. 108.
Salinger. With Kennedy, p. 56.
64 Smith. 4"1.
60S Salinger. With Kellned) , p. 56.
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Salinger retells the story and states that Bill Lawrence, then the White House
correspondent of the New York Times, sarcastically began his question with, "Mr.
Salinger, as you plunge deeper and deeper into maners about which you know absolutely
nothing ... " Salinger was outraged and yelled that "it was the President's press
conference - nO[ theirs- and he would run it his own way." Afterward, when Salinger
went to recount the story to President Kennedy, Kennedy laughed and stated, ''Don't tell
me. I already know. I could hear it clear across town.,,66
On January 25, 1961 at 6:00 p.m. EST, the frrst live press conference was
broadcast to the nation. The location was changed to the larger State Department
Auditorium, which many feared would take away from the "intimacy" of the White
House press conference. 67 Yet, in reality, this was a much more ideal location. A
permanent set-up could be arranged, it was only five minutes from the White House,
there was enough room to accommodate the television cameras and equipment, and ~he
President would not have to stand on a large stage as was the previous aITatlgement. 68
During the press conference, one reporter asked Kennedy about the consequences of an
"inadvertent statement." The President confidently responded that the interests of the
country "are as well protected under this system as they were under the system followed
by President Eisenhower, and this system has the advantage of providing more direct
communication."69 The press conference reached an audience of over 60 million viewers,

Salinger. With Kennedy• .p. 58.
Salinger. Ora] HistO'ty. p. 106.
68 "Memo to Pierre Salinger from Bill Wilson." Papers of Pierre Salinger. Subject Files. John F. Kennedy
Library, Box It.
IA "John F. Kennedy News Conference #1." Papers of the President, John F. KelU1edy Library. Box 8.
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and the President "thought it went very we11.,,70 In a memo to Ted Sorensen, Salinger
remarked, "The press conference in its present format is here to stay.,,7\
President Kennedy and his staff were not the only people satisfied with the new
press conference formal; the response from the American people oveIWhelmingly
supported the change and commended the administration's desire to communicate
directly through television. The President received thousands of leners from Americans
expressing their support of the live coverage. n A telegram was even sent to the President
from fonner press secretary Jim Hagerty, who was then working for ABC as vice
president of news, special events, and public affairs. The telegram read, "Congratulations.
It was a fine conference. It looked wonderful on TV. ABC will carry it anytime."n
Pulse conducted a public opinion survey on the new live coverage of presidential
press conferences. The survey was conducted in New York City, the city with the most
television stations and thus, the most programming options to viewers at any given time.
Five hundred people were "asked if they knew that President Kennedy's press
conferences were shown on television while they were actually taking place," and 90.2
percent replied that they did know. It was reponed that of this number, "almost 85
percent had watched a (east one of the press conferences and the vast majority of these

-80 percent-had tuned in on purpose and had not just stumbled across the press
conference while they were turning the diaL" These results proved that Salinger's risky,
"radical departure from tradition" had been a success. Salinger stated, "I think this shows

70 Salinger.

WiJh Kennedy, p. 138.
"Memo to Ted Sorensen from Pierre SaJinger, The relations of the President with the Press, April 17.
J961," Papers of Pierre Salinger. Subject Files. Box 11, p. 3.
72 "Memo to Ted Sorensen from Pierre Salinger," p. 10.
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that at the audience end citizens are following the press conferences - and not by
accidenl."74

It is true that the press conferences had proven to be successful, but Kennedy
understood the importance of the right level of exposure. FDR made sure not to inundate
the American people with his fireside chats; Kennedy cut back on the number of
television appearances as well. An excess of press conferences would cause the people to
lose interest. As indicated in Figure 2.1, Kennedy held less number of press conferences
than Eisenhower, and only one-third as many as FDR. 7S Although Kennedy and his team
had hit upon a successful way to communicate with Americans through the live press
conference, they were careful not to overuse their new strategy.
Looking back, Salinger is confident that his suggestion to Kennedy to open the
press conferences to live television coverage was a perfect strategy. Of his time spent as
Kenendy's press secretary in 1966, Salinger states, "Most of the pencil and paper
reporters now concede that they were wrong - that live TV brought about none of the dire
consequences they thought it would. Ironically, many of the reporters .who were most
opposed to the format in 1960, are now the most adamant in insisting that LBJ should use
it more often,"
And. Salinger was also accurate"in his prediction that Kennedy would be rise to
the occasion and perform well under the pressure of live television. Salinger writes. "The
ideas and philosophy of the man were best displayed during those moments of truth when
he stood alone before millions of his countrymen to answer to questions of greatest
moment to their lives and their very survival." Sadly, John F. Kennedy did not have the
Salinger's Speech Notes for Pulse, Inc. Luncheon, New York. October 18. 1961," Papers of Pierre
Salinger. Subject Files. John F. Kennedy Library, Box II, p. 5-6.
75 Kernel!, 85 ..
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opportunity to write his own memoirs, but the transcripts of his li ve press conferences
serve as a remarkable alternative, Salinger writes, "They [the transcripts] reveal as much
about the man as they do about his ideas, His grasp of the infinite detail of government;
his studied refusal to look at problems in over-simple terms; his quickness of mind; his
capacity for righteous anger; and his quick humor are all clearly evident."76 The decision
to go live was a calculated judgment that proved to be successful and ultimately changed
the relationship between the president and the television forever.

The press conference conrinues to evolve
As an attentive student of Franklin D. Roosevelt and John F. Kennedy, President
Lyndon Johnson learned the importance of circumventing the press and communicating
directly to the people. Yet Pierre Salinger, who stayed on as Johnson's press secretary
for a short time, suggested that Johnson experiment with the press conference in order to
detennine which format worked best for him. Salinger stated, "JFK. had chosen the mass
press conference, open to live TV and radio, because he was convinced that he must go
directly to the people to sell the innovations of the New Frontier. Also, he had great
success against Richard Nixon in the debates." This same situation, however, did nol
exist for Johnson. Salinger believed that Johnson "could expect greater support from the
Congress than JFK, not only because partisanship would not be as virulent during the
presidential transition, but because of his own great skill in working with Congress,tln
President Johnson and Salinger agreed to experiment with a variety of press
conference fonnats. They began with an entirely impromptu, informal fonnat on

76
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December 7, 1963. After Salinger's press briefing, he told reporters that Johnson wished

•
•

to meet with them in his office over coffee. Only twenry or thirty reporters were in
attendance, and Salinger remarked that an "atmosphere reminiscent of Franklin D.
Roosevelt's meetings with the press" presided. Johnson was satisfied with this first
conference and decided

w go' ahead and try a live, televised press conference on February

29'. 1964.
Sali1nger and Johnson agreed to change the sening from Kennedy's press
conferences and moved the location to the International Conference Room at State.

•

Furthennore, Johnson decided to sit at a desk, whereas Kennedy chose to speak from a
rost.rum.

78

Press relations excelled during the first few weeks of the Johnson

administration. Salingor stated, "The correspondents, of course, were not unaware of the
OIlitiolil's interest and tried to

p~ay

a constructi ve role in restoring stabi liry in Washington

after the nightmare of Dallas." Yet relations began to deteriorate as the weeks went on.
Johnson had grown accustomed. to the press's sympathetic treatment and was highly
sensitive to the adversarial relationship that began to form after his presidential

•
•
•
•
•
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honeymoon. Salinger comments, "If the press had voluntarily become a partner of
government in restoring national unity after Dallas, it was now clearly returning to its
normal role. 79
Johnson did not react well to the press's return to its "normal role." He wanted
lheir partnership to remain intact and reacted by reaching out even more to the press.
Johnson also recognized that Kennedy was a truly gifted orator who possessed an
ulilmatched talent and felt that he could make up for his shortcom.ings by increasing
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contact with the press. Jack Valenti, Johnson's assistant, stated, "LEI's obsession to talk
to the press, to have them near, was a narcotic for him. He wanted their approbation. He
wanted them to notice his strength, not his inadequacies."go
Johnson intended to make up for his relative lack of rhetorical lalent and to
prolong the honeymoon treatment of the press by holding more press conferences than
any other president. As indicated in Figures 2.1 and 2.2, Johnson not only held more

press conferences than Kennedy held during his administration but increased all other
forms of broadc~t communication as well. In just his first year in office, LBJ appeared
on television more times than JFK did in three years and more times than Eisenhower did
in eight years.
In their book Presidential Television, Minow, Martin, and Mitchell refer to
Johnson as the "compulsive communicator. uS1 Johnson may have learned a great deal
from the previous presidents, but he seemed to overlook FDR and Kennedy's warning of
overexposure. LBJ also failed to master the adversarial relationship between the
president and the press with the success of his predecessors. His plan to make up for his
lack of rhetorical skill and to maintain friendly press relations by an abundance of
communication backfired. Valenti stated that there "seemed to be an avalanche of
barbaric (as the president saw them) attacks, and as the criticism grew more and more
virulent, LBI saw an odious conspiracy stalking him." Yet Valenti looks back and states,
'The fact remains Lhat had the president stood aloof from the press. he would have fended
off mos't of their probings.',n Unfortunately, this advice came too late, and by the end of
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his presidency, Johnson's relationship with the press had completely deteriorated, and it
was agreed that his communication skills paled in comparison to those of Kennedy.

Figure 2.2 goes here

As described earlier, Richard Nixon had no intention of allowing himself to be
victimized by the press, even though his relationship with Washington reporters had
rarely been very good. He saw the press as an adversary, as an alien and aggressive force
against him, and Nixon intended to change this from the onset of his presidency. He
wrote, that the "basic need is not PR - it's PO [a presidential offensive]." He continued
with the press conference model developed by President Kennedy, but his hostility
toward the press compelled him to make significant alterations.
Nixon changed the name of "press conference" to "news conference" in order to
demonstrate that it was the president who made the news, and !.he news was what the
conference was all about, not the press. ll3 Nixon made his first outright attack on the
press during his flfSt press conference held on January 27, 1969, just seven days after his
inauguration. He told the press, that he refused to respond to questions dealing with
domestic or foreign affairs. He stated, "I do not believe that policy should be made by
off-the-cuff responses in press conferences or in any o!.her kind of conference. I think it
showld be made in an orderly way." SJ
Despite this tension that existed between Nixon and reporters during his press
conferences, Nixon was nonetheless extremely successful in conveying a positive
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Figure 2.2: Number of Presidential Addresses 1929·1995 (Yearly Averages for First Three Years of First Term)
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message

to

American viewers. Jack Keogh, Nixon's chief of writing and research, stated

that there was "widespread agreement among friend and foe alike, including often
frustrated Washington news corps, that he [Nixon] was a master," Nixon dazzled
American and reporters after his second news conference in 1969. Even commentator
Frank Reynolds, a staunch anti-Nixon reporter, agreed, stating, "There was no band to
play 'Haill to the Chief as he came in, but they should have played it as he walked OUt."83
This success is partly due to the great care Nixon took in preparing for the news
comferences. Keogh states that President Nixon was "personally and thoroughly
involved" in the brainstorming and researching of possible subjects that took place before
each conference. 86 Herbert Klein also reveals Nixon's preparedness, stating, "Richard
Nixon's. effectiveness in using the television medium is remarkable. This is due, of
course to ,the tremendous amount of preparation that he takes before making a television
appearance. With the exception of TR, Wilson and Hoover, RN is probably the only
president in this country who still sits down from time to time and completely writes a
major speech hirnself.,,87
Although Nixon experienced success with his news conferences, he did not hold
them wrrh great frequency. This is due to Nixon's belief that a press conference should
only be one form of communication with Americans and also due to his belief that press
conferences promote "off-the cuff- responses.,,88 In fact, Nixon held fewer press
conferences than all of his predecessors held. David Gergen writes, "The frequency of
presidential press conferences had been declining since FDR, but under Nixon they fell
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Keogh, p. 49.
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a new low." During his first term, Nixon held eight press conferences per year, and this
number fell to just five per year during his second terrn. 89 Historian Melvin Small reveals
that Nixon held "the fewest number of press conferences of any president from Hoover
through Carter.,,90
Reporters did not react well to the diminished number of press conferences, thus
adding to the intense hostility that existed between reporters and President Nixon. It is
lnie tnat an adversarial nature did exist during press conferences under Truman,
Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson; yet. the tension between Nixon and the press
reached an unprecedented level, especially after the onset of the Watergate scandal.
During a pre-ss conference in August of 1973, CBS's Dan Rather began his question, "{
want to state this question with due respect for your office," and Nixon cut him off and
stated, "That would be unusuaJ."91 Unfortunately, the heated tension caused the press
conference to deteriorate into a bickering contest and undennined the peop~e's confidence
in President

N~xon.

Hoping to decrease the level of hostility that existed during Nixon's press
conferences, President !Ford made a number of changes. These changes became apparent
nineteen days after his Inauguration when he held his first press conference. 92 President
Ford allowed reponers to ask follow-up questions if they were not satisfied with the
presidem's response to their questions and moved the reporters' chairs closer to the
podium. Ford wanted to rearrange Nixon's press conference sening completely in order

Gergen, p. 84.
Melvin Small. The Presiden.c)' of Richard Ni:XJJn (La werence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1999),
p.228.
91 WiUi'am L. Rivers. The Olher Government; Power & the Washington Media (New York: Universe
Books. 1982), p. 206.
91 Jerald F, terHorst. Gerald Ford and the Furure ojtlte Presidency (New York: Joseph Okpaku Publishing
Company, Inc., 1974). p. 189.
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to symbolize a fresh start. Unlike President Nixon who spoke with a blue velvet curtain
in the background, Ford decided to stand on the other side of the room, in front of a
doorway leading to the Great Hall of the White House. Ford's first Press Secretary Jerald
terHorst states that this backdrop of the open door was a "symbolic reference to Ford's
'open' administration." In an aside, terHorst also comments that "unlike Nixon, Ford
wore no makeup" during the press conferences. 93 Ford was not looking to hide anything;
he wanted to use the press conference to get a truthful message out

to

Americans. Ford

and his team were able to use the press conference as a way in which to reinforce
Americans confidence in the office of the presidency.
Carter's first press conference was held on February 8, 1977, and was the first of
many more to come. Barry Jagoda, Carter's television adviser during his campaign and
during the first year and a half of Carter's administration, suggested that Carter refrain
from holding his press conferences during prime time viewing. Jagoda understood that
an ,interruption of regular prime time programming annoyed and

~rustrated many

Amedc'ans, and Jagoda did not want 'to irritate the electorate. 94 These feelings of
an.Floyance are a l(eJli,ng s~gn that the American viewer had changed since the days of
Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, when a presidential televised address was a
television event that viewers did not want to miss. This idea of rlecreased presidential
audience sirze will be analyzed! in Chapter 3, but it important to note that the Carter picked
up on the early si'gns of disinterest among the American viewers.
President Carter and his staff also decided to make a commitment to hold two
press conferences each month based upon a number of different theories. Powell did not
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want Carter to "lose his feel for the medium." He stated that a president's "sense of the
issue, whjch makes the difference between an adequate response and a good one fades
quickly."95 There was also a factual aspect to their theory. By subjecting Carter to
reporters' questioning twice each month, Carter was sure to stay on top of the most
pressing issues. Powell states, " ... Even the best briefing book cannot possibly remind or
~nform a

President of everything of importance that has happened during a twO or three

month period. The danger here is that an adequate answer turns into a terrible one.'t%
Powell also believed that the president had an obligation to reach out to
AmericaJils on a regular, frequent basis. Powell states, "The American people have a
right to see how their Chief Executi ve and Commander in Chief handles himself under
tough cross-exarrunation, without benefit of a text that has been carefully polished and
endlessly rehearsed. The ability to perfonn adequately in such a situation is not tbe most
important qualification a president should have, but it is well up on the Iist. 97
Looking back on Carter's administration, however, Powell admits that this "two
press conference per month" policy was not the most effective way to communicate with
the American people. Powell states, "Our commitment to hold two a month was foolish.
A president simply has more important things to do with his time than prepare for two
full-blown press conferences each month." Carter had experimented with town hall
meetings, where he would travel to different towns around the country and hold an open
meeting in which citizens could voice their concerns. Powell believes that televising
these town hall meetings may have been a more effecti ve way to address the real
~ Jody Powell. Tire Other Side of the Story (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1984), p.
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concerns of the people. He believes this "not because the citizenry asks more intelligent
questions than the press. but because they ask questions about the things they want to
know about. ,,93 President Carter may not have been able to effectively communicate
through his press conferences. but the theory behind the frequency of his press
conferences is important for every president to consider.

The growlh ofpublic relations components ofpresidential staffs

As presidents became more comfortable with and more reliant on television, the
importance of the White House press office began to grow. During the newspaper era,
the president's press office consisted of a few aides whose role was to provide sustenance
to the fifty or so newspaper reporters. These reporters spent their time in a pressroom the
size of a regular hotel room. 99 President Franklin D. Roosevelt hired the White House's
fi,rst press secretary, Stephen Early, in order to authorize the use of direct quotes from the
president in news articles. loo President Truman was the first president ever to hire a
media advisor to help him with the delivery of his speeches. lOl
It was during President Eisenhower's administration that the press office began to

take on a much broader role. Before his administration, the press secretary did not playa
very important function. For example, press secretary Stephen Early's role was minimal
compared to what the job entailed during Eisenhower's administration and the
administrations to follow. In an excerpt from Early's diary, he explains a typicaJ day in
which he held a press conference, arranged for photographers to come to the White
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House, wrote a memorandum, and then "left the office about noon and took Helen and
the kids to the circus."l1)2 Starting with Eisenhower's administration, this type of
schedule for the press secretary would be unheard of.
President Eisenhower's press secretary, James Hagerty, came into the
administration with great enthusiasm and high expectations for the future of presidential
communication. He knew that there would be no half days in his future. The day
President Eisenhower took office, Hagerty stated, "We are in a day of a new medium 
television. I would like to work out with television representatives ... a system whereby
the president could give talks to the people of the country - possibly a press conference 
on television ... about once a month."lo3 Hagerty was able to influence the networks so
thal they would broadcast all that he asked of them. Political scientist Elmer Cornwall
stated, "It was Jim and not the networks that decided the newsworthiness of a given
presidentia~ stalement.!(» Hagerty's determination and innovative thin.king was the style

of press secretary leadership that would be necessary in the period of network
domination.
The president began to rely upon his communication staff even more heavily
during the period of network domination. An effective commun.ication staff became an
absolute necessity. Instead of a hotel room sized pressroom, a briefing room was
constructed above the swirnnllng poo1. IOS The public relations component of presidential
staffs exploded under the Nixon administration. Nixon recruited a diversified sUlff from
the broadcasting, advertising, and public relations fields in order to help him reach out to

101 Stephen T. Early Diary, May 8. 1934, Early Papers. FOR Library.
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the public. Nixon's adviser Herbert Klein stated, "When one looks at the memos wrilten,
ilhe hours in meetings, the long informal discussions, one might think that the White
House staff was made up basically of top PR men from New York, with the help of a few
other PR experts from perhaps Washington, Chicago, and LA."I06 And, Klein's
assessment of the staff was true. Nixon hired aides who had worked as broadcast
program managers, broadcast news reporters, newspaper editors, television news
producers, advertising accountants, and television production experts. Klein described
this extreme focus on the media as an "obsession." Klein stated, "It seemed to me that
half of the President's staff considered themselves experts on the press and public

I
I
I

adminisrrations as presidents became increasingly concerned with controlling the

I

Office of Communication for the Executive Branch. The commencement of this office

~

relations,"I07 Nixon set a precedent, and this "obsession" would continue into future

message conveyed to Americans.
One of Nixon's first acts as president was the inauguration of the White House's

marked a significant change in the mentality of the president during the time of network
domililation; the president must be actively strengthening and using his relationship with
television effectively,lOS This office's primary role was to ensure that a favorable
portrayal of the Administration was appearing on the television screens of Americans.
FCC Commissioner Nicholas Johnson claimed that Nixon's new staff created "the
overwhelming impression of an Adminislration whose fixed focus is on the little glass
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screen:O'I Nixon's diversified staff brought the ability to communicate with Americans to
a new, professional level and served as an example for presidents to come.
The presidents after Nixon continued to follow his precedent, and President Ford
added an even greater component to his staff. Ford needed assistance with the delivery of
his 1975 Address to the Nation, and he hired former CBS news producer Robert Mead to
help him. Mead was tile first television expert hired since Robert Montgomery during the
Eisenhower administration; yet, Mead's role was much more crucial to the president than
Montgomery's had been. Mead believed that enough practice would make Ford's address
perfect. Mead hired a CBS production unit consisting of a twelve-person crew and rented
a state of the art VPS 100 Teleprompting system from Q-TV in New York so that
President Ford could practice before his big event." D Mead thought of everything; he
decided the Address should take place in the more intimate setting of the wrote House
library and even thouglilt to have a log burning in the fIreplace. After witnessing
President Ford's execution of the Address, the Washington Post's David Broder wrote,
"No president probably ever rehearsed more carefull y for an address." III This was yet
another step in the evoJving presidential embrace of television, but more importantly, in
the institutionalizing of the present's new role as communicator-in-chief.

Presidential innovations
Each president enhanced presidential conununication in his own way, either by
building upon the ideas of predecessors or by innovating. President Truman and

Minow. Martin. and Mitchell. p. 55.
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111 David Broder. HFor~ Careflllly Rehearsed' 'Make-or-Break' Speech:' Washington Post (January l4,
1975), p. A3.
100

110

I
I

I
I
I
I

I
I
I
I
I

58
President Eisenhower's press conference innovations have already been discussed, but
other important communication tools were developed during the period of network
domination.
President Kennedy was the first to truly diversify his use of television to
communicate with the American people. President Eisenhower allowed staged, stuffy
cabinet meetings to be filmed, but President Kennedy wanted to reach to the public on a
more intimate level. Kennedy's live press conferences proved to be a successful
communication outlet, but Kennedy and his staff recognized the need for other
communication strategies as well. Salinger stated that the press conference was not "the
be-all and end-all as far as educating or communicating to the American people. It is one
vehicle."m Kennedy experimented with other televised "vehicles" in order to make the
tmpol1ant connection with his constituents.

Television cameras were permined to follow Kennedy and his brother, Anorney
General Robert Kennedy, on a tour through the Whi te House as the two brothers
discussed the resistance to school desegregation in Alabama. JJ3 The program, entitled
Crisis, aired on ABC and also contai-ned footage of Alabama's governor George C.

Walilace decision-making meetings. Pierre Salinger deems ABC's airing of Crisis
"resulted in as important a view of the American presidency in action as television has
ever been able to present."114
President Kennedy and his staff also granted all "worthy" requests for special
televised interviews. Salinger points to Kennedy's interview with David Schoenbrun of

III "Remarks of Salinger. at the Luncheon Meeting of Public Infonnation Officers, June 8, 1961," White
House Ce ntra II Fires. John F. Kennedy Library, Box: 1L8, p. 8.
113 Minow, Martin. aI'ld MilcheU. p. 41.
'Il4 Salinger, p. 11.3.
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CBS as an "outstanding example." Schoenbrun was one of the most knowledgeable
reporters on the field of the European Common Market. In 1962, President Kennedy sent
a complicated bill to Congress, facilitating trade relations between the U.S. and members
of the European Common Market-lis Salinger stated that most Americans were
uninformed about the European Market and did not comprehend the significance of this
bill; he saw the interview as "a great way to sell our program." 116 President Kennedy
took advantage of Schoenbrun' s request and used the interview as a way to educate
Americans on the subject of the U.S. trade panem and on the imponance of establishing
trade relations with the Common Market. Salinger remarked that this interview "was just
one phase of a vast educational campaign by the government on this important point.""1
Walter Cronkite of CBS wished to commemorate the network's first thirty minute
evening news show with an exclusive interview with president Kennedy, and his request
was. granted. Although CBS recorded a half and hour of questions and answers, only
twelve minutes were broadcast. The cur footage resulted in a distortion of what the
President said about President Ngo Dinh Diem. During !:he interview, President Kennedy
spoke of his "respect and sympathy" for President Diem; unfortunately, the televised
versjon only included Kennedy's negative remarks. ll8 Salinger stated that the interview
made it seem as if Kennedy "was advocating the overthrow of Diem; in fact, it was
q,uoted, after Diem's assassination, as proof that President Kennedy really wanted Diem

ki!'led.""9
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As can be imagined, President Kennedy was deeply troubled by these false
accusations after Diem's death. President Kennedy and his staff believed that exclusive
interviews were another effective way to reach out to the public; yet, Walter Conkite's
interview powerfully illustrated the danger of cut footage and misrepresentation.
Salinger admits that the repercussions of the Cronkite interview "frightened me
terrifically because I think it did the President, and the country, a great disservice because
ilt misrepresented the President's position .... "120 When President Kennedy was asked to
g,ive an exclusive interview on NBC's Huntley-Brinkley show, Kennedy agreed under the
conclition that the White House approve the segments that would be cut from the final
version. Cronkite's interview had served as a lesson to the Kennedy administration and
would serve as a lesson to administrations to follow.
A Conversation with the President. which aired on the evening of December 17,
1962, was another way in which the Kennedy administration reached out to the public
through television. This program was set in the President's office and consisted of an
hour-long conversation between Kennedy and reporters from all three networks.
Kennedy's sincere assessment of his first two years in office was heard in the homes of
mi1llions of Americans. Salinger stated. "Never before had the American public had such
an intimate glimpse of a President: his personality, his mind at work, his sense of history
- and his sense of humor."m

I

I
I

The first lady was also involved in Kennedy's commitment to communication
with the American people. On February 14, 1962, millions of viewers followed Mrs.
Kennedy on an hour-long tour of the ,executive Mansion. Salinger deems this television

l~ Pierre Salinger, John. F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program. p. 123.
121
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event as "one of the most memorable television events of the Thousand Days. ,,122 Mrs.
Kennedy had worked hard to restore the White House and she happily agreed to CBS's
proposal. 123 Yet when the other networks discovered the plan, they were outraged.
Salit:lger stated, "They were insistent 'thal I require CBS to furnish them with tapes of the
tOlJr for simultane.ous telecast on aU three networks," Salinger refused based upon his
position that who ever comes up' with a good idea, be it a magazFne, a newspaper, or a
television network, they get the rights. The ABC and NBC continued to pressure
Sallinger, and he was forced to go to President Kennedy in order to resolve the situation.
Due to the belief that the Executive Mansion was public domain, Kennedy decided that
all three networks be allowed to telecast the tour, with the condition that CBS be given
fuJI credit on the air. 'u
Presidents Truman and Eisenhower made use of the domestic ceremony as an
occas'ion for public statements, but Kennedy modernized that approach and used it

fOUf

,times as often as Truman and Eisenhower. 125 As seen in Figure 2.3 and Table 2.3,
Johnson learned from the success of Kennedy's domestic ceremony and held a domestic
ceremony on an average of three per week. Kennedy and Johnson realized that domestic
ceremonies are appealing television presentations and have the ability to lift the spirits of
the people and saw them as an excellent form of publicity .'26

Figure 2.3 goes here
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Table 2.3: Comparative Use of Presidential Ceremonies
President
Truman
Eisenhower
Kennedy
Johnson

Number of Domestic Ceremonies

226
233
321
841

Yearly Average
29.1
29.1
110.7
164.9

Source: Hart, Roderick. The Sound ofLeadership. Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1987, p. 24.

Apart from his institution of the White House Office of Communication for the
Executive Branch, Nixon is also known for other contributions to presidential
communication. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson had engaged in conversations with
news reporters and perrnined these conversations to be broadcast at a later dale. Nixon
took the innovative step ofmakililg these conversations live. By doing so, he created
another way to present his views to an average audience of more than 55 million people.
Time magazine described these "live conversations" as a "public relations triumph for

Richard Nixon.'''21
Nixon was also an innovator in terms of his use of prime time television. During
the first 18 mOFlths of his presidency. Nixon appeared in prime time as frequently as
Presidents Eisenhower, Kelilnedy and Johnson combined during their first 18 months in
office. Nixon appeared on primetime 31 times during the first 39 months in office.
Johnson only appearedl24! Limes in 5 years, Kennedy appeared 10 times in 3 years, and
Eisenhower only 23 times in 8 years. In 1970. Nixon's State of the Union Address was
broadcast at 12:30 p.m. EST and reached an audience of 22.5 million Americans. The
following year the address was moved to prime lime, reaching an audience of 54.4

In Minow, Manin. and Mitchell. p. 57.
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million people. The audience size doubled just by changing the time to prime time, and
this made a huge impact upon Nixon and presidents to come. A prime time precedent
was set for future presidents to follow. l28 It is clear that each president since President
Truman has made meaningful contributions to the quality of presidential communication.

Conclusion
The relationship between the president and television has been evolving since the
birth of television. Presidents have learned from the successes and the failures of their
predecessors. Theodore Roosevelt's "bully pulpit," has never been so bully as in the first
three decades after television became a commercial medium in America. But the salad
days of three-network television were coming to an end in the 19805. and this would
spur-lndeed require- a more complex evolution for the presidential use for television.
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Chapter 3
The Strategies of Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush

Introduction.

I
I
I
I
I
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Presidential communication began to take on a whole new meaning with the onset
of cable television. Prior to this new development, the three main networks dominated
television, and it was easy for presidents to target and to reach their intended audience.
But the numerous program options available with cable television now made the audience
much more differentiated, complex, and difficult to contact; cable television transformed
the American audience into an elusive, moving target. For this reason, it was necessary
for presidents to sharpen and to modernize their communication skills in order to keep up
with the changing television technology. This chapter will compare the strategies of
presidents in the era dominated by three television networks to the strategies of
Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush in this era of cable television.

The new challenges of cable television
By 19'85,43% of households were-eable subscribers; viewers were no longer
limited to netwolik broadcasts but had access to a wide variety of television

t

programming. l As mentioned in Chapter 1, the increase in the popularity of cable
television caused a downward spiral of network viewing.:! Viewers had so many options
that they were finding more attractive programming on th_e over 500 cable stations that
became available to many households. Thus presidents no longer had the captive
audience they once had when television was dominated by the three networks.

1

Nielsen Media Research.
fred MacDonald, One Na/ion Under Television (New York: Pantheon Books. 1990), p. 230.
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It is true that the public's reliance upon television as an infonnation source has
increased over the years; yet the public's desire to tune into presidential speeches and
addresses has diminished with the advent of more programming options. Since the rise in
cable television, a sharp decline in presidential television audience size has become
strikingly apparent. On January 23, 1980, 58% of American households owning a
television were tuned into President Caner's State of the Union messages. 3 Carter's
televised policy addresses reached an average audience of 69 million Americans. 4 But
soon thereafter, cable television began to take hold of the nation, and presidential
television appearances no longer attracted as many viewers.
It is clear that presidential viewing audiences have changed drastically over time.
It can be hypothesized that this decline varies in severity according to the type of
televised address (state of the union message, policy address, news conference), the time
of the address, and the president's approval ratings. It is possible that certain types of
addresses and certain time slots attract a larger viewing audience. It is also possible lhat
the level public support for the president can influence the size of the audience.
After analyzing the Nielsen data from 139 televised presidential, primetirne
addresses from 1969 to 1998, an extremely sharp decline in presidential viewing
audiences is evident. A decrease in audience size can be found in all presidential
televised addresses, regardless of the type of address or of the time slot. Yet it is
interesting to note that in keeping with the hypothesis, the severity of the decline does
differ according the type of the address and according to the time slot. Furthermore,

3
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contrary to the hypothesis, a decline in audience size is also evident regardless of the
president's approval ratings at the time of the address.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the decline in the presidential audience size from 1969 to
1998. As seen in the graph, a high of 54% was hit in 1970 during the Nixon
administration. After a low of 39% in 1972, auclience size continued to steadily increase
until 1980. From 1980 on, the audience size has steadily fallen. Funhermore, Figure 3.2
illustrates the decline in presidential audience by administration. The average viewing
audience actually increased slightly from President Nixon to President Carter. Yet there
is a significant difference between President Carter's average audience of 49% and
President Reagan's average viewing audience of 37%. The Reagan administration marks
ririe beginning of the decline in presidential audience size. After his administration, the
audience size was never the same.

Figure 3.1 goes here
Figure 3.2 goes here
This decline directly correlates with the rise in cable television among American
households. Americans no longer wanted to tune into the three major networks to watch
a presidential address when they had hundreds of cable television options. As seen in
Figure 3.3, the average percentage of television households tuned into one of the three
major broadcast networks ("netshare") during primetime has declined, while the
percentage of American households subscribing to cable has increased. It is clear that
cable television has. gready affected Ithe president's ability to reach Americans; as cable
subscribers have increased, presidentilal auclience size has decreased.

Figure 3.3 goes bere

Figure 3.1: Average Size ofPresidentiaI Viewing Audience 1969-1998
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Figure 3.2: Average Audience Size for Presidential Addresses by Administration
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This decrease in audience size is true of all.televised presidential appearances.
Figure 3.4, Figure 3.5, and Figure 3.6 reveal [he average audience size for primetime
policy addresses, news conferences, and state of the union messages from 1969 to 1998.
As displayed in Figure 3.4, the audience size for primetime policy addresses increased
from 47% under the Nixon administration to 52% under the Ford administration; but,
beginning with the Reagan administration, audience size has declined with each new
administration.
Although Nielsen did not collect data for President Bush's news conferences,
Figure 3.5 nonetheless demonstrates a decline in audience size for televised news
conferences as well. Nixon's average news conference audience was 49% and tlUs rate
declined beginning with Reagan and ultimately dropped to 20% in the Clinton
administration.
Finally, audience size for state of the union messages has also declined. As seen
in Figure 3.6, there was a slight decline in audience size under the Ford administration,
but audience size increased to 53% during the Carter administration. Yet, once again,
beginning with the Reagan administration, audience size dropped with every succeeding
admi ni stration.

Figure 3.4 goes here
Figure 3.5 goes here

Figure 3.6 goes here
There was a decline in alllhree types of televised addresses, yet Figures 3.7 and
3.8 iJlustrate that tlUs rate of decline varies according to the type of presidential
appearance. During the Nixon, Ford, and Caner administrations, state of the union

Figure 3.4: Average Audience Share for Presidential Policy Addresses
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Figure 3.5: Average Audience Size for News Conferences
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messages had the smallest audience size. Yet, after the Carter administration, state of the
union messages have received the highest audience ratings of the three types of addresses
studied. This could be due to the fact that state of the union messages occur infrequently
and are highly publicized events. Furthermore, news conferences have received the
lowest audience size ever since the Carter administration.

Figure 3.7 goes here
Figure 3.8 goes here
Is there a difference in audience size according to the time at which the
presidential appearance is aired? Figures 3.9 and 3.10 reveal that audience size for
presidential appearances has declined regardless of the times at which they occur. Yet it
is interesting to note that a difference in audience size can be found at different times.
Unfortunately, Nielsen only included data for Bush's speeches that took place at 9 pm
EST. Yet it is nonetheless evident that presidential appearances on television before 9
pm EST reached a smaller audience than presidential appearances after 9 pm EST. The
larger audience size for addresses after 9pm EST could be anributed to the fact that this is
a much more convenient time for working Americans, especially those in the western
time zones.

Figure 3.9 goes bere
Figure 3.10 goes here
Finally, is there a correlation between audience size and the president's public
approval? Figure 3.11 shows that for Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter, the average
audience size is strikingly similar to the president's average approval rate. In fact,
President Carter's average audience size and his average rate of public approval differed
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by only one one-hundredth of a percentage point. Yet, beginning with President Reagan,
average audience sizes began to decline regardless of the president's approval ratings.
Figure 3.11 shows that while 71 % of Americans approved of President Bush, only 35%
of Americans tuned into hils terlevision appearances. This is a telling discovery; the
majority of Americans supported Bush, but they stiU did not feel inclined to watch his
attempt to communicate with them. Public opinion may have played a role in audience
size before cable lelevision, but Figure 3.11 reveals that no maner what the public felt
about Ithe president,

~hey

were not

I.~kely

to tune in.

Figure 3.11 goes here
This analysis of 139 primetime addresses from 1969 to 1998 powerfully
iHustra~es

the profound impact made by cable television on the president's ability to

reach Americans through television. In each figure, the decline in audience size begins
with the Reagan administration, the onset of the era of cable television, and never
recovers. Cable television offered Americans other viewing alternatives, and the public
was no longer the captive audience they once were with network domination.
Joe S. Foote conducted a significant study during the 1986-1987 season,
illustrating the audience's new tendency to switch to cable programming when the
presfdent appeared on all three networks. His study sought to determine the average
number of audience households who watched television during 9 prime-time presidential
appearances in that season. It found that while the presidential speeches deterred viewers
from watching network programming, there was no difference between the number of
households watching television on preSidential speech evenings and on non-presidential
speech eveni,ngs.
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The study revealed that, on average, 11.1 million fewer households watched a
presidential appearance than the regular program it replaced. One of the highest rates of
defection

~n

this study occurred when President Reagan addressed the nation in March of

1986 with regard to Contra aid funding to rebels in Nicaragua. This address caused 16
million households to change to a channel that was not carrying the President's speech.
Foote states, A substantial number of Americans made a conscious decision to avoid just
II

the- President's message, watch an alternative program, then quickly return to network
programming. ,,5
The ratings for independent stations in New York rose by as much as 75% for
some stations during President Reagan's State of the Union Address in 1987.
FunherrnoFe, when President George H. W. Bush's first prime time televised news
cOD.ference delayed the beginning of "The Cosby Show," so many viewers defected from
Bush's appearance that the hit show received its worst ratings of the year. Foote states,
"Millions of viewers obviously went elsewhere when they saw the President appear on
the screen rather than Bill Cosby."6
The advent of cable television made reaching the American public increasingly
harder for the modem president. Ronald Reagan's presidency marks the transition from a
television era dominated by the three networks to a new, more complex and challenging
television era dominated by numerous programming options. In order to overcome this
new challenge, it was necessary for President Reagan and those presidents who foHowed
to go beyond tfue communication methods developed by previous presidents and to invent
new ways to reach this much more differentiated audience.

S Foote,
6

Foote,

p. 154.

p. 155.
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Reagan's working relationship with the press

In 1965, Ronald Reagan admined, "The shape of television-except for its
mammoth size- is not yet clear to me ...The single stunning success of such things as TV
dinners bears witness to the strength of television's grasp on the public - and upon me as
well ..,7 Yet, by the time he became president, Reagan seemed to have fully grasped the
true "shape" of television and understood how to utilize "the strength of television's grasp
on the publ1ic" to his political advantage. He capitalized upon his skills as an actor, his
abi,lity to communicate with others, and his knowledge of the importance of establishing
a relationship with the press. This allowed Reagan, unlike presidents before him, to
establish a working, peaceful relationship with the Washington press corps; Reagan and
his team were able to win over the press and completely use and manipulate it to their
political advantage.
The hostility and the feeling of contempt for the press did not exist during the
Reagan administration. David Gergen, who worked as Reagan's director of
communications as well as for Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Clinton, states, "Of the six
presidents I have known, all but one have felt battered, even brutalized, by the
press ....Reagan stands out as the exception."s And an exasperated David Burke, ABC's
vice president, wondered, "I don't know how to explain why he hasn't been as vulnerable
to the onslaught as some American presidents. It's a hard subject for me ... It isn't

Ronald Reagan. W/lere's the Rest of Me? (New York: Karz Publishers, 1981). p. 294.
David Gergen. Eyewitness to Power: The Essence ofLeaLkrship (New York; Simon & Schuster. 2000).
p. 184-185.
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because he intimidates us. It isn't that he blows us away with logic. So what the hell is

This peaceful relationship allowed Reagan and his team to truly take advantage of

an iliat television had to offer.

In late 1981, House Speaker Tip O'Neill even admined,

"He handles the media bener than anyone since Franklin Roosevelt, even Jack
Kennedy."IO How did Reagan create this working relationship with the press and
experience such success through television during this time of audience fragmentation?
The answer to this question lies in the powerful combination of two key elements:
Reagan's own personal ability to connect with the American people and the
"communication apparatus" that worked to mani pulate the television to Reagan's

I

advantage. The product of this powerful formula won him a reputation as the "Great
Communicator. ,,11

I

The personal anrihutes ofthe "Great Communi!:ator"
AHhough Reagan had a strong support system behind him, many people credit
Reagan alone for the success he was able to stir up through television. David Gergen
states, "I was one of Reagan's first 'directors of communication' at the White House.

I
I
I
I
I

The title was. a misnomer. He was director, producer, and star all rolled into one - the
'Communicator in Chief from the beginning to the end of his presidency .... When the
curtain went up, he stood center stage alone.,,12 Reagan's unique personality and

Mark Hensgaard. On 8ended Knee: The Press and the Reagan Presidency (New York: Farrar Straus
Giroux. 1988). p. 4.
10 Gergen. p. t85.
II Robert E. Denton. Jr.. The Primetime Presidency of RonalLJ RenglUl (New York: Praeger. 1988). p. J.
12 Gergen. p. 211.
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Hollywood background allowed him to reach out easily and connect to the American
people.
One of Reagan's strengths was the "good guy" image that he seemed to embody,
what Gergen described as an "aw shucks" mannerY His speeches conveyed images of
personal courage and self-sacrifice. 14 Even during his acting days, directors were
incapable of assigning him a villainous role; Reagan seemed to embody the wholesome
American stereotype. Tom Shales of the Washington Post joklngly wrote, " ... Put hi min
a room, just him and a camera and 80 million folks out there in television land, and he's
Johnny Carson, Grandpa Walton and Big Bird all rolled into one."IS Reagan projected
himself as a man of values and understanding, and this image appealed to the American
people.
This wholesome image allowed Reagan to connect with an audience. Audience
members feb as' though Reagan was talking to them, not over them. Gergen states,
"Reagan could reacb people with his speeches because he felt an emotional bond with
them. They were not "children" to him, as they were for Nixon; they were fellow
Americans."16 Reagan seemed to capture the sentiments of the people in his speeches.
Afterthe ChaUenger tragedy, Reagan's speech verbalized the internal feelings of many
Americans. During his speech in honor on the fortieth anniversary of D-Day, Reagan
"put himself in the shoes of the men who had climbed up Pointe de Hoc and described
what they felt inside.'H7

IJ

Gergen. p. ~85.

I~ Roben E. Denton and

Gary C. Woodward, Polincal CommWlicarion in America (New York: Praeger.
1990), p. 178.
15 Tom Shales. "Reaga.vision: The Baule Continues," in Los Angeles Times, Friday, March 26, 1982. p. 17.
16 Gergen, p. 200.
17 Ibid.
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In his autobiography An American Life, Reagan explains the origin of this ability
[0

truly connect with his audience. "When I was a spons announcer," he writes, "I

reamed something about communicating with people I never forgot." 18 Reagan's friends
used to gather at the local barbershop in order to listen to his sports broadcasts. During
his broadcasts, he would picture his friends together and pretend that he was talking
directly to them. He would imagine their reactions to his choice of words or to his
intonation and make adjustments according to his friends' imagined responses. Reagan
states, "Over the years. I've always remembered that, and when I'm speaking to-a crowd 
or on television - I try to remember that audiences are made up of individuals and I try to
speak as if I am talking to a group of friends ... not to millions, but to a handful of people
in a living room ... or in a barbershop."19 Reagan knew all the right things to say and just
the right way to say them.

Reagan also possessed an amazing ability to improvise and to remain cairn during
awkward public moments. Gergen remembers one of these moments occurred in April of
1982 when Reagan was delivering a prime time speech in order to build sup'port for his
economic program. Gergen suggested that the President use an easel and charts and that
he draw a red line to show the economic consequences of not enacting his budget. The
speech was rehearsed a few hours before the 9:00 PM Eastern slot, and everything ran
smoothly.
Yet disaster struck during the speech as Reagan attempted to draw in the red line.
Reagan stated,. "Our original cuts totaled $101 billion. They (pause) r can't make a big
enough mark to show you." Gergen recalled, " 'Screeeccch!' That was all that could be

18
19

ROFlald Reagan. An American life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990). p. 246.
Reagan. p. 247.
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heard or seen. No line. An awful silence." The cover had not been replaced on the red
pen after the rehearsal and it had dried out. Fortunately, television produced Mark Goode
had a backup on hand, and he immediately started crawling across the Oval Office to
make the jmportant handoff. Gergen recalls, "A twinkle carne into Reagan's eye.
Reaching off camera and without missing a beat, he told the audience, 'Now my pen is
worklng.' Magically, the line appeared. The night was saved." Gergen includes this
story

~n

his memoirs because it reveals Reagan's presence and level-headedne.ss. He

states, "] have long imagined that if Nixon had been giving that speech; he would have
thrown us out the garden window .... ,,20
Reagan also projected appealing themes to Americans during his speeches. In his
fareweH address on January 11, 1989, Reagan stated, "I won a nickname, 'the Great
Communicator.' But I never thought it was my style or the words I used that made a
difference: It was the content. I wasn't a great communicator, but I communicated great
things." Despite Reagan's assessment, his style was important, but his content equaled it
in importance. Reagan focused on inspiring themes such as freedom, honor, and
patriotism. Gergen stated, "In the politics of the late 1970s, when millions were
disillusioned and worried that the country was on a slide, Reagan communicated a vital
message: American could regain its glory if it found its core values, and he was the man
who would lead the way." This message touched and comforted the majority of
Americans. There were certainly those Americans who did not see the importance of his
message, but "to Main Street, he was a 'Communicator of great things.'

~Gergen. p. 214.
~I Gergen. p. 216-211.
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Reagan's understanding of the importance of humor also helped him
communicate to Americans. He stated. "I've always found humor is a good way to get an
audience's anention. and for years I've been mentally collecting quotes and jokes to use in
speeches. ,,22 This communication tool is vital to the success of being able to connect with
an audience. Robert E. Denton. Jr. and Gary C. Woodward. co-authors of Political

Communication in America, characterize humor as "the modem emblem of power in a
savvy, subtle, sensual television era."n Although many Americans could easily forget
the detaHs of Reagan's speeches. the memory of the laughter that he was able to provoke
is somedting that will stay with audience members. Gergen declares, "Everyone still
associates Reagan with laughter."24
Reagan's delivery of his speeches was nearly flawless. ffis experience as an actor

and the thousands of speeches he made during his political career allowed him to perfect
his ability ,to reach an audience through timing and cadence. He wrote, "Here's my
formul1a: I usually start with ajoke or something to catch the audience's attention; then I
teEl then what I am going to tell them; I tell them, and then I tell them what I just told
tbem.,,25 Reagan had internalized certain "tricks of the Lrade." Gergen summarizes
Reagan's tricks as: prepare carefully, keep it short. keep it brisk. use the language of the
livLng room, look for catchy phrases, use occasional props, be positive, anticipate critics,
and have a good closer. 26 Reagan had his communication down to a science, and his'
technrque seemed to work. His personal attributes and communication skills enabled him
to ovepcome the decrease in potential television viewing audience and truly impact those

n Reagan. p. 247.
~l Denton and Woodward. pAS.
24 Gergen, p. 234.
:!.l Reagan. p. 247.
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Americans he did have the chance to reach. But Reagan's individual qualities are only
one piece of the puzzle; the communication apparatus thallay behind him must also be
credited for the success of Reagan's relationship with the press.

1he "terribLy cunning aides"

Reagan's communication staff worked like no presidential staff before it to
generate a positive image of the President through television. Television critic Tom
Shales Slates, "It is potentially a very sinister combination -this enormously charismatic
President, this figure-head that everyone loves, and this [collection] of aides who are
terribly cunning about how to put their boy across ...These guys understand television so
much bener, and they understand that television is what you have to understand.'>27 The
ancholi and managing editor of NBC Nightly News, Tom Brokaw, stated, "Reagan's got
that kind of broad-based philosophy about how he wants the government to run and he's
got

an these killers who are willing and able to do that for hirn.,,28
Reagan's communication team, particularly Michael Deaver and David Gergen,

had a sophisticated knowledge of the workings of the media based upon their own
indivi'dual knowledge and upon an analysis of what strategies had been successful in
previous administrations. Their knowledge and skill enabled them to completely reinvent
the idea of using television to promote the president. Mark Hertsgaard, a member of
Reagan's team, stated, ''They introduced a new model for packaging the nation's lOp

16

Gergen, p. 235-244.

27

Hertsgaard, author's interview, p. 50.
Hertsgaard, p. 5.

28
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politician and uSlng the press to .seJi1 him." Referring to Deaver and Gergen, Hertsgaard
admitted, "If they did not exactly get away with murder, they came pretty c1ose.,,29

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

The "killers' " strategy was based on the necessity of using the press and the
television to Reagan's advantage. Americans may not tune into presidential speeches, but
the still watched the news. If Reagan's team could control the messages that appeared on
the news. they could effectively communicate with Americans. As ABC reporter Dan
Banis points out, soundbites become increasingly important in the era of audience
fragmentation. 30 Hertsgaard reveals that the "objective was not simply to tone the press
but to transfonn it into an unwitting mouthpiece of the govemment; it was one of
Gergen's guiding assumptions that the administration simply could not govern effectively
unless it could 'get the right story out' through the 'filter of the press.,,,3J
The press is what influences the minds of Americans when making a judgment of
the president, and therefore the press must be controlled. Instead of trying to circumvent
the press to communicate with the American people, an attempt made by previous
presidents, Reagan and his tearn sought to use the press by manipulating television to
their political advantage. Without control, the press was a danger to the administration.
Pollster Richard Wirthlin states, '"The more influence they could exert over how
Reagan's policies were portrayed in the press, the greater were the White House's
chances of triggering widespread disaffection or endangering Mr. Reagan's fe-election
chances. ,,12

:?'I

30

Heltsgaard, p. 5.
Dan Harris, interview conducted by the author, March 8, 2002.

~I
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Gergen reveals, "I was convinced that Reagan had to be on the offensive on his
communication." Gergen believes !.hat the control of the "bully pulpit" had left the hands
of the president and was being dominated by :the television networks. He states,
"Executive producers in New York had become the arbiters of what Americans heard and
saw of their president, and what was corning through diminished both the voice and
statiUre of the only person elected by voters to lead the nation." He goes on to declare, "A
more aggressive, cynical press corps was making it too difficult to govern. It was time to
take the

pu~pit

back."))

Reagan's team created an elaborate communication apparatus to reclaim the
"bully pulpit." It seemed as though the entire administration was focu.sed on the goaJ of
controlling the media and using it to their own advantage. Her1sgaard staleS, "To be sure,
Reagan's was hardJly the first administration to establish a public relations apparatus
within the White House. But few, if any, administrations had exalted news management
to as centra1l a role in the theory and practice of governance as Reagan's did." Peggy
Noonan, one of Reagan' s speechwriters recalls, "When I was in the White House, TV
was no longer the prime means of receiving the presidency, TV in a way was the
presidency... and decisions were made with TV so much in mind, from the photo op to
the impromptu remark on the way to the helicopter, that the President's aides who
planned the day were no longer just pan of the story - it was as if they were the
producers of tbe story. They were the line producers of a show called While House, with
Ronald Reagan as President.":W Leslie Janka, a deputy press secretary for the Reagan
administration who later resigned, stated, ''The whole thing was PRo This was a PR outfit

33
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that became President and took over the country. And to the degree then to which the
Constitution forced them to do things like make a budget, run foreign policy and all that,
they sort of did. But their first, last and overarching activity was public relations.,,35
[t is clear that an obsession with public relations and the packaging of the
president developed and grew during the Reagan administration. Yet the actual players
are not so willing to admit to this obsession. Hertsgaard reveals that Gergen and Deaver
worked closely together and "flourished on the basis on their common appreciation of the
supreme importance of good propaganda to a modern presidency. Neither man would put
[t

quite that way, of course.,,36 And, when retelling the beginning stage of Reagan's

presidency,. Gergen recalls. "With the help of our 100 Day Plan, we were off and running
in those opening months. Or was it off and spinning, controlling, elbowing, and
manipulating? It may depend on one's perspective."3? During their time working for the
Reagan administration, Deaver, Gergen, and the other members of the communication
team created .a powerful strategy to use the news to their own advantage. And it was this
strategy that helped to compensate for the declining size of the audience able to be
reached t~rough prime time addresses or news conferences. Their powerful plan was
imp'lemented in several different lines of attack.

I

I
I
I
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Implementlltion o/the strategy:
"Spin Patrol"

Reagan's communication team set out to control all the messages that were
received by Americans through the press, and they soon became known as the "spin
patrol.,,3& Deputy White House press secretary under the Reagan administration Marlin
Fitzwater defines spin as "the weaving of basic truth into the fabric of a lie, the
production of a cover garment that protects, or obscures, or deflects public examination."
He sta!.es that spinning is especially easy in the White House because "the process
Fequ~res

fortress-liJke credibility and incredible galL No maner how great the siege of the

White House, people still want to believe the president and those who speak for rum."39
The Reagan administration as not afraid to take advantage of the public's vulnerability,
and David Gergen was the leader of the crusade to spin the news.
FitzwateT states that Gergen was dubbed the "spin master," because he possessed
"a special knack for engaging a reporter in discussion, ascertaining the reporter's attitude
on an issue, and, in mid-conversation, turning his explanation to fit the reporter's bias.'>JO
Gergen would caJIl up reporters and major networks in order to influence their portrayal
of the president in a panicular story. An article in The National Journal quoted one of
Reagan's offidals as stating that Gergen regularly "called all three major networks about
an hour and a half before their final deadline to find out what they were going with. And
then, for the

nex~

hour, to hour and a half, there was a flurry around here trying to

,7 Gergen. p. 185.
Gergen. p. 187.
Marlin Fitzwater. Call the Briefing! Reagan and Bush, Sam and Helen: A Decade with Presidews and
the Press (New York: Random House. L995). p. 220.
38
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influence what they were doing." The article also included a statement by Deaver
upholding Gergen's routine and explaining that it was "absolutely necessary.'-.ll
Joanna Bistany, one of Gergen's deputies, stated, "Gergen made a very conscious
effort at the start to concentrate on the networks," and that "on deadline" calls to the
Iiletworks were made "five, maybe ten times, maybe fifteen."J2 CBS was Gergen's most
frequent target. CBS anchor Dan Rather states that the routine calls were "designed to
make us think twice. I don't care how good you are, in some ways, on some days, it is
bound to work on your subconscious. We are better at resisting it, but we are not perfect
at resisting it.'>J3 Senior producer of the CBS Evening News Tom Bettag also stated, "A
call even from a Gergen is no small thing. It's a sort of subtle reminder usually over
relati1vely small details. There was no 'Don't run that story!' They understand how much
we brace at anything smacking of overt control. Usually it was more like, 'We wonder if

· that. ... '
you re aI lze

,>oW

Gergen himself upheld his actions during an interview with Mark Hertsgaard. He
did claim that some accusations, such as the comment made by Dan Rather, were slightly
exaggerated. Gergen stated that "Dan's views were taken a little out of context" and that
their conversations were usually initiated by Rather. Yet Gergen believed in his right to
call and persuade the networks. He stated, 'TI a story comes out that puts a bad spin on
things or reaHy distorts the news from our point of view, if it is really egregious,

41
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particularly on facts, I had no hesitation about calling them up and saying, 'We've got a
real problem with this story. ",45
Yet in Gergen's own book Eyewitness to Power, he is more regretful of his
actions taken to spin the news. This may be attributed to the fact that his book was just
recently published in 2000, whereas Hertsgaard's book was published in 1988. When
writing his own book, Gergen had more time to see how his actions have influenced other
administrations. Gergen also saw frrst hand how his precedent of spinning the news
played om when he served on President Clinton's communication team, which will be
discussed in the succeeding chapter. Gergen notes the successes of the Reagan
communication team, but also points out that he made his share of mistakes. He writes,
"In particular, I find it painful how some of the initiatives I helped to launch, have
become exaggerated and misshapen in current politics. I worked hard under Reagan to
persuade the press corps that he was on the right track ...Reporters began calling it 'the
spin patrol. '" He goes on to claim, "Those efforts were fair, in my )mdgment, but in the
years since, spin has become a twisted form of propaganda."J6 It is true that Gergen may
have set into motion a practice that now inhibits reporting the full truth with regard to the
president. hut this practice was only duplicated because future adminislrations recognized
the success it brought to the Reagan administration.

~s Hertsgaard. p. 31.
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Visuals

It was clear to Reagan and to his staff that Reagan's popularity needed to be

managed by controlling the images that Americans saw on television:H They knew that
visual imagery would help during this time of highly differentiated television viewing
patterns. A viewer may not be likely to sit and watch a presidential speech or a long
news segment on the President, but flashes of image-building pictures of the President
would be sure to capture the audience's anention. Reporter Sam Donaldson stated that
Deaver and Gergen understood "a simple truism about television: the eye always
predominates over the ear when there is a fundamental clash between the twO.,,48
Fnnhermore, the images helped Reagan's team to control what repoFters would
say about the President. Gerald Pomper, professor of political science at the Eag1eton
Institute of Politics at Rutgers University, states, "Reporters can comment only in the
context of a picture~ the medium is impotent without photo-opportuni,ties and cannot
easily resist a s~ory with good visual possibilities."49 For these reasons, Reagan's staff
focused on projecting positive images of the president to the media; they gave reporters
the "photo-opportunities" that they could not resist. Larry Speakes, Reagan's deputy
Whi;te House press secretary, states, "We learned very quickly that when we were
presenting a story or trying to get our view point across, we had to think like a television
producer. And that is a minute and thirty seconds of pictures to tell a story......so

Ibid.
Hertsgaard. p. 25.
49 Gerald PompeT. The ElecTion of 1984 (Chatham. NJ: Chatham House Publishers. 1985), p. 162.
.lO Larry Speakes. Speaking Ow: TIle Reagall Presidency from Inside the White House (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons. 1988), p. 220.
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A clear example of the Reagan team utiJ,izing televised images took place in
January of 1983, during the depth of a recession. Deaver arranged for Reagan to visit a
working class bar in Boston, because he believed that a visual image of Reagan
conversing with workers over a few beers would help promote a "regular guy" image of
Reagan. Deaver states, "It may sound cynical, but you can do a lot of things cutting
programs, but a picture of an Irish President in an Irish pub with a bunch of blue-collar
workers and an Irish priest - that will last you for a long, long time."31 And, when
Reagan was pushing his education reform, Speakes states that "the visual of him was
sjning at a little desk and talking to a group of students, or with the football team and
some cheerleaders, or in a science lab." Speakes admits, "We learned very quickly that
the rule was no pictures, no television piece, no matter how important our news was." n
Reagan's communication apparatus had the visual aspect of their strategy down to
a science, and the press complied. According to Speakes, a tacit agreement became
established among Reagan' s communication team and the press. He states, "Once in
frustration, I gave a memorable retort to the press that became known as 'Speakes's
Law:" He goes on to state, "ABC television's art department even had it made into a
signlhat I put on my desk: 'You don't tell us how to stage the news and we don't tell you
how Ito cover it. ...53 Reagan's commun.ication team believed that they had the right to
stage .the news in a way to use it to their political advantage. Yet, as described in the
section above, it aJso seems that the Reagan team believed they had the right to tell the
press "how to cover ~t" as well. But the press did not seem to mind, and the Reagan
team's vilsual stra[egy was successful. "Night after night," long-time Washington
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journalist Martin Schram argued, "Reagan had his way with the TV news. He succeeded
in setting their agenda and framing their stories by posing for the cameras in one
beautiful and compelli ng setting after another. ,,54

Line pi zhe day
Another part of the strategy was the re-implementation of the "story line of the
day," which was first developed under the Nixon adminislration. S5 Each morning
Reagan's communication team they would decide upon a message to project to the
evening news networks and newspapers. Hertsgaard reveals that James Baker, Reagan's
chief of staff, as weU as Gergen, Richard Darman, Reagan's assistant, and Speakes
usually fed these meetings. An unnamed participant at these meetings who was
interviewed by Hertsgaard stated that the meetings would convene by someone asking,
"What are we going to do today to enhance the image of the President? .. What do we
want the press to cover today and how?"
The projection of a "line of the day" exemplifies the Reagan team's effort to
manipu~ate

the news to Reagan's advantage. Hensgaard states, "the very devising of a

liJile of the day was a tacit admission that what the White House told the press was not so
much the ,truth as a ,carefully calculated and sanitized version of it." ABC's Sam
Donaldson told Hertsgaard in an interview that the Reagan communication team "seems
to believe it has a divine right to do whatever it wants in the way of manipulation ...The
peop,le around Reagan, and perhaps Reagan himself, really have contempt for the press as

Speakes. p. 218.
Martin Schram. The Great AmericOJl Video Game (New York: William Morrow. 1987), p. 23.
ss Hensgaard, p. 38.
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an

~nstitution.

They believe they were born to rule, their ideology was born to prevail,

Ihal t.hey somehow are the upper class."S6

Use ofthe television raJings
Because the onset of cable television had fragmented the audience, the Reagan
communication learn put a heavy consideration upon the television ratings when making
a decision. Speakes states, 'Throughout me Reagan years, we not only played to
tel.evision, we used all of our television judgments strictly on audience size." Speakes
reveals that during Reagan's presidency Good Morning America was the number one
moming show, Dan Rather anchored the number one evening news show, and ABC's

David Bn'nkley Show was the leading Sunday show. When the communication team
wanted to get an important message out, they looked to presidential and staff appearances
on these popular shows to reach out to Americans. They understood the new trend for
viewers to change the channel when they saw the President; but, if messages were
communicated through popular shows. people would be less likely to change the channel
and more likely to absorb the ideas. Ratings reached a new importance in the new age of

•

a much more differentiated viewing audience.

A genuine communications strategy
Reagan's communication strategy, implemented through the use of "spin patrol"
techniques, the visual imagery, and the line-of-the-day, manipulated television to
generate a positive image of Reagan, and thus to generate support for him and for his
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policies among the American people. Past. presiden~ial administrations, most notably
Nixon's, considered the press to be the ultimate enemy in the quest to communicate with
Americans; the Reagan administration, however, saw the press as an accomplice.
Hertsgaard Slates, "Like a double-threat running back in football, blessed with the
strength to power his way up the middle as well as the speed to sweep the end, the
Reagan apparatus projected its messages to the American public not only by going over
lhe top of the press bur also going right through it."s7 But, what made lhe press such an
easy target? Why did the press allow itself to be controlled and elbowed?
The answer lies in the press's hunger for presidential news, which grew to an
unprecedented level during the Reagan administration. The media accepted the
controlling aspects of the Reagan apparatus in exchange for good stories about the
President. Hensgaard states, ''During the Reagan years, it was the rare network evenimg
newscast thal did not include at least one White House story."
This was not a trend based in tradition. In the past, coverage of Wasltington has
been more dispersed among the different branches of government. During the Nixon
administration, coverage began to focus more upon the president, "but it was greatly
stimulated by the arrival of the Reagan administration, with its prowess as a supplier of
attractilve visual images." Christopher Matthews, former press secretary to House speaker
Thomas "Tip" O'Neill, states that the Reagan era was "the only time in history when a
major medium had a section regularly fenced off just for the President to speak...They
know the presidency is ideally suited for the television age, because it is one person, there
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~s

all the People magazine aspect - what lis he like, what is Nancy like? It is amazing

how the monarchy translates so well ililto the te1evi'sion age and legislatures do not."
When trying to explain the press fixation with the President, The Washington

Post's Roben Kaiser states, "[The President] is the political figure that the whole country
has ,in common. If you start with that assumption, which is understandable sociologically
but bizarre journalistically, you're giving it away to this guy to begin with. You're
saying, 'Anything you do or say in public, Mr. President, is going to be news. ",ss
Therefore, the success of the Reagan tearn' s communication operation was because the
press, although somewhat resistant, Let themselves be taken advantage of in order to
satisfy .their desire for presidenrial news.

The Bush communication straJegy

As soon as he took office in January of 1989, Bush made an effort to distance
himself from the kind of manipulative media strategy that Reagan and his communication
apparatus depended upon. It was just not George Bush's style, and he rejected il from the
OutSet. The White House Office of Communications may have been Reagan's lifeline, but
it was much less significant in shaping and setting the tone for Bush's administration.
Bush wanted to make it clear that he was promoting a more open, natural image of the
presidency and nol the controlled, connived "onscreen" image projected during lhe
Reagan administration. 59
Bush did nol deem television as important a tool in communicating with the
American people as the Reagan team did; he did not want television to be the center of
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hi,s new administration. Reporter Lesley Stahl states, "This White House had a plan to

shift the emphasis from network coverage, away from the Reagan obsession with camera
angles." Bush's team would not allow their communication strategy to revolve around
deadlines set by the networks. Stahl reveals that the Bush team regarded television with
feelings of indifference. She states, "They acted as if television didn't maner,"
Stahl recounts a time when Bush went on a three-day trip to eight different cities,
aIld none of his travels were televised. According to Stahl, this lack of public relations
would have upset the Reagan team greatly, but it did not seem to bother Bush and his
stafe,o Stahl also remembers an impromptu gathering between reporters that Bush held
on the

pa~io

outside of the Oval Office. Stahl states that Bush "was so reluctant about

Itelevision, I had to beg him to wear a lavaliere microphone." She asked., "Sir, couldn't
we please clip a mike onto your tie? We're outside, and the sound won't be good." The
President responded, "Maybe I want it that way.,,61 ClearJy, television was not Bush's
mam concern.
Gerald Seib wrote in the Wall STreeT Jounull that the television reporters had once
grumbled about the "the cynical, manipulative Reagan presidency" were now upset about
the "unpackaged Bush presidency." Stahl admits that she is included in this group of
reporters. She states, "I was astonished at how sloppily Bush's events were thrown
together and how many opportunities the president lost to promote his antidrug or his
Iliteracy messages just because cameras weren't in good positions or one couldn't hear

~9 John Anthony Maltese. Spin Cf?ll1rol: ,he While House Office ojComnlunicaJion and the Management of

Presidenrial News (Chapel HiB, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1992), p. 215.
Lesley Stahl. Reporting Live (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999), p. 336.
61 Stahl. p. 336.
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what he said."62 Bush did not develop a strategy to embrace television in order to use it
to his political advantage. His indifferent feelings toward television certainly contrast
with Reagan's obsession with the medium.

I

II
I

~

Bush and his team wished to distance themselves from elements of Reagan's
communication apparatus; however, Reagan's "spin patrol" legacy implemented itself in
the Bush administration whether Bush and his staff were willing to admit it or not.
Bush's press secretary Marlin Fitzwater recalls the press conference held preceding the
fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Bush's performance during this press conference was a
public relations disaster. Fitzwater states that Bush appeared to be "uninspired" from the
onset and that during the middle of the conference "the President did the one thi ng that
made every Bush staffer start to sweat. He started sliding down in his chair." According
to Fitzwater, Bush slumping in his chair was the "absolute ironclad signal that he didn'lt

Fike what he was doing, dido't want to be there, and was probably going to show oit."
Bush began to answer question after question in a monotone voice, with his hands
folded on his chest and his head bent. At last, Lesley Stahl of CBS stated, "In what you
just said... you don't seem elated." Bush explained that he was just "not an emotional
guy" and that the fall of the Berlin Wall "pleased" him. Fitzwater reveals that after that
press conference he ran to call Stahl and stated that Bush did not want to come across as
gloating during the press conference so as not to insult Gorbachev or other Eastern
European leaders. Isn't Fitzwater's excuse for Bush's behavior just another fonn of the
"spi.n conttol" from which Bush and his team wanted to distance themselves? Reagan's
communication team hit upon a strategy that future administrations could not resist.
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Ti,e consequences of Bush' s communication strategy
Bush's reaction to the manipulation of television under the Reagan administration
may .have been too extreme. In his effort to distance himself from the stagecraft of
Reagan, Bush also inadvertently distanced himself from the American people. It is true
that Americans were disillusioned with the "onscreen," manipulated image of the
presidency, but they nonetheless expected their president to attempt to communicate with
them. Political scientists Craig Allen Smith and Kathy B. Smith support this view in
meir book 17te White House Speaks. In his effort to distance himself from Reagan, Bush
overlooked potentially effective opportunities to communicate with the American people.
Smith and Smith argue that, "Political situations rich with rhetorical potential were
repeatedly ignored by Bush... 63 His unwillingness to truly seek out the American people
weakened the relationship between the President and the public. "By avoiding public
discourse." Smith and Smith note, "Bush enabled others to charge, credibly, that he was
not in cbarge, that his policies were not coherent, that he did not care about domestic
policy, and that he was out of touch with America."64
Not only were potential television opportunities overlooked, but instances when
television could have been used to help Bush out of a difficult situation were also
overlooked. Lesley Stahl points out that Bush's fateful "Read my lips, no new taxes"
statement could have been cleared up with skillful use of television. She writes that "it
all comes back to performance on television" and that Reagan would have said, " 'I was
forced into

~t.

I had to do it.' But Bush said. 'I should not have done it.· .. Stahl believes

63 Craig Allen Smith and Kathy B. Smith, The White House Speaks: PresidenJial Leaaership as Persuasion
(Westpon, Connecticut: Praeger, 1994), p. 236.
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•
•
•
•
•
•

I
I
I
I
I
I
I

I
I
I
I

93
that Bush shied away from television at a time when he could have used it most,6S It is
clear that Bush learned fTOm Reagan's mistakes; yet Bush seemed to have overcorrected
for the "symbohc presidency" created by Reagan.

Evolution ofJhe press conference continues

In keeping with their strategic efforts to control Reagan's image on television,
Reagam's staff opted to reduce the number of press conferences he held. As described
above, Reagan's staff was intently focused upon projecting a controlled, "right" image of
Reagan, and the nature of the press conference did not permit this control. Therefore, the
number of speeches and public television appearances was decreased in an effon to
diminish the opporruniry for television reponers to ask questions of Reagan and to put
him on the spot. As seen in Figure 3.12, the total number of press conferences dropped
significantly dl!lring the Reagan presidency. President Caner held 59 total press
conferences in 4 years, while President Reagan held only 42 press conferences in 8 years.
Reagan was a,veraging less than one press conference every three months just before he
Ie£! office. 66 As indicated in the previous Chapter, routine exchange of information
between ttte press and the president had characterized every president's administration
since Roosevelt's. The press conference was viewed by some as the most effective tool
in cOITIJIlunicating with the American people. Yet in an effort to preserve his well
constructed image, Reagan's staff heavily restricted the number of press conferences.

Stahl. p. 401.
Samuel Kernen, Going Public: Nell' Strategies of Presidential Leadership (Washington. D.C.: CQ Press,
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Reagan's press secretary Larry Speakes states that the lack of press conferences
was the source of some of Reagan's strongest criti:c~$m.67 But Reagan's tearn felt that a
cut in the number of press conferences was the only way to protect the President from
embarrassment and from ruining his precisely controlled image. Reagan's team would
heavily prepare Reagan for press conferences, but Speakes reveals that "in spite of all our
groundwork, we never could tell how Reagan would do ... Sometimes that rehearsal
would be bad and you would be living in fear that the President was going to make a
series of major mistakes ... and he'd be brilliant, or you might feel entirely comfortable
after the briefing session and the final act would be riddled in mistakes.,,68
Reagan just could not be counted upon to respond spontaneously to questions
with educated answers. He was known for exaggerating stories and for making blatantly
untrue statements, one of his most famous being his claim that "eighty percent of ,the
nation's air pollution was caused by trees." These types of ridiculous statements made the
public question Reagan's competency as a leader. And, Gergen states that "the gaffe
stories were the worst when we were doing afternoon press conferences."69
Reagan was also known for a Jack of knowledge on contemporary events. Gergen
states, "Working for him, I saw he was no dullard, as his critics claimed... Yet, Reagan
could be remarkably unaware (and indifferent to) developments around him ... it's hard
for anyone to argue that he knew as much as a president should know about the state of
the world." If a subject did not interest Reagan, he would unthinkingly skim over it, thus
causing major gaps in his knowledge. 70 Gergen claims. "The only story you got out of
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the conference was how many mistakes he made.,,?1 Reagan simply could not be trusted
to answer questions on live television; therefore, the frequency of the press conference
was reduced. This reduction is certa3nly in accord with the strategy of the
communication apparatus. How could Reagan's team risk destroying the positive image
they worked so dldigently at generating?
By the last few years of his administratJion, the number of live, televised speeches
made by Reagan decreased even more. He would only give welcoming addresses or pre
set speeches to be held in front of a non-critical audience. These types of non
controversial speeches ensured that the President would not be caught in a difficult
situation that would adversely affect his image. His staff considered him to be more of a
"highly prized piece of political furniture" that could be used to "decorate" events. 72 In
,this way, positive public images were being projected of the President by his mere
attendance at events, but the press was not given the opportunity to ask questions of
Reagan that might compromise his popular image.

Figure 3.12 goes here

71

72

Hertsgaard; p. 140.
Denton and Heywood, p. 160.

I
I
I
I
I

96
Table 3.12: Presidential News Conferences 1929-2001
President
Hoover
F. Roosevelt
Truman
Eisenhower
Kennedy
L. Johnson
Nixon
Ford
Carter
Reagan
Bush
Clinton

(1929-1933)
(1933-1944)
(1945-1953)
(1953-1961)
(1961-1963)
(1963-1969)
(1969-1974)
(1974-1977)
(1977-1981)
(1981-1988)
( 1989-1992)
(1993-2001)

Ave. Per Month
5.6
5.3
3.15
2.1
1.9
2.1
0.6
1.4

1.2
0.5
2.7
1.95

Ave. Per Year
67
72.3
38
24.5
22
26
6.5
19
15
5.5

Total
268
881
302
193

33

131

21.9

175

64
132
39
41
59
42

Source: Ragsdale, Lyn. Vital Statistics on the Presidency: Washington to Clinton.
Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1996, p. 167-168 and Public Papers o/the Presidents o/the
United States, online version, www.access.gpo.gov.

The use of the press conference was restored under the Bush administration;
Bush held more press conferences in his first year than Reagan held over his eight years
in office. 73 His staff was not so focused upon controlling the image of Bush projected to
the American people and was not afraid to allow televised interaction between reporters
and the president.
Bush too was known for occasional slip-ups, although not as numerous or
damaging as Reagan's, but this did not deter Bush's staff from holding frequent press
conferences. These slip-ups and syntactical errors became known as "Bushspeak." Mary
Malalin, a member of Bush's fe-election team, remembers that the President used a line
from a song by the "Nitty Gritty Dirt Band" in one of his speeches, but referred to the
band as the "Nitty Ditty Nitty Gritty Great Bird." A reporter commented the next day
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that "President George Bush couldn't even get out his name yesterday."74 Bush also
slruggled with grammar, and Stahl states that "bad syntax was Bush's middle name."75
Nevertheless, Bush, unlike Reagan, was confident in his ability to answer reporters'
questions with intelligent, impressive responses. By shying away from press
conferences, as Reagan did, Bush would not be able to take advantage of an important
personal asset.
Unlike other presidents, Bush did not view press conferences as a way to speak
directly to the American people. Instead, he viewed them as a way to interact with the
press and to make a favorable impression upon them. Political scientist George C.
Edwards ill states that President Bush talked "to the press, not over it," and this generated
a sense of approval and respect for President Bush among the press COrpS.76 Bush's view
marks a very drnmatic change in presidential use of press conferences. Since President
Kennedy, presidents had been using press conferences as a tool to communicate directly
with lIle American people. The press conferences would be scheduled during prime time,
when the biggest viewing audience could be reached. Yet Bush did not see press,
conferences as a way to communicate with the people but as a way to communicate with
reponers.
Bush's new mind-set is exemplified in the informal, impromptu "press
conferences" that he would hold with reporters. These press conferences were located in
informal setti1ngs and were usually held in the afternoons, not during prime time. The

George C. Edwards III. "George Bush and the Public Presidency: The Politics of Inclusion," in The BILS"
Presidency Firs' Appraisals, eds. Colin Campbell and Ben A. Rockman (Chatham. NJ: Chatham House
Publishers. 199'1). p. 148.
74 Mary Ma{alin and lames Carville. All's Fair: Love, War. and RUlll/ing for PresidenJ (New York:
.
Random House. 1994), p.12.
75 Stahl, p. 343.
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press conferences continued to be broadcast by the three networks, but the afternoon
timing reveals that they were not intended to reach a large viewing audience. Bush did
not want to be constricted. by the restrictions of the prime time network schedule; he
wanted to use his press conferences as a way to ingratiate himself with the press. Helen
Thomas was the first female reporter to close the press conference with the traditional
"Thank you, Mr. President" and has covered every president since John F. Kennedy. Yet
she states that the formal ''Thank you, Mr. President" carne to an end during the Bush
admini'straLion. Thomas explains, "He liked to hold his news conferences in the
aftemoon, and to his credit, they would go as long as we asked questions, since the prime
time network rule of a designated. half hour didn't apply."n
Furthermore, the significant increase in the number of press conferences he1d by
Bush is another clue that he had changed the idea of the press conference. As
demonstrated in Figure 3.12, Bush held the most press conferences since the Johnson
adDlinisUiation. Since Bush was holding infonnal, afternoon meetings, it was much easier
to call a ,press conference. It is clear that Bush used the press conference as a way to
court the press and not as a way to win over the American public. This strategy is very
different from the direction President Kennedy's press conferences seemed to be going
with the first live press conference back in 1961.
Bush's numerous press conferences displayed his desire to make himself available
to the press. This is a direct contradiction to President Reagan, who was criticized for his
inaccessibi,l~ty

to the Washington press corps. Reporter James Reston notes that Bush

"Ileld almost as many press conferences in his first eight months in the White House as
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RonaJd Reagan had in the previous eight years."ts And !Fitzwater states that Bush's
numerous press conferences made him "generally mom accessible than any president in
modem history.,,79 Bush made an immense effort to reach out

(0

the press.

Lesley Stahl describes a cartoon drawn by Tom Meyer of the San Francisco

Chronicle as an example of Bush's availability to the press. She writes that the cartoon
showed Bush "in my bedroom pointing at me as if at a news conference: 'Miss Stahl?' In
my bed with curlers, I say, 'I know it's crazy, but I miss the days when he was less
access~ble. ""so Bush's openness to the press was somewhat overdone and not recei ved as

well by the press as Bush had hoped. Despite all of his efforts, Bush did not develop a
friendly relationship with the press. Fitzwater states, "President Bush, to the very last
day of his administration, could not understand how that press could be so bad to him
when be had been so good to them."SI Therefore, Bush's strategy seems to have
backfired. Bush sacrificed an effective way

(0

communicate with the American people

by converting the press conference into a way to court reporters but nevertheless was
unable to establish the relationship he desired with the press.

Conclusion
The onset of the cable era forced Reagan and Bush to make new decisions about
the way and which they were going to communicate with the American people. Some of
these dedsions simply entailed continuing with the communication strategies establ.ished
under previous administrations, but changes were necessary in order to cope with the new

n Helen Thomas. Fronr Row aJ rhe White House: My Life and Times (New York: Scribner. 1999), p. 121.
78 James Restoo. Deadline (New York: Random House, 1991), p. 447.
79 Fitzwater, p. 12.
so Stahl. p. 336.
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differentrated te!evision viewing audience. Reagan's communication apparatus changed
the way in which presidents use television. Instead of attempting to circumvent the press,
Reagan's 'team found a strategy that would "go right through" the press and use it to their
advamage. Some of the new strategies in which Reagan and Bush developed to cope
wirth the fragmenting audience worked well, while others did not. Yet, despite the
success and failures, the scope of presidential communication was forever changed
during the new period of cable television domination. This next chapter will evaluate the
cormmmication strategies of presidents in the contemporary period and will seek to
determine Ute new opportunities and the new constraints placed upon presidential efforts
to make fu1'l use of the television medium.
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Chapter 4

Opportunities, Constraints, and Strategies:
A focus on the contemporary period

1""oday's highly diversified, fragmented audience has posed great communication
challenges to Presidents William Jefferson Clinton and George W. Bush. This chapter
focuses on the contemporary period and seeks to detennine the character of television as
a communication medium for presidents today. What opportunities and advantages does
television provide in reaching the American people and building support? What are the
constraints on presidential efforts to make full use of the medium? This chapter will also
strive to identify the strategies that Clinton and Bush have deployed in an effort to
maximize the advantages and minimize the disadvantages of television in this modern
era.

The conlempormy environment
The appearance of the aU-news networks is one of the most significant changes in
today's world of modern political communication. These news networks have changed
.the way in which people use television. Today, one can simply go to an all-news network
in order to get the news he or she desires instead of waiting until an evening news
broadcast by one of the three networks.
Cable News Network (CNN) is one of the major all-news networks that has
revofutionized the idea of televised news. Ted Turner launched CNN in 1980, making it
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the first 24-hoUlI' all news network. I Turner introduced this new network based upon the
belief that

24~hour news

channels would become the main source of news for Americans

in the future. Not many people agreed with Turner's predictions when CNN was first
established!. Amateurish news correspondents, inadequate video technology, and
fmancial difficulties flawed the network. Yet eventually CNN was able to win over
viewers by its ability to be the first to cover breaking news and also by its ability to offer
extended, all-day coverage on major stories.

2

CNN viewers were informed instantaneously of major breaking news such as the
PanAm 103 crash in December of 1988, the San Francisco earthquake in October of
1989, the American invasion of Panama in December of 1989, and the release of Nelson
Mandela in February of 1990. In their book The CenlU1y, Peter Jennings, anchor and
editor of ABC News' World News Tonight, and Todd Brewster, former editor and writer
for Life magazine, state, "While the three big broadcast networks were forced to make
judgments on whether to interrupt other programming to present such news (and if so, for
how long), the producers at CNN faced no such decision - news was their network's

raison d'e/re.") The success of the all-news channel networks forced the three broadcast
networks to make difficult choices.
By the 19905, viewers relied upon CNN for breaking news, and it was clear that
Ted Turner's hypothesis proved to be true. It was reported in 1989 that CNN and its
afiiliate ''Headline News" attracted 24% of the overall news-watching audience during a
24-hour period. In comparison, CBS attracted 30%, ABC 28%, and NBC 18% of the

I Thomas L. Yancy. in History ofthe Mass Media in the United StaJ.es, ed. Margarel A. Blanchard
(Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers. (995), p. 114.
2 Yancy. p. t 15.
1 Peter Jennings and Todd Brewster. The Century (New York: Doubleday, 1998), p. 534.
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news-watching audience. It became strikingly clear to the networks that CNN was fast
becoming a strong competitor. Furthermore, it has been calculated that over 500,000
- housebolds tune into CNN's primetime newscasts held at 8:00 and 10:00 pm EST, and
between 700 and 900 thousand American homes watch CNN's "Larry King Live" each
night. 4 Even the White House has become hooked to CNN. The televisions in the
Situation Room in the White House were once tuned into a special CrA station; today the
televisions are nmed into CNN because of the station's ability to report on news first. 5
And, in 1996, CNN International was launched as the frrst and only 24-hour global news
network. This expansion meant that CNN was broadcast to over 200 nations and
territories and to an estimated 80 million people.6
CNN was not the only domestic all-news network that arose in the contemporary
period. Fox News Network and MSNBC were also created, giving viewers choices for
24-hour news sources. And the creation ofC-SPAN (Cable-Satellite Public Affairs
Nef\vork) by Brian Lamb has enabled viewers to have 24-hour access to House and
Senate proceedings and as well as other political information. When asked what the
effect of C-SPAN has been on the nation over the past twenty years, Lamb is hesitant to
reply, but he states, "I could say that it is the most important thing to happen to American
politics this century, but 1 would prefer to say that, at the very least, it has extended the
gallery." 7

Joe S. foote. Television Access and Polirical Power: TIle Networks. the Preswency, and the" "Loyal
OppositioJl" (New York: Praeger. 1990), p. 157.
~ Interview w,ith Ron Nessen. March 11. 2002.
6 Margarec A. Blanchard, in History o/the Mass Media in the UniJed Stales, ed. Margaret A. Blanchard
(Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers. 1995). p. 116.
7 Travis Paddock. ''C-$PAN Chief Says Network has 'Extended the Gallery...· in The University Record
(April 8. 1998).
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These new news options completely changed the face ofjournalism. The effects
of the all-news, networks on the three networks can be comparable to the effects of
television on the newspaper industry. When television flISt came to the

scene~

newspapers, could no longer be the first to report a story, and the reporters had to change
their strategy to more in-depth anafysis of what the television news broadcasts had
already reported. Jennings and Brewster state that this same switch in strategy occurred
in the 1990s with the success of the aU news channels. They state, 'The older broadcast
networks were themselves suffering much the same fate (and turning to the same
solutions), for with,the exception of the biggest stories, it was virtually assured that CNN,
with its 24-hour window to the world, would get the news on the air first." Therefore,
network news broadcasts continue to cover breaking news, but may have to turn to a,
more in-depth analysis of 'the news just as newspaper reporters had to do hack in the
1960s. 8
One would trunk that the introduction and popularity of all-news networks would
give report'ers more access to the president, but reporter Helen Thomas states just the
opposite. Thomas compares an experience she had with President Johnson to the climate
of the Clinton administration. She remembers a day when she was at the White House
covering a story on Johnson, and afterwards he invited her to have lunch with him and
the First Lady. Thomas then recounts a story of a day spent at the White House in
December of 1997. Clinton met "with House Speaker Newt Gingrich, Chinese dissident
Wei Jing Sheng, other members of Congress and a businessmen's group." But, "the word
from the White House press office to the press corps: 'No questions.,n Thomas believes
that mod.em presidents are hesitant to talk in ''today's media circus." She reveals, "The

S Jennings

and Brewster. p. 534.
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sad equation is that there are more media outlets devoted to covering the president and
more demand for coverage that have left us with less access than ever.,,9
Other changes in the modern realm of communications can also be identified.
With today's technology, it is possible to broadcast the president live from any location.
We now see the President talking to groups of school children or making a speech at a
university; we see him interacting with common people and not simply speaking from the
White House. But a negative aspect to this constant coverage is that presidents and their
staffs have less and less control of the message that is getting out to the public. ABC
reporter Dan Harris states that message management is much harder today because the
24-hour news cycle moves so quickly. 10 Furthermore, Ron Nessen, one of President
Ford's press secretaries, states that his main focus was the three nightly news programs
and that press secretaries before the advent of all news coverage had considerably more
.

tune to prepare.

II

Another, not so positive change in today's world of modem political
communication is the growing fragmentation of the American viewing audience. As
discussed in Chapter 3, this challenge to presidential communication fIrst arose in the late
1970s and early 19805 when cable television grew in popularity. With today's digital
cable and satellite options, people have access to hundreds of channels and are less likely
to watch a presidential address. Except in times of crisis, Americans have grown less and
less interested in what the president has to say.
Other aspects of the modem age of political communication have carried over
from previous times. Since the Nixon administration, presidents have struggled with the

g
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tendency for modern network news bureaus to take control away from the president by
accentuating presidents' failures and by offering editorial comment on presidential
statements. Dan Harris states that the Watergate scandal "opened the flood gates" of
negative news coverage. He reveals that a mentality grew among reporters that it was
more "glamorous" to uncover scandal during this time. 12
Negative presidential coverage continues to have a detrimental effect upon the
ability of the president to communicate with the American people; the president's
message to the public is being intercepted and twisted by the media. The presidential
effort to make full use of the television medium continues to be constrained in loday's
environment. During a press conference on May 7, 1993, President Clinton was asked
how he explained the IS-percentage point drop in his popularity ratings in only two
months. Clinton abruptly responded, "I bet not 5% of the American people know that we
passed a budget... and it passed at the most rapid point of any budget in 17 years. I bet
not one in 20 American voters know that because... successes and the lack of discord are
not as noteworthy as failure. ,tl3 Clinton's statement illustrates the negative impact the
media can play on the public's judgment of the president.
Over the years, the press has focused upon presidential failure as opposed to
presidential success. The Center for Media and Public Affairs bas been analyzing
network news coverage of the president since 1989. Every presidential news story
broadcast by one of the three major networks has been given a positive or negative score,
depending upon the slant of the news story. Their results show that Clinton's words are
correct; there is a disproportional focus on presidential failure in today's media. The fIrst
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three years of the administrations of Presidents George H. W. Bush and Clinton were
evaluated. The three years were divided into 24 quarters in order to evaluate the negative
and positive news story coverage. The results showed that of the 24 quarters, the average
negative and favorable coverage was equal in only 4 quarters. In the remaining 20
quarters, there was more negative coverage than positive coverage of the president. 14
Figure 4.1 displays the findings of the Center for Media and Public Affairs as quarterly
averages.

Figure4.l goes here

Tim Groeling and Samuel Kernell also conducted an analysis of the coverage of
the president and found an interesting connection to approval ratings. Groeling and
Kernell evaluated the three major networks' evening news programs from 1990 to 1995
and concluded, "We fmd qualified support for the bias hypothesis but even more
compelling evidence that changes in presidential approval, whether favorable or
unfavorable, drive news coverage of the president's public support." They went on to
note, "As the president's popularity declines, it becomes more newsworthy; as it raises it
does not." 15
The network news habit of focusing on negative presidential stories continues to
be a further barrier to presidential communication with the American people through
television. Presidential statements will be edited and news reporters have the tendency to

President CliDlon press confereoce. May 7,1993, Washington, D.C.
Samuel Kemell. Going Public: New StraJegies of Presidential Leaders/lip (Washington. D.C., CQ Press.
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Figure 4.1: Television News Evaluations of Bush and Clinton
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reflect their own opinions about the president in their editing. It is more difficult for the
president to afuact a prime-time viewing audience; and now, whenever stories about the
president are getting across to the American people, there is the chance that the stories
wiU cast him in a negative light. It seems that in the contemporary period, presidents
have become more and more fed up with the frequent negative, editorialized stories.
They have seen what strategies worked well and what strategies did not work well for
past presidents confronting this persistent problem. The contemporary presidents thus
seek new, alternative means of televised communication in an effort to circumvent the
distortion ~d the manipulation by the press that they so often perceive.

Clinton's media strategy
Accordlllg to one of President Clinton's early media advisers, Mandy Grunwald,
Clinton's media strategy consisted of two parts: relying upon more informal program
formats and a general effort to avoid the Washington press corps. She betreved that tills
strategy would allow Clinton to reach an audience that did not necessarily read the
newspaper or watch nightly news programs. Large, informal program formats would hit
this targeted audience and give Americans a more "personal look at the president." Most
irnponantly, Grunwald believed that these formats would allow the President to
circumvent the press. With this strategy, the President could go directly to the people and
address their concerns and ultimately gain more control over the messages being received
by the American viewer through televlsion. 16

I~ Tim Gtoeling and Samuel Kernell. "Is Network Coverage of the President Biased?" Journal of Politics
(November 1998, Volume 60, Issue 4), p. 1063.
16 Roben E. Denton Jr. and Rachel L. Holloway, "Clinton and the Town Han Meetings: Mediated
COn\fersation and the Risk of Being 1n Touch,' .. in Roben E. Denton Jr. and Rachel L. Holloway, eds., The
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It was clear to reporters from the very beginning of Clinton's adminlstration that
part of his communication sUategy involved avoidling the press at all costs. This strategy
was very different from that of Presidents Reagan and Bush, who attempted to reach out
to the Washington press corps. Yet Helen Thomas states, "Bill Clinton and his team had
arrived at the White House with a notable, but different goal: make whatever end runs
necessary to avoid the White House press corps." Thomas reveals that Clinton held a
private strategic meeting with top staff on his official fi.rst day in office. During this
meeting he told the staff about his plans to continue holding televised. town hall meetings,
to appear on "Larry King Live," and most importantly to avoid regular contact with
reporters. Thomas reveals that Clinton did not realize that a television technician was
setting up cameras in the back of the room for a later question and answer

sessio~

and he

relayed Clinton's plans to the reporters in the pressroom. Thomas states, "Well, we knew
we were off to a good start.,,17
Clinton held true to his plan to distance himself and his staff from reporters. He
immediately designated the corridor connecting the pressroom to the press secretary's
office as "off-limits" to reporters. Furthermore, the door that separated. the briefing room
from the press secretary's office was closed. But Thomas reveals that communication
director's George Stephanopoulos's decision to hold live daily briefings put an end to
these changes. Thomas states, "As far as I was concerned, it was news when reporters
were' being del1ied access to the press secretary's office, and I made a point of it loud and
clear at the start of the several briefings - on television." Clinton had no choice but to

Clinto1l Presidency: Images. Issues, and Communicatioll Slraregies(Wesrport, Connecticut Praeger, 1996),
p.30.
17 Thomas, p. 94.
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allow reporters access to the corridor and to re-open the door to the press secretary's
o.f fiIce. 18
Yet, despite these concessions, Clinton held true to his overall plan to circwnvent
the press. In an effort to employ this strategy, Clinton committed to at least two
appearances per year on the "Larry King Live Show" and also developed the idea of
holding weekly, televised town hall meetings across the nation. The idea of a town hall
meeting was first explored in the Carter administration. They were never televised and
were ultimately considered to be a failure. 19 Yet Clinton's town hall meetings created an
opportunity for Clinton to reach out to the American people without the interference of
the media.
The town meeting demonstrated Clinton's effort to "host the presidency."
Journalist Joe Klein of Newsweek had written during the campaign about Clinton's skill

in this kIDd of forum, allowing him to be "equal parts master of ceremonies, televangelist
and group-therapy facilitator. You tell him your problem; he tells you his 12-step
program with appropriate body language, concerned lip-biting, caring nods and
clucks...TelE Bill, and fee~ better." 20 During the town hall meetings, Clirtton made a great
effort to create a

one~o:n-one s~tuation

by moving away from his seat and movirtg closer

to the questioner. Clinton was a!lso known to establish direct eye contact with the
questioner. The cameraman would then place the camera in a position near the
questioner, giving the members of the television audience the feeling that Clinton was
talking directly to them as well.

Thomas. p. 94.
Sleven Stark. "The First Postmodem Presidency." The Atlanne Monthly (Volume 271, number 4, 1993)
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The town hall meetings were Clinton's favorite forms of communication because
he was in complete control of the message he was sending to the American people. 2 \
During a special town hall edition of Nigh/line on September 23, 1993, host Ted Koppel
stated, 'There is something wonderful about being able to bring an American president
and an audience of 1,000 of his constituents together for this kind of exchange. ,,22 Yet, as
more and more town hall meetings took place, not everyone, including Clinton and his
staff, voiced this kind of praise for the new town hall strategy.

It soon became apparent that the town hall format did not afford as much control
as Clinton's staff had hoped. Due to the wide range of audience questions, the White
House could not control which topic reporters would chose to focus upon in their next
story. Elizabeth Drew, ajoumalist with close ties to the White House, revealed that a key
Democrat admitted, "I don't believe the town meeting was a useful device. When you
have those town meetings, a hundred subjects come up and there is no message.,,>23 Drew
too wondered if the town meeting was the best format. She asks, "Did the American
people want a Phil Donahue in the presidency?,,24
H is true that the town hall meetings evolved into a kind of talk show forum and
that Clinton did not create an image of "adept policy leadership but rather of boundless
empathy."2S One must evaluate the consequences oftrus empathetic image. Clinton was
so busy empathizing with citizens that Americans were not getting a sense that real work
was being accomplished in the White House. The town hall meetings defined Clinton as

Denton and Holloway. pJO.
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a shoulder to cry on, not as a strong leader. And, after two years of the town hall
i1'ueetings and disappointing midterm election votes, it became clear that the public was
not looking for a "Phil Donahue" to lead the nation. This disappointment provoked
Clinton's advisors to change their strategy. According to Drew, Clinton's Chief of Staff
Leon Panetta believed that the president was becoming "over-exposed" and that the
dignity of the office was deteriorating due to an abundance of infonnal televised
appearances. After the two-year experiment with town hall meetings, Panetta worked to
decrease the number of informal formats and to increase the number of formal press
conferences in an effort to restore dignity to the Office. 26

The constant campaign
Another aspect of Clinton's strategy was to continue campaigning once he was
elected; the campaign mentality of Clinton and his staff dominated even after the
inauguration. This "continuous campaign" mind-set could be attributed to the fact that
Clinton was the fIrst president since Richard Nixon in 1968 to win the presidency without
\J,rinning the majority of popular votes. For this reason, he felt that he needed to continue
campaigning into the presidency. 27
President Clinton composed his presidential team almost entirely of his campaign
staff, the fITSt sign of a permanent campaign. Clinton's counselor David Gergen believes
that this was a poor decision. Gergen states, "If anyone had paid attention to Reagan's
success, they would have noted how much he gained from integrating campaign loyalists
with Washington veterans." Gergen believes that Clinton did not use the eleven weeks in
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between the election and the inaugura1iion to his best benefit. Gergen states, "As we saw
with Carter and Reagan, a newly 'elected president must seize upon those intervening

weeks to appoint his new team, map out policy and communication plans, build bridges
to key constituencies, and - wbenever he can - get some rest. It is the moment to put the
campaign behind a focus on governing. ,,28 Because Clinton's team was made up mostly
of his campaign team, many communications strategies were carried over from the
campaign and did not reflect a rational communication plan for governing.
The town hall meeting is an example of a campaign strategy that was carried over
into the presidency. During the

[lIst

three years ofms presidency, the President was

bavelingjlllst about every fourth day. And, even on the days when Clinton remained in
Wasb.i.ngton, he used video conferencing to visit with constituents. The effort to conduct
town halls across the nation put. a great strain on Clinton's schedule. Clinton also made it
a priority to visit California often because of its important 54 electoml votes. By the
1996 election, Clinton had taken trips to California on an average of at least every six
weeks. Clinton continued to pursue his campaign strategy and to reach out to as many
people as possible in order to win them over. 29
Another communication strategy that remained in use after the election and into
the presidency was the tendency of Clinton's staff to "spin" the news of the president.
Gergen admits that during a campaign, members of the team witt tell reporters "damn
near anything to grab a good headline.

II

The only focus of a campaign is winning "each

day's hattIe" and ultimately winning the election. Twisting the news to portray the
president in a positive light, or "spinning," can not really get one into trouble during a

Davrd Gergen. Eye Wimess to Power: the Essence of Leadership, Nixon to Clinton (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 2000) p. 257-258.
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campaign. Gergen states that after the election, "people can fold up their tents and go
horne, not worrying about the debris in their wake."
Yet the president and his staffmust have a completely different mentality while in
office. The president and his team must maint.ai.n their focus not only upon the
importance of grabbing headlines, but also upon the future. Gergen acknowledges that
"the mind set for governing is entirely different" than the mind-set of the campaign.3o
Gergen's statement is certainly ironic considering that he was involved in the Nixon
administratiOR, an administration adept at spinning the news, and also considering that he
was known as the leader of the "spin patrol" during the Reagan administration. It is
obvious that Gergen did Rot adhere to his own philosophy on governing; but, this
statement was made in IUndsight, and Gergen's regrets about his role in spinning lhe
news are discussed below.
Due to ilie "continuous campaign"

mind~set of Clinton

and his staff once in office,

spinning each day's story continued to playa major role in communication with the
American public. Clinton's press secretary Joe Lockhart publicly admitted that many of
Clinton's staff "fell into a pattern of spinning stories beyond their legitimate bounds."
This spinning did not take the fonn of lSlatant public exaggeration, but "half-truths" and
even "bald-faced lies" were known to be told during phone calls and conversations in an
effort to bolster the image of the President and the First Lady.31 President Clinton's first
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director of communications, George Stephanopoulos, even referred to himself as the
President's own "spin doctor" in his merooir. 32
David Gergen, Clinton's advisor, admits that be felt partially responsible for the
spinning of each day's story that was taking place during the Clinton administration. As
described in Chapter 3, Gergen worked for President Reagan as director of
communications, and he basically created the idea of "spin control" during this time.
Yet, while working for Clinton, Gergen admits that be was "aghast at how it had been
corrupted." Gergen asks, "How could we have taught a younger generation of pubic
officials the wrong lessons about governance?" He confides, "While officials since the
beginning of the republic have been cajoling the press, one of my deepest regrets in
public life is a feeling that I have contributed to this deterioration. ,,33
The spirming of the news about the President and the First Lady was certainly
another strategy that did not work well for the Clinton administration. Reporters became
well aware of the higher-than-usual tendency for Clinton's staff to exaggerate the t:rIJili
and this was reflected in media's portrayal of the President. Reporters could not delineate
between truth and exaggeration, and the public picked up on this as well. Gergen stated
that during the Clinton administration, "reporters became unclear where the truth stopped
and the spin started. After a while, they wondered whether the Clinton team knew
themselves. ;,34
George Stephanopoulos also states that the White House press corps was much
more aware of the tendency for the President's staff to spin the news after their
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experience with the Reagan communication apparatus. Therefore, spilIDing was not
working to the Clinton team's advantage. He states, "Elaborate staging only increased
the tendency of skeptical reporters to focus on the process rather than the substance of
what we were trying to say." He went on to reveaJ, "The benefits of spin were being
canceled out by the press's resistance to it. Often we reacted by spinning even harder,
but I was beginning to see the virtue in just letting stories go - Zen spin.,,35 But,
unfortunately, the Clinton team did not embrace a policy of "Zen spin," and the "half
truths" and lies had a negative impact upon the public's perception of the President during
his ftrst few years in office.

A change is necessary in the strategy
Helen Thomas reveals, "By May 1993, polls showed that Clinton's approval
ratings had plummeted to 36 percent, lower than for any American president at this point
in rus tenn, with 50 percent disapproving of his perfonnance in office. ,,36 Clinton
realized that it was time to make changes in his communication strategy. He decided that
Stephanopoulos was not executing his job as director of communications effectively and
decided to replace him with Gergen. Stephanopoulos states that he believed that the
President should make himself more accessible to the press and that this belief made the
Clintons think that he "was going soft." Stephanopoulos admits, "In the end, I wasn't
strong enough to convince the Clintons that we were making a mistake, or skillful enough
to give the press what they needed even if it wasn't what the Clintons wanted. There was
plenty of blame to go around: the Clintons were intransigent and the reporters were self
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absorbed. But they could all agree on at least one point - that George was doing a poor
job. And they were ri.ght.,,37
Gergen stepped in as director of communications and helped reduce the tension
between the president and the reporters, although the spinning of the news continued
under his direction. Thomas states, "Gergen set out repairing some breeches with the
press corps. His office may have been down in the basement - it was the old barbershop
- but his finger prints were everywhere." Gergen also prepared Clinton's fIrst prime time
press conference, and it was held on June 17, 1993. Clinton was hesitant to have this
contact with reporters and Thomas states that he generally "tried to evade follow·up
questions unless the reporter insisted and stood his or her ground.,,38 Nevertheless, an
important communication tool with the American people was reinstated with Gergen.
Mike McCurry was also hired
diminish

~he

as press secretary, and his actions also helped to

hostilily between Clinton and reporters. Thomas states that he "brought a

new spirit to the White House when he carne abroad.',39 When Thomas told him that she
and other reporters "were tired of being treated with contempt by the press office,"
McCurry responded by saying, "Anyone who does that will not be around here long,"
McCurry did not see reporters as the enemy, and a working relationship began to
deveJop. Thomas states, "He put together a st.aff that did not view reporters as the enemy
or as intruders - a refreshing change from the recent past." McCurry did have his
conflicts with the press, but he was able to foster a much more accommodating attitude
toward the press than Clinton's previous staff. 40
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TI,e [mernet as a tool ofpresidential communication
President Franklin Roosevelt incorporated the radio into his communication
strategy with the "fireside chats," President Kennedy was the [lISt to televise his press
conferences, and President Clinton was Ithe first to experiment with the Internet. This
experimentation with the lnternet was part of the effort to adhere to the strategy of
avoiding the Washington press corps. The Internet began to gain tremendous popularity
during the Clinton administration; more and more homes were becoming connected.
Clinton and his staff soon realized that the Internet was an untapped venue that had the
potential to reach a large number of Americans.
In September of 1993, the Clinton Administration announced the National
Information Infrastruetw'e (NIl) initiative. On May 27, 1993, a meeting ofthe pohti'cal
communication division of this initiative was held. It was during this meeting iliat
Clinton's director of electronic publishing and of public access e-mail to the White
House, Jonathan "Jock" P. Gill, announced the idea of connecting with the American
public through e-mail. Gill stated that this idea was developed during the campaign in an
effort to disseminate infonnation to the public without going" through the media Just like
the town hall meetings, access to Americans through e-mail was thought to provide more
control over the messages Americans were receiving from their president Gill believed
that communication via the Internet would be a way to communicate with the American
people w~thout "mterpretation or filtration or manipulation" by the press. 41
Jonathan Gill was a volunteer member of Clinton's election team in 1992 and was
in ·eharge of answering e-mail. When Clinton was elected to office, Gill was asked to
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join the White House Office of Media Affairs and continue with constituency
communication via e-mail. Gill hoped to make e-mail communication a pennanent
feature of the administration, not just an extended aspect of the campaign.42 Gill based
this new communication strategy upon two models of management theory. The first
model is known as the "top-down" or "one directional model," and it described the
existing state of communication between the President and the American people. In this
model, Americans only have the option of tuning into and paying attention to the
president or not. The "top-down" model does not invite Americans to actively engage in
communication, does not allow them to select what information they would like to
receive, and does not promote political conversation among constituents.
The second model of management theory promotes all of these things. The
second model is thought of as a "two-way, upward-downward, and lateral interaction"
mode1. 43 Gill explained that this second model became the focus of the Clinton
administration's communication strategy. According to Gill, the "top-down'" model
worked against community and interactivity; he hoped that the tl2-way" mod.el would
enable the Clinton team to communicate with Americans and "involve them as
interactivel:y as possible. ,,44 Although this objective was never fully achieved under the
Clinton administration, the Dew White House homepage, the new e-mail system, and the
creation of Americans Communicating Electronically (ACE) were considered significant
filfst steps toward achieving communication according to the "two-way" model.

41 Kenneth L. Hacker, "Vi.rtuaI Democracy: A Critique of the Clinton AdministratioD Citizen-White House
Electronic Mail System," in Tile Clinton Presidency: Images. Issues and CommWlicarion Strategies
(Westport, ConnecticUl: Praeger, 1996), p. 50.
42 Hacker, p. 52.
43 Hacker, p. 51.
"" Ibid.
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The first White House Web site, www.whitehouse.gov, was laWlched in 1994, but
was not fmalized until 2000 after $600,000 had been poured into the project.

45

The site

offered and continues to offer biographical information about the President, the First
Lady, and the Vice President, history and tours of the White House, current news and
policies, full texts of speeches, and the day's news at the White House. 46 The Clinton
administration also developed a "White House Kids" section in which children could take
virtual tours of the White House with Socks the cat and Buddy the dog in order to gain a
simplrified understanding of the workings of the White House. Finally, the web page
invited constituents to send e-mail to the President or to the Vice President.

47

The constituent-White House e-mail system was introduced in August of 1993
and not included on the web page until 1994. President Clinton's e-mail address was
PRESfOENT@WHITEHOUSE.GOV and Vice President AI Gore's address was
VICE.PRESIDENT@WInTEHOUSE.GOV. A letter from the White House Office of
Presidential Correspondence in 1993 stated that the Clinton administration hoped that the
new e-mail system would make the President and the administratioll more accessDble to
the American people. The letter also stated that in this early stage, an e-mail sent to the
White House would be read and the subject would be recorded. Unfortunately, the
sender would not receive a response from the White House, but White House staff
members ""ere working on creating a number of "response based programs." The letter
emphasized that the new system was experimental but that it bad great potentia1. 48 In an

~ Jack Lule, "Click and Learn on the White-House Web Site,H in Chronicle of Higher Education (May 18,

200 l. Volume 47, Issue 36) p.l.
~ www,whilehouse.gov.
47 Lule, p. ~.

" "While House Reachable wough Internet E-Mail" in Database Magazine (Augusl, Vol. 16 issue 4) p.
14.
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Gill stated that not only was it a hope to create a response program, but also to

create responses that would direct constituent questions to pertinent documents on the
web."9
During the Clinton administration, MlT's Artificial Intelligence lab investigated
the public's use of the new web page. The report indicated that between 30,000 to 40,000
people accessed documents provided by the web page every day and that an additional
100,000 people received governmental information via e-mail (once the system was

created) on a daily basis. The MlT study concluded that document receivers were
"younger, more educated, and more male than the average American population" and that
75% graduated from college, 50% graduated from graduate school, and 20% of the

document receivers were women. 50
Furtlhermore, Gill told an interviewer from Educom Review that the White House
was still receiving more written mail than electronic mail despite the new emphasis on
communication via the Internet. The White House received an average of 40,000 to
60,000 pieces of paper mail per day and received an average of 800 e-rnails per day. Gill
attributed this to the fact that a piece of paper and a pen were accessible to almost all
AmeTicans, yet Internet access was still not widely available. For this reason, Gill set out
to make e-mail access more accessible to all Americans. 5f
Gill was one of the original creators of Americans Communicating Electronically
(ACE). This organization sought to remedy the fact that Internet access and e-mail

was

not available to all Americans, only to those wealthy enough to buy their own computer
and Internet connection. Gill identified more than 3,000 extension offices of the

49

50

Hacker, p. 53.
"Survey Br·iefing Points for Busy Officials," MIT AI Lab in Hacker.
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Department of Agriculture located throughout the nation that could serve as public
Internet centers. Gill made it possible for citizens to access these extension offices and
use them to send and receive e-mail from the White House. 52 The Clinton administration
took pioneering aclion to modernize with technology in order to access Americans
W~tJlout going

through the press. The true power of the Internet was just being realized

during the Clinton administration, and Clinton's exploration and experimentation with
web sites and e-mail access has set a great precedent. As the Internet expands and
communication becomes even more rapid and varied, it will be an invaluable
communication resource for future presidents.

President George W Bush continues with a "2-way" strategy
When President George W. Bush took office, he and his staff also realized the
importance of creating a "2-way," interactive relationship with the American people. It
was unclear whether the Bush administration would continue on with the "technological"
precedent set by Clinton and his staff. Would the Bush team continue making the
President and the Vice President accessible to the American people through e-mail?
Would they continue providing the public with government documents on line? Jack
Lule, a journalist for the Chronicle ofHigher Education wondered this as well and writes,
"I logged on at 11 :30 a.m. on January 20 to get a good seat for the peaceful transfer of
power from one Web team to the other." Yet Lute found that the White House server
was down and that nothing was available. But just one hour later, the forty-third
President of the United States appeared on the web page. Links to the biographies of

n Hacker. p. 53.
Hacker. p. 52.
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Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, First Lady Laura Bush and Lynne Cheney were
availalble by 12:30 that day.
Today the White House Web Page is just as informative as it was under the
Clinton administration. A second web site was also launched, www.whitehousekids.gov.
This site features the Bush family's English Springer Spaniel, Scottish Terrier, cat, and
even Ofdia, their long hom cow who lives on the ranch in Texas. 53

It is dear that the Clinton administration developed a new strategy that will
become a permanent fIxture of the modem presidency. The Internet meets the objective
of allowing the president to bypass the manipulative press and communicate directly with
the American people. The drawback is that the only people who most likely access
information about the president are the people who are already politically knowledgeable
and inquisitive, the people the President does not have difficulty in reaching. Therefore,
increased use of the Internet will have a positive impact on people who are already active
in politics, but will most likely not have a great impact on how the president is perceived
by the American people in general. Yet as the Internet becomes more and more
accessible and expansive, its use as a communication tool will increase in value.

Defining Bush's communication strategy
Although it is early in his presidency, certain characteristics of Bush's
communication strategy have become apparent. Only time will tell how history will
regard the effectiveness of his methods. Before Bush even took office, his
communication team took the time to study the strategies of past administrations. Bush's
press secretary A.ri Fleischer stated iill an interview, "[ studied a lot of previous briefings,

I
I
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and I met with all my predecessors, or as many as I possibly could... So [ would read
Mike McCurry's briefmgs; I read Marlin Fitzwater's.... I met with them to hear their
guidance, to get their advice.,,54 The closeness of the election signaled to Fleischer and
,the rest of Bush's communication team that they would need to develop a strong initial
strategy. Bush was not coming into the office with as much public support as past
presidents due to the loss of the popular vote and the Florida recount. Fleischer states,
"Well, it is really interesting, because particularly coming off of the election - we have to
put our coverage in the context of where the president just came...and I think there was a
presumption in the press that the president would come in from a weak point of view; that
he would not have any strength corning into his administration."ss In order to reassure
the American people of Bush's legitimacy as president, it was necessary for him to come
across as a strong leader.
Bush's team set out to ''manage the message" that the president was sending out
to, the people; they wanted to convey a clear, unified impression. Fortunately, Bush
began his administration focusing on big themes such as Social Security and Medicare,
tax relief, and school improvement, and this concentration of ideas helped his
communication staff. Fleischer states, " .. .It's kind of easy to have a unified message
when you have a president who has a unified approach to ... to conduct[ingJ his
business.,,56 By sending a strong message, the President's communication team hoped to
reinforce the idea of Bush as a strong leader.

SJ www.whitehousekids.com.
sol(11erview v,'ith Ari Fleischer by Terence Smith, April 10. 2001. A NewsHour wilh Jim Lehrer Transcript.
www .pbs,orglnewshour/mediall OOda~s/tleischer.html,p. 7.
S5 Interview with An Fleischer by Terence Smith, p. 2.
5(" Interview with Ari Fleischer by Terence Smith, p. 3.
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Bush also took time to develop his public speaking skills in order to be a more
effective communicator. Throughout his campaign and into the beginning of his
presidency, Bush has been criticized for his limited ability as a public speaker. The
pub~ic was

accustomed to the impressive rhetorical style of Reagan and Clinton, and the

grammatical errors made by Bush caused many critical Americans to doubt his
intdligence.
In order to remedy this doubt, Bush spent the month of August 2001 "honing his
communication skills and trying to shake the early media label of him as a tongue-twisted
Texan. n57 Being able to reach a television audience has been difficult for modem
presidents, and it is imperative that Bush makes a strong impression when he does have
the opportunity to reach the American people.
Bush also deemed President Reagan's use of visual imagery as an important
strategy and sought to incorporate it into his own communication method. Like Reagan's
staff, Bush's team realized the importance of a picture to grab the attention of the

viewers. Reporter Martin Schram recounts the similarities between the visual
communication strategies of Reagan and Bush. Schram states that Bush "is a president at
work, carrying out a made-for-tv strategy that was fIrst developed by Reagan's grand
master of political imagery, Michael Deaver. ,,58
More generally, Bush's initial communication strategy was very similar to
President Clinton's. This could be attributed in part to the help offered by Clinton's
communication team to the new President. Ari Fleischer states, " ... Jake Siewert,

Francine Kiefer, "Bush Burnishes Communication Skills," in Christian Science MoniTor (September 5,
2oot, Volume 93, Issue 173) p. 3.
ss Martin Schram, "Manin Schram: Behind the Scenes of Bush's TV Tricks:' in Naples Daily News (June
S7
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President Clinton's last press secretary, could not have been more professional and more
helpful in the transition period." 59 When characterizing Bush's initial strategy, an aide
stated, "Think of the administration's first eight months as an 'homage to Bill Clinton' •
dominated by political and conununications advisers, micro-initiatives, and a neverending campaign to keep the president's approval ratings over 50 percent." 60 Yet this
strategy all changed after the terrorist attacks of September 11 th •

A new communication strategy
In the aftennath of the events of September 11, 200 1, Americans looked to their

President for leadership and confidence. A new communication strategy was necessary
for these unprecedented times. President Bush needed to focus on comforting and
reassuring a nation of stunned and grieving Americans.
The use of the fonnal address has been the most powerful tool in reaching
Americans. The very night of the attacks, President Bush addressed the nation. His
words were comforting, and the repetition of "we," "us," and "our" throughout his speech
reminded Americans that we are all unified through our shared sense of loss and
confusion. Bush began, "Today, my fellow citizens, our way oflife, our very freedom
came under attack." He also stated, "The pictures of airplanes flying into buildings, fires
buming, huge structures collapsing, have filled us with disbelief, terrible sadness and a
quiet, unyielding anger." Yet Bush's words were also reassuring. He stated, "American
was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in
tlite wodd. And no one will keep that light from shining." He ended by stating, "This is a

59
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I
I
I
I
I

127
day when all Americans from every walk of life unite in resolve for peace. America has

stood down enemies before, and we will do so this time. None of us will ever forget this
day, yet we go forward to defend our freedom and justice in our world.,,61 Bush's words
conveyed his shared sense of terrible loss as well as his desire to lead to Americans when
they needed it most.
Bush's September 20th speech reinforced images of comfort and leadership, as
well as a desire to rectify the horrible wrong that was done; this speech focused more

I
I

stated, "There is no question that this was the best speech George Bush has ever given,

I

difficult of circumstances ...This was a call to arms last night ... this was very much aimed

I
I
I
I
I

upon the work to be done in the immediate future. Dan Balz of the Washington Post

and -and probably one of the best speeches most of us have ever heard under the most

at getting the country ready for what's coming ahead.,,62 Again, Bush used words such as
"we" and "our" to unify Americans. He stated, "Tonight, we are a country awakened to
danger ,and called to defend freedom. Our grief has turned to anger and anger to
resolution. Whether we bring our enemies to justice or bring justice to our enemies,
justice MIJi be done.'.63 Gloria Borger of US News and World Report and CBS News
noted: these unifying statements as well as Bush's personal statements. She stated, " ... At
the end oftbe speech he started using the first person. He started talking about himself,
and he said' f will not yield. I will not rest. I will not relent.' And I think that he was

Text of Bush's Address, September 11,2001. www.cnn.coml2001fUS/09Jlllbush.speech.text!
Imerview wilh Dan Balz, Gloria Borger, Tom Gjelten, and Ray Suarez by Gwen Ifill, September 21,
2001. Washington Week transcript. www.pbs.oriVweta/was ...onweekLtranscriptsltranscriptOl0921.html.
p.2.
(,} Text of Bush's Address, Septeinber 20,2001. Seauleliines..nwsol:ll"Ce.comlcgi
bin... id=26844841 3&slug=speech21 &date=200 10920, p. I.
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making a very personal promise to the American people .... ,,64 The American people
needed to hear this promise, and President Bush was not afraid to make it.
President Bush's use of the fonnal address has made him come across as a true
leader to the American people. He has been perceived as a grieving, compassionate
American, a tough Texan, and an international leader. Bennett Roth, a reporter for the

Houston Chronicle, stated, "In both addresses, a president not known for his rhetorical
elegance came across as both compassionate and reassuring to ajittery nation .... ,.65
Borger believes that Americas have been searching for an authentic hero and cites this as
one of the reasons why John McCain was able to connect so well with the voters. Bush
has the authenticity for which Americans have been searching; Borger states, "Suddenly
now we have a leader and -and we must trust him.',66
Bush came into the office with some Americans questioning his legitimacy but
I

his leadership through this hardship has quelled these fears. Roth states, ''That
cataclysmic day transformed Bush from a domestic-oriented politician trying to
overcome the contentiousness of a disputed election into a powerful and popular
commander in cbiefwbo may be accomplishing more abroad than at home." David
Kennedy, a historian at Stanford University states, "It does seem to me he had an aura of
insubstantiability and illegitimacy. And both of those have disappeared.'.67
Yet members of Bush's communication team assert that these qualities have
always resided within Bush and that the events of September 11 th did not force him to
develop new qjualities of leadership or authenticity. Karen Hughes, Bush's

Interview with Dan Balz, Gloria Borger. Torn Gjellen, and Ray Suarez by Gwen lfillll, p. 3-4.
Bennett Roth. "91 ~ I Events Transformed B ush ~mage," in the Houston Chronicle. December 28. 200 I.
66 Interview witb Dan Balz. Gloria Borger. 1"000 Gjellen. and Ray Suarez by Gwen Ifill. p. 5.
67 Roth.
601

6.l

I
I
I
I
I

I

I
I

129
communication chief stated, "I don't think. you develop leadership and character
overnight ... You don't suddenly have a crisis and it brings out qualities you never had.
This stuff about (being) transformed. From my perspective his is the same President
Bush that I saw going through difficult issues in Texas.',68
A second part of the new strategy is to have more contact with foreign leaders,
and to make this apparent to the American people. Roth states, "Since Sepl II, hardly a
day has gone by when a prime minister or president has not trooped through the White
House to meet w·th Bush and have his photo taken in the Rose Garden." Bush wants
Americans to know that he is seeking out and cooperating with world leaders. During his
campaign, Bush was unable to name the leaders of Pakistan and two other countries. 69
Now he is proving to Americans that he has the strength and the ability to lead a world
fight against terrorism.

The public's response to Bush's communication strategy
Polls have shown that Bush's efforts to communicate to and reach out to
Americans have clearly been effective. After his September 11'" speech, 91 percent of
Americans approved of Bush's response to the terrorist attacks. Furthennore, the public
response after his September 20th speech was overwhelming. A Post-ABC poll showed
that 79 percent of Americans watched or listened to Bush's speech. 70 Tom Gjelten of
National Public Radio states, "Now, how unprecedented is that? To me that says that
Americans are looking to their president for leadership."71 These modem times have

6li Ibid.
(flRoth.
70 PostrABC Poll: Bush Addresses Nation; War on Terrorism, cooducted Thursday, September 20,2001.
71 Interview with Dan Balz, Gloria Borger. Tom Gjelten, and Ray Suarez by Gwen Ifill, p. 5.

I

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

130
been characterized by a lack of viewer interest in what the president has to say. But, in
times of crisis, the people have proven

(0

be very interested.

Furthermore, 95 percent of the people who watched the speech approved of what
Bush had to say.72 And, most importantly, 80 percent of those who watched Bush's
September 20 th address stated that it made them feel more confident in the country's
ability to handle the crisis. And Figure 4.2 indicates that even

fOUf

months after the

attack, President Bush's approval ratings remained in the high eighties. These results
suggest the success of the President's post-September 11 tb communication strategy; the
President has been able to comfort and to reassure the nation, as well as to demonstrate
his ability to lead a war on terrorism.

Figure 4.2 goes here

The communication strategy must evolve once again
Bush came into office with the same objective that Clinton and other predecessors
had when they entered the presidency: to keep popularity ratings high by reaching out the
public. In order to gain approval from a large voting bloc, Bush invited the Mexican
president to the fiTSt state dinner at the White House. A proposal to help grandparents
e-mai[ their grandchildren and a proposal to encourage the media to report positive news
were placed on the fall agenda. When the terrorists fIrst attacked, Bush was reading to a
group of elementary school children in Florida, the famous "swing state."
With Bush's approval ratings as high as they are, there is now no need for his
communication staff to be preoccupied with improving Bush's standing in the eyes of
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Figure 4.2: President Bush's Job Ratings from February 21,2001 to January 27,
2002
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Americans. 73 Dan Ham's states that no president wants to be in wartime, but that in terms
of message control, these are great days for the President. 74 Therefore, it has been
necessary to re-define the focus of Bush's communication strategy. As discussed earlier,
their ftrst task was to develop a way for Bush to comfort and to reassure Americans after
the attack on the nation. But now Bush's commtmication strategists such as Karl Rove,
Karen Hughes, and Ari Fleischer have a different task: to maintain the appeal of a
popular president.

Conclusion
The modem age has confronted presidents with new communication challenges.
The new communication environment is one of 24-hour all news channels, live
broadcasting from virtually anywhere, and an increasingly fragmented television viewing
audience. Furthennore, the editorializing ofthe press continues to tum the television
medium into a potential enemy of the modem president. Instead of working with the
media as presidents have done in the past, presidents are now experimenting with new
technology in order to bypass the press corps and communicate directly with the
American people.
Yet the events of September 11 th prove how powerful a communication tool the
television continues to be. Although modem times have shown a decrease in audience
share during a presidential address, in times of crisis Americans go to their televisions in
order to be reassured by their leader. Without the power of television, Americans would
have been lost after the tragic events. What have we learned from our half century of

?l
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Interview with Dan Balz, Gloria Borger, Tom Gjelten. and Ray Suarez by Gwen Iflli. p. 3.
Lizza, p. 14.

132
presidents on television? Has television improved or diminished the quality of
presidential performance in American government? The [mal chapter will seek to answer
these remaining questions and to determine the future of presidential commWlication with
the American people.

'~Interview with Dan Hanis. conducted by the author. March 8. 2002.
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Chapter 5
What Now?
The future ofpresidential communicaJion

Much can be learned from the successes and the failures of presidential efforts to
communicate with the American public over lbe past half century. The technological
advances offering hundreds of options to American television viewers have created a new
era of presidential communication. It is now necessary to look back and evaluate what
worked well and what did not work well for past presidents and to base our assessment
of effective, new communication strategies upon these lessons of the past.
But, it is also necessary to include innovative thinking in today's modern strategy.
President Clinton's experimentation with town hall meetings and the Internet, for
example, is a sign that inventive planning is now necessary in order to communicate
effectively with the highly atomized American audience. Unprecedented communicat:ion
challenges inevitably lie ahead, and future presidents must be prepared to keep their
communication strategy in tune with the American audience. This chapter will predict
the character o~.television in the future, identify the challenges that will come along with
the new technology, and suggest the most effective communication strategies to confront
and overcome the hurdles that future presidents will face.

The future ofthe television medium
In order to identify the future challenges to presidential communication, one must

look ahead and envision how the television medium and the television audience will

134

change in the years to come. What is the next stage of television? The evaluation of the
evolution of television in Chapter 1 can serve as a guide to help us imagine the character
of television in the future. In the television industry, there is a pattern that new
technology is initially slow to catch on, but then a boom takes place in which the new
technology becomes commonplace in every American home. This pattern is seen with
the initial commercialization oftelcvision, color technology, videocassette recording, and
cable television.
This precedent suggests that the new technology of digital cable can be predicted
to explode in the upcoming years. Today, only a small percentage of American homes are
subscribers to digital cable, but 10 to 20 years in the future, the majority of American
homes will most likely subscribe. Thus the near future of television can be envisioned as
the majority of Americans having access to over five hundred different channels. And, in
ten years, experts are predicting that digital technology will have the potential to send
1000 to 2000 channel options to American homes.! Media consultant Tom Giarrosso
believes that with this abundance of channel options, viewers will be able to watch several
channels at the same time and will simply adjust the audio to the channel that they would
like to hear at that one second. Multiple channels will be viewed simuJtaneously, and it
wiU most likely be wireless transmission 'that win bring these options into the horne. 2
This pattern ofne\\iitechnologies sta.rting off slowly in the consumer arena and
then exploding in popularity is also p!laymg out right now with the emergence of the

1

Kim !Love, Omar Shaikh, and Ion W.ard. 'The Future ofl'elevision"
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Tom Giarrosso, media consultant, phone interview conducted April 13, 2002.
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digital versatile disc (DVD). Before long) DVD players will replace videocassette
recorders (VCRs). Reuters reports that "sales of video cassette recorders (VCRs) fell
about 35 percent in 2001, while sale of digital versatile disc (DVD) players rose almost 50
percent." Furthermore, in the past year, VCR sales fell from 23.1 million units to 14.9
units, while DVD player sales rose from 8.5 million units to 12.7 million units.)

Reuters also reports that the Consumer Electronics Association predicts that 14.9
million DVD players will be sold in the next year. 4 Yet according to Consumer
Electronics Association analyst Sean Wargo, a complete conversion from VCRs to DVD
players will not take place until the price ofDVD players decreases. Wargo states that
the average VCR sold for $50 in 2001, while the average DVD player sold for $193.
Wargo believed that the 95 percent market penetration of VCRs will remain "for some
time to come."
Giarrosso's predictions of DVD player market penetration echo those of Wargo.
Giarrosso states that DVD players wjJl become common in homes as soon as the price
becomes more affordable, which he predicts could be in the next year or so. Once the
conversion from VCR to DVD players takes place, Giarrosso foresees great things. He
states that it will be possible to transfer old VHS movies onto DVDs and send them to
friends and family via the Internet. Giarrosso predicts that we will eventually be getting
aU of our television through this method. 5 Americans will become indifferent to network

) Reuters. "Repon: VCR Sales Fall, DVDs Surge in :lOO," Thursday, January 17.2002.
hn:p:/idailynews.yahoo.com/htx/nni/200201.17/tcltecb_televisioo_digital_dc_2.hnnl.
• Ibid.
S Tom Giarrosso, phone interview conducted January 3, 2002.
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progranuning; they will have the ability to watch pre-recorded programs whenever they
wish.
The new high defInition television, known as HDTV, will also change the
television medium in signifIcant waYS.6 The i.nspiration for HDTV was the introduction
of wide screen movies. Producers wanted all viewers. even those seated in the back rows,
to feel as if they were seated in the front row of the theater; they wanted all audience
members to feel as though they were amidst the action. To achieve this goal, Sony and
NHK developed a high-defmition system called the NHK Hi-vision in the late 19705.
This system offered audience members a picture quality comparable to the quality of a
photograph taken with 35mm film. HDTV made such an impact in the film industry that
it was soon expanded to commercial broadcasting, and now it is just starting out in the
consumer market. 7
HDTV offers consumers a much better picture than today's traditional, analog
televisions. The HDTV set is distinguished by its high image definition and by its "wide
screen." An analog television has a width to height ratio of 4:3, whereas the HDTV set
has a width to height ratio of 16:9. The picture ofan HDTV set is made up by more
horizontal and vertical lines than an analog television, thus improving the defInition. 8 The
number oflines is actually increased by 100 percent when upgrading from an analog
television to an HDTV. 9 Furthermore, because of the wide screen of the HDTV, the

~ Giarrusso, phone interview conducted January 3. 2002.

Professor Kelin J. Kuhn. "HDTV Television - An Introduction,"
www.ee.washington.edu/conseleclCElKuhnfhdtv/95x5.html.
S "FAQs" www.hdtvgalaxy.com.
9
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picture will be more comparable to a movie theater screen and will not display the
"cropped" version of a program as do analog televisions. lo
How far away is complete market penetration? When will the HDTV set replace
the estimated 750 million television sets worldwide? As with the market penetration of
DVD players, it all depends on the price. HDTV sets are actually available now in most
major electronic stores. II Yet prices for HDTV sets range from Samsung's TSL2795HF
which sells for $979.00 to Sony's 42-B 1 which sells for $S,495.00Y As soon as these
prices drop to more affordable levels, HDTV sets will invade the market.
Yet this is not likely in the near future because there is not enough demand for the
new high definition television to cause prices to drop. Without the demand for the
HDN, no mass production has been necessary, thus the price for an individual set
remains high. 13 Philips continues to produce almost 75,000 televisions per week, proving

that the demand for the traditional analog television is still strong. 14 Yet when more and
more consumers catch on to the new HDTV set, the television medium will undergo even
more changes.
According to Giarrosso, HDTV will offer much more than simply an improved
picture. The high definition television will also allow the viewer to pick and choose what
he or she would like to watch, thus weakening even further the hold of the network
stations. All programming will be based on the individual demands of the viewer. The

10
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new television can store programs for the viewer and play them whenever the viewer
would like to watch. For example, when a person comes home from work, he or she will
have access to the program of ills or her choice. It will even be possible to send favorite
episodes to friends and family so that they can watch at a time that is convenient for
them. ls
UltimateTV is an example of one of the many companies experimenting with this
personalized programming. The UltimateTV service developed by Microsoft uses a
Digital Video Recorder (DVR) and automatically stores and records television programs
onto a hard drive. The UltirnateTV Web site boasts, "Digital recording means no more
tapes

no more flipping back and forth between channels, and no more fighting over the
You can control live TV shows just like you were watching a tape or DVD.

remote

Pause, fast forward, reverse, use instant replay or slow motion, so you')] never miss a
thing.,,16 This service is only in the beginning stages right now, but when ~t becomes more
common in American homes, television viewing will transform into something radically
different
This new television technology is all tied into the idea of interactive television.
Instead of being a passive viewers, future generations wi 11 interact with the television.
Viewer/television interchange will take place in a variety of different fonnats. Video on
demand, or pay-pef-view as we know it today, will expand greatly in the future, offering
viewers a multitude of movies, concerts, and sporting events. It will also be possible to
enroll in distance learning courses thfOUgh the television, allowing the viewer to have an

)j

Giarrosso, phone interview conducted January 3, 2002.
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~nteractrve
ava~lable

link to, the professor. Because th.ere will be so many programming options

to future viewers, interactive television will offer personalized, computerized

television agents in order to help viewers fmd the programs that they would like to watch,
as well as to offer viewers complete indexes of television programs. "Civic networking"
wrll also be a part of the interactive television medium; the television will evolve into a
sort of "town hall." It will be possible to hold community events such as debates, town
meetulgs, school committee meetings, and book clubs via the television. 17 This "civic
networking" may encourage more citizens to get involved in their community because it

will be so much easier to contribute interactively from the comfort of one's own living
room. Interactive television could provide for a more politically aware and active
American electorate in the future.
Furthennore, when viewers choose the program that they would like to watch.
Little boxes will appear on the bottom of the screen that offer the viewer more infonnation
about what they are seeing on the program. If, for example, you are watching a Red Sox
game and would like to know individual biographies and statistics of a given player, it will
be possible to call this information up on the television just by using your remote control.
This feature will be especially useful to advertising agencies. The HDTV
technology will enable viewers to simply skip over commercials, thus rendering
commercials as we know them today useless; no one will watch them. Advertising
agencies are strategizing now as to what form commercials will take in the future. It is
predicted that advertisements win become integrated into the program. For example, if a

16

www.ultimaletv.com.
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viewer sees a lamp that he or she likes on an episode of "Friends," the viewer can have
the

opt~on

of clicking on that lamp and learning how much it costs and how to purchase

it. AI] advertisements will become 'internal; they will be woven into the content of the
program. I 8,
Commerce.TV is one the many companies that is experimenting with the idea of
integrated advertisements. The people of Commerce.TV hope to successfully "capitalize
on the universality of television and familiarity of the remote control" in order to offer
products to the consumer. Television viewers will see icons appear on the screen,
encom-aging them to learn more about the product and possibly purchase it, all with a

click of the remote controt The Commerce.TV web site declares, "Commerce.TV is so
easy, it's an impulse action-That looks cool. I think I'll buy it.' Without changing the
channel, lifting the phone or turning the computer on, the purchase is made." The website
also- claims that Americans will just need'to "press a few buttons on the remote, and
whatever they need will be right at their fingertips." 19 The idea of internal advertisements

witI remedy the problem of viewers skipping over commercials when that power becomes
available to them in the future. It is strikingly clear that the new technologies now
emerging-DVD players, digital television, HDTV, and interactive television-will bring
about great changes in the television medium as we know it today.

Love. Shaika,and Ward.
Giarrosso,
~
r...hone interview conducted January 3.2002.
.
www.commerce-tv.com .
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Consequences ofdigital cable and television by demand

The increased popularity of digital cable will further fragment the viewing
audience, diminishing the ability of a president to reach large groups of Americans through
television. Recent presidents have struggled with the fragmentation of the television
viewing audience; with each new administration, television has become a less and less
direct venue to a captive American audience. An explosion in the number of subscribers
to digital cable will cause this challenge to intensify in the future years. With the audience
dispersed over 1000 to 2000 different channels, appearances on network television will
reach an even smaller audience than recent presidents have struggled to attract.
An increase in the number of digital cable subscribers will not only bring about a

further fragmentation of the audience, but will also act as a deterrent to watching a
presidential appearance. Recent experience suggests that the more control the audience
has over the programming that they consume, the less they want to watch a

presidentia~

appearance. Today Americans have a significant amount of control over what they
consume on the television, and viewers are bypassing presidential television appearances

in favor of otheF programming options. An explosion of digital cable will give the
American television audience more control than ever before. Future presidents must fmd
ever more sophisticated communication strategies in order to stay in touch with the
decentralized audience. They must discover a way to communicate with Americans who
are not as willing to listen to the president as they were in the past. They no longer have
the captive audience that the age of network-dominated television provided.
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And, when the new television-by-demand technology is available to Americans,
the only way that the president will be able to reach the public is if the individual viewers
choose to watch a presidential address. With the new technology, aU programming is by
demand, so it would be up to the viewer to call up and watch a presidential message,
which would be highly unlikely. These new technological advances that are predicted to
emerge in the future will require that presidential conununication strategies undergo major
changes.

Determining the future ofpresidential exposure

Another future difficulty facing modern presidents is to determine how much
exposure will be necessary or desirable. Some scholars such as Theodore Lowi, a Cornell
University professor of government, believe that there has been an over-exposure of the
president in recent years. Since the president began to utilize television as a method of
communication with the American people, his aura has been augmented; Americans today
feel more of a connection with the President. Lowi asserts that a "personal presidency"
has developed in the United States, "an office of tremendous personal power drawn from
the people... " He states, "This is a new social contract in return for delivery on
promises, American citizens identify directly with the presidency .... ,,20
But Lowi believes that over-exposure has caused unrealistically high expectations
to be placed upon the office of the presidency. "As visi bility goes up so do expectations
.and vulnerability," he states. "Thefe's more of a chance to make really big mistakes. It's a
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treadmill to oblivion. It's why modern history is filled with so many failed
presidencies. ,,2 I Today the president is. more of <Ii celebrity than ever before. But this
raises the bar of expectations and invites unfavorable, as well as favorable, attention to the
president-as it does to all celebrities.
Jeffrey Tulis, professor of government at the University of Texas at Austin, also
believes that the relationship between television and the President must be re-examined
and re-cast. Tulis argues that the present "teledemocracy" bas had a detrimental effect

upon the' office of the presidency. Tulis believes that it is necessary for the president to
al'low himself sorne distance from the American public in order to consider passionate
ideas in a realistic manner. 22 In his book The Rhetorical PreSidency, Tulis argues that the
media "reinforces the tendencies of the rhetorical presidency to undennine the possibility
of deliberation. lin According to Tulis~ presidential television coverage is invading the
President's personal contemplation of important maners.

Plans for the future
The commun.ication strategies of future presidents will have to be profoundly
different from the strategies that we have seen in the past and are encountering today.

But different in what ways? How should future presidents tackle the challenges that lie
ahead? Let US imagine.

Theodore J. Lowi. The Personal Preside", ( Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), p. 140.
Steven Stark, "The First Postmodem Presidency," in The Allantic Monthly, April 1993.
22 Ibid.
21 Jeffery K. Tulis. The Rhetorical Presidency (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987),
p. 1,88.
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The following is a memo from me to lhe president elected in 2020, advising her on
the most effective ways to communicate with the American people.

January 2020

To: Ms. President
From: leona Wasson
Re: Political communication strategy

POLITICAL COMMUNICATION STRATEGY
]0

order fOF you to communicate effectively it will be absolutely necessary for

your presrdential communication strategy to counteract the highly fragmented American
viewing audience and to harness the power of today's television technology. Here is my
assessment of how you can best accomplish that goal.

I. POSSIBLE STRATEGIES TO OVERCOME AUDIENCE FRAGMENTATION
In the past, presidents have focused a significant part of their communication
strategy on live prime time appearances. These prime time appearances would air on all
three networks and be a sure way to reach millions of Americans. Yet the diversification
of the audience has made this tool ineffective. The audience is no longer concentrated
among three network channels, but decentralized among 2000 available cable channels.
And this

decentra~izatiolil has

intensified in recent years, especially since all television

programming is now based upon demand.

~-

-

-----

-

-----,
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In order to overcome these obstacles, you must consider decentralizing your
conununication approaches as well. Pursuing a variety of different venues that are
targeted to reach smaller audiences will enable you to reach more Americans more
effectively. Prime time network appearances could be replaced by appearances on
morning shows, talk. radio, C-SPAN, MTV, and local television stations. 24
This type of strategy wo-old make polling and audience research an absolute
necessity for your administration. Information regarding the types of audiences that
different programs draw must be readily available to you. Your target will no longer be
large audiences, as was once the case with the dominance of network television and their
captive audience. Instead, the group or groups of individuals to whom your message is
directed must be identified and then you can make appearances on the types of programs
and channels that attract that certain group. For example, if you are seeking to reach out
to females in order to gain support for a certain bill, appearing on a morning show, a
venue that typically attracts a large female audience, could be a consideration. There
should be continuous polling of audience members for each major program. You should
have a target show for each group of people that you would like to address. Reaching out
to a large audience is now impossible, but with reliable, up-to-date polling, it will be
possible for you to reach out to Amer,icans in an individualized way.
This strategy could pl10ve to be an extremely effective way to target younger
Americans as welL A poU conducted in 20001 revealed that 50 percent of voters under
thirty years of age stated that their vote was itIUluenced by information they acquired by

14

Steven Starlc "The First Postmodem Presidency." in The Atlantic Momhly, April J 993.
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watching Jay Leno, David Lettennan, Saturday Night Live, Politically Incorrect, and
MTV. By making appearances on shows such as these, you will be able to reach a large
part of the electorate. You will be tapping into a potentially huge source of support. 25
Yet it is important to keep in mind the effects informal appearances will have on
the prestige and dignity of the presidency. Is it really appropriate to have a presidential
appearance followed by a music video? What does that say about the true importance of
your message? I believe that the public's response to infonnal appearances should be
closely monitored, but that these appearances will have a positive effect on your
-communication effort. Being able to come across as a "regular person" with a sense of
humor who is genuinely interested in reaching out to young Americans can only increase
your popularity.
Media analyst Stephen Hess believes that a mixture of different venues is a very
effective strategy and states, "The more the better.,,26 Furthermore, Ron Nessen believes
that an appearance on any show can be successful as long as the president presents
herself as a "good sport" and can engage in "self-deprecating humor."n
In general, adhering to programs with a sense of formality about them, such as
local news programs, morning shows, or CNN, will be one effective way to reach a
targeted group of Americans. And appearances on more informal programs will allow
you to connect effectively with the young generation of voters.

Interview with Ron Nessen, March II, 2002.
Interview with Stephen Hess, March 4, 2002.
17 Interview with Ron Nessen, March II, 2002.
25

26
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H. A MODERN "DIRECT RELATIONSI-{[P" STRATEGY

Examining and adding to past presidential strategies that were not adopted is a
possible way to develop a new strategy that would assist you in combating the increased
fragmentation of the American audience. Doug Ross and David Osborne, part-time
advisers to President Clinton, created a presidential communication strategy for Clinton
that was not fully adopted by the administration. Yet a second look at this strategy
reveals that it could work well if it were modernized and further developed. Ross and
Osborne proposed a plan based on the idea of a "direct relationship" between the
president and the public. Their strategy, created in 1992, entailed communicating with
Americans through video and audiocassettes, direct mailings, and also providing the public
with 800 numbers that they could access in order to gain a greater understanding of a

certain issue.
Ross based this strategy on the ideas of popular business theorists such as Max
DePree, author of Leadership Jam and Leadership as an Art, and management expert
Tom Peters. Ross believes that the federal government can be compared to large
companies because both are having difficulty reacting to public demands through
traditional centralized strategies. An "era of decentralization)' has emerged and will
remain into the future. Just as companies are reaching out to consumer demands on a
more indivldualized basis, so too should the president seek to communicate in a more
decentralized way as opposed to sweeping) prime time communication efforts. 28

2S

Ibid.
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Although not fully adopted by the Cli.nton administration, I believe that Ross and
Osborne's plan shows promise for your communication strategy. Maintaining Ross and
Osborne's underlying theme of.a "direct relationship," while modernizing certain aspects
of the strategy could be an effective way to combat the challenges of audience
fragmentation and viewer reluctance to watch presidential appearances. Ross and
Osborne mentioned video and audiocassettes, direct mailings, and 800 numbers as
possible communication avenues. In their strategy, the vast power of the Internet was
overlooked.
You should seek to communicate through the venues mentioned by Ross and
Osborne, but also through the Internet. Clinton experimented with the power of the
Internet during his adrnin.istration by creating the White House Web site and by making
himself and vice-president AI Gore accessible to Americans through e-mail. Why not go
even further in the future? Give Americans the opportunity to sign up for emails on
,issues that are ofparticuJar concern to them. Develop web sites dedicated to certain
events that your communication team wishes to highlight or to certain issues for which
~fOur administration

is looking to build support. This way you will be communicating

with people who are interested in what you have to say. Today' s viewers are likely to
tum the channel when they see the President on television. This happens out of a sense
of disinterest and political unawareness. But there are bound to be issues of particular
concern to every citizen, and if those issues can be highlighted, those citizens who were
once disinterested may become more politically active and aware.
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As the Clinton administration realized, the Internet is also a way to circumvent
the intermediation of the press. By posting presidential speeches on the Internet, the
American people have access to the entire speech. Your communication team should
adopt this method as well. All of the information that you would like to convey to the
public should be posted on different presidential websites in order to ensure that the
public has access to un-manipulaited, un-editorialized material.
Future presidents should also build upon the Clinton administration's idea of
making the president and the vice president accessible to the America people through e

mait Setting up e~mail systems that would allow the public to e-mail you and the vice
president about their concerns, and establishing an effectiv,e way to respond to these e
mails would foster healthy communication relationship between you and your
constituency.
Furthermore, e-mails would also be beneficial to your ad.mini!stration.as ,an
instantaneous indicator of public opinion. Your administration will no longer have to wairt
for polls to be conducted; you will have an idea of the public's opinion as soon as the e
mails are read. The Internet should be viewed as a key communication tool. It is true that
the American audience has become extremely fragmented; yet it is important to remember
that the world has also become extremely interconnected through the Internet at the same
time. For this reason, the Internet must serve as an important piece of your
corrununication strategy.
lIDTV and! the existence of interactive television also offer features that you can
take fun advan.tage of in your effort to form a "direct relationship." Internalizing
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commercials, the strategy that the advertising industry took when traditiona~ commercials
became useless, is a strategy that can be modified to work effectively for you as well.
Interactive television is another way in which your message can be individualized. As we
all know, it is now possible to call up more information about certain products that we
see on television programs. For example, it is very easy for viewers to use their remote
controls to purchase a lamp on "Friends" or to purchase anything they desire through
CommerceTV.
Would it not be just as easy for viewers to use th.eir remotes to gain more
information about a certain political issue that is being discussed on a program?' The
viewer could simply click on a box and then have access to more information. This «click
of a box" could link. the interested viewer to presidential websites and give the viewer a
list of e-mails addresses to which the viewer may write in order to express his or her
opinions about the issue. The viewer could also be given the option to participate in
opinion polling. These polls would serve a two-fold purpose: Americans would be given
another outlet in which to express their opinions, and you would have a constant gauge of
the sentiment of the American electorate. Although the television reclmology of 2020 has
rendered the past sweeping conununication strategies ineffective, the features of modern
television can be used to your advantage.
Ross and Osborne were onlo something with their idea of a "direct relationship"
bet\veen the president and the American people. Building upon and modernizing their
ideas could bring much success to your administration. It is clear that the sweeping

lSI

communication strategies of past administrations are outdated. The fragmentation of the
audience demands a fragmentation of your communication strategy.

III. STRATEGIES TO DEAL WITH THE QUESTION OF OVER-EXPOSURE
Several decades ago, Theodore Lowi was critical of the relationship that presidents
had fonned with television over the years. He claimed that the president had been overly
visible and that the presidency had evolved into a "personal presidency." Lowi pointed to
high visibility as the source of the unrealistic expectations placed upon the president.
Back in 1993, Lowi believed that President Clinton should limit his relationship with
television and the media in an effort to reduce the expectations placed upon him. [n
effect, Lowi was suggesting that the Clinton administration work to diminish the grandeur
of the role of the president. 29 It is clear that Lowi's opinions were not shared by the
Clinton communication team. Yet inflated expectations continue to exist today. Lowi's
suggestion to avoid a "personal presidency" could have relevance in your communication
strategy.
But is diminishing your relationship with television the correct way to approach
communication with Americans? Do you think that you should seek to weaken your
relationship with television? Horace W. Busby, a fonner aide to President Lyndon
Johnson, believes that a diminished role of the president is inevitable. Busby states, "The
president will become more of an irrelevancy. The old image of the powerful President
wasn't due only to the Cold War. It was the product of a more primitive era. People
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today have far more education and exposure to the outside world. They don't need to
attach that importance and responsibility to the office anymore.,,30 Author Steven Stark
points out that Busby's hypothesis rings true not only in tenus of the president, but also
in terms of major groups and authority figures. He writes) "Indeed, in the new age of
fragmentation, when it's tougher to assemble a mass following, virtually all colossal
entities and authority figures of the old age have seen their power recede.,,3l
Lowi may call for a reduction in the visibility of the president and Busby may
believe that the role of the presidency will naturally diminish; yet it cannot be denied that
your role as president is central to our unity and success as a nation. To reduce visibility
and to allow for the role of the president to become irrelevant would leave Americans
without a strong leader and without a sense of political unity. Furthennore, you rely
upon communication with constituents to build popularity and upon popularity to
generate support for policy initiatives. To suggest that you remain aloof would lead to a
feeling of detachment among the American electorate.
Furthermore, the events of September 11, 200 I underscore the relevance of a
national leader in the modern era. Twenty years ago, Americans looked to President Bush
for reassurance and hope. The period after September 11 mdemonstrated to us that during
times of crisis, the American people need a person whom they can depend upon for
security and leadership. Therefore, I believe that less communication with the American

)(J
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people is not the answer for your strategy of political communication. Different forms of
communication, however, are the answer.

It is true that many scholars see a diminished role for the president in the future.
Yet maybe the key to effective communication isjust the opposite. Today's society is
infatuated with Hollywood; there is a huge craving among the public for infonnation
about the lives of television and movie stars. To focus more attention on making yourself
a "celebrity" in the eyes of Americans could bring back the people's interest in what their
president has to say. This will be done not by decreasing your visibility, but by
increasing it. A fine I ine must be drawn in order to disassociate yourself from the petty,
superficial world of Hollywood and to create a dignified, trustworthy celebrity. If this
line can be effectively determined and adhered to, you will see much success.
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